Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

275. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, December 30, 1965, 8:48 p.m.

1853. 1. We are again keeping you up to date on diplomatic developments for your own information and for use with GVN as you see fit.

2. Harriman had most useful talks in Warsaw. Since major operating result is message that Poles may now convey to Hanoi, we are repeating to you Warsaw’s 1073.² Although not in exact form stated by Harriman we believe this represents fair summary of position as it might be conveyed to Hanoi. Reference to “14-point statement” is to memorandum (actually composed by Secretary) which you will receive through circular to all posts sent tonight.³ We suspect Poles may be most active Eastern European at least until Shelepin reaches Hanoi.

3. We continue to have only public information on Shelepin visit to Hanoi,⁴ but fact that announcement came only very shortly after we informed Dobrynin that we were deferring resumption of bombing indicates that visit arranged on some other basis. Our best guess is that it was political in character (Shelepin being Party man) and perhaps related to large volume of reports suggesting plans for early conference of Soviet-oriented nations, in which Vietnam would be major topic. We have reports Shelepin may arrive Hanoi over weekend, and his presence and possible statements there may of course become major factor in situation even though trip arranged on other grounds.

4. Harriman is now in Belgrade and we believe will go to New Delhi thereafter, rounding out ICC consultations represented by Harriman in Warsaw and McGeorge Bundy in Ottawa. (Latter released today.) FYI: Harriman may then go to Karachi, Teheran, and Cairo, in some order, plans not yet final. End FYI. We do not anticipate significant substantive results from talks with Tito or Shastri.

5. Goldberg had useful, although general, talk with Pope, who among other things expressed gratification at message received from GVN. You might convey this to Do and indicate it was distinct plus in worldwide terms. Goldberg now goes to Paris and will see De Gaulle tomorrow. We will naturally take no initiatives and will not encourage any from French side.

6. Mann going to Mexico for consultation there on general basis, as part of effort to cement our Latin relations on Vietnam and generally. This will probably be announced sometime tomorrow.

7. All of above adds up to continuing effort to demonstrate diplomatic activity and to open all avenues for constructive Hanoi response. So far there has been no such response. We have of course noted first indirect Hanoi reference to situation but have not completed our analysis. At first glance, Hanoi is at least taking somewhat different rhetorical line, even though it concludes with familiar statements about accepting four points and taking other actions.⁵ Would be much interested in your analysis.

8. One sidelight of Harriman talk with Rapacki was that latter brought up “second-hand” report that Chauvel may propose handling NLF representation issue on basis co-chairmen convening conference, with each then free to invite any party they choose. Would appreciate your comment on this suggestion. Rapacki conversations generally, as well as Hungarians over weekend, have indicated NLF representation issue may well become central focus of some Communist counter-gambit. We have all along taken line that any position NLF might be granted should be matched by equivalent status for other interested groups in South Vietnam such as Buddhists, Catholics, sects, etc. Chauvel proposal might lend itself to such handling, although it would remain vital to affirm position of GVN as sole legitimate government of SVN.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Pinta. Drafted by William Bundy. Repeated to the White House.
2. Document 274.
3. See footnote 4, Document 269.
4. Assessments of the announced visit to Hanoi of A.N. Shelepin are in telegram 2040 from Moscow, December 29, and Intelligence Note No. 651 from Hughes to Rusk, December 30. (Both in Department of State, EA/ACA Files: Lot 69 D 277, Communist Positions and Initiatives—Soviet) A CIA assessment by William Hyland, December 29, is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLII, Memos (B).
5. Reference is to a broadcast by the Voice of Vietnam on December 30, entitled “We Are Determined To Smash All Maneuvers of War Expansion and All Peace Tricks of the U.S. Aggressors.” Text in FBIS, North Vietnam, January 3, 1965. A Department of State telegram sent as 717 to Harriman in Belgrade and 2960 to Goldberg in Paris, December 30, provided INR interpretation of the North Vietnamese commentary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)