Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

181. Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 23, 1965.

POLICY CHOICES AND DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURES ON VIETNAM

Based on the Depuy briefing,² the draft pause scenario,³ and Lodge’s 1377,⁴ we confront major policy decisions in the next month or six weeks. This memorandum is a very rough attempt to frame the substance of the choices, and to identify some of the related problems we face.

I. Elements of the Problem

A. MACV (through Depuy) makes a strong case that we cannot keep up adequate pressure on the VC without additional deployments totalling about 115,000 men during the course of 1966, raising our total to 325,000 by the end of the year. While the Depuy presentation may be unduly pessimistic in assuming that VC morale will stay up and that they will be able to obtain adequate equipment and even reinforcements, it is also possible (though I think less so) that it errs in the other direction by not assuming a really major DRV effort to increase forces in the South. At the very least, Depuy seems realistic in stating that we shall probably have to make a major additional commitment to attain our basic objectives, and that even with a second phase we cannot say with anything like absolute assurance that we are going to get there. Somewhere along the line the VC will probably weaken, and this may be well short of filling in Depuy’s bar charts in blue and green. But we have to have the worst case constantly in mind, and the realistic median view would be that we do have to do a great deal more.

B. If both the American public and international opinion are to accept our doing a great deal more, even on the ground in the South without an expansion of bombing of the DRV, we have to worry about whether we have a convincing case that we have exhausted all avenues to negotiation. We are currently in a fairly easy position on this because of universal reading that the DRV’s September statements⁵ add up to a rejection of negotiations. For the moment, there is no favorable negotiating effort going on on any front, with the SYG effort being known privately to us (and we would suspect to other key countries) to have elicited no response from Hanoi. At the same time, the strength of our position of willingness to negotiate is being slightly eroded by the interpretation put out by Senator Mansfield and others and the apparent diplomatic reading in Washington that we have hardened and are really set to fight the thing through to the end, even including the erroneous exaggerated interpretation that we intend a total military victory over the VC for its own sake, as opposed to whatever degree of pressure will induce the VC and Hanoi to lay off and turn to a political line, which is what we still really intend. The noises out of Saigon, both from the GVN and from our Embassy’s dealings with the press, have also tended to confuse matters and to confound the perhaps legitimate point that the GVN needs time to get its house in order with the illegitimate conclusion that they and we could not live with negotiations and that we really are both opposed to it whatever we say in public. In sum, our posture cannot be considered firm and wholly tenable if we look ahead 3-6 months without further moves.

C. On the other hand, any demonstrable move toward a peaceful solution, such as a pause in the next three months, raises the most serious questions of creating misunderstanding in Hanoi and/or interrupting the slow effort we are making to build some real political structure in Saigon. Lodge’s 1377 makes it perfectly clear how he would react initially to a pause, and one cannot dismiss his reading of the internal political situation as simply due to his own personal rather superficial view of things. At the very best, we have a major tactical job to do to bring Lodge and the GVN aboard if we are to make a major move such as a pause.

D. The Depuy briefing was somewhat reassuring as to the degree of US casualties we may expect (N.B. it would help to see a projection of this in terms of casualties per committed battalion per month accepting Depuy’s judgment that the present rate can be maintained). Nonetheless, we are faced with the pressures from various quarters, symbolized by General LeMay and the Ford/Adair line, to hit the North substantially harder. The degree to which this will rise during the next 3-6 months will depend heavily on actual casualty experience and also on the proportion of apparent successes to apparent reverses (any really adverse engagement could really set the pressures off).

E. The Soviets have been reserved in their private comment, but there may well be substance to the report from Matseev, the Isvestia correspondent, to Robert Kleiman to the effect that the Soviets would like to see a pause of at least three weeks to get diplomatic pressures started that might bring Hanoi onto a negotiating track.⁶ In other words, the vital Soviet factor argues strongly for a pause. Equally, it almost certainly argues against any real step-up in the bombing, and was a major factor in the Thompson Group conclusion that this was not wise, for this reason as well as because it would probably not have a favorable effect on Hanoi in the absence of greater progress than we have yet achieved in the South.⁷

II. Broad Policy Choices

A. A serious pause for a month, followed—if it fails—by decisions on Phase II deployment and possibly by some step-up in the bombing of the North. On the objective international factors, this has a great deal to commend it. It would clear the decks in a convincing fashion and probably tend to reduce the dangers of escalation even after we had resumed, at least as to the Soviets.

On the other hand, as noted above, bringing the GVN (and Lodge) aboard would be terribly difficult just in itself, and we must have serious doubts whether it would have an adverse effect on GVN solidity. Any major falling out between the GVN and the US, or any overturn in the GVN political structure, could at this stage set us back enormously, if not fatally.

Another contrary argument is that it might at least confuse our message to Hanoi and justify their tendency to think that, despite all our actions, we are really looking for an easy way out. We could offset this to some degree by the kind of message we get through to them and by our continued actions in the South, but there would still be some chance that the hard-liners in Hanoi would read it the other way notwithstanding. In other words, it could conceivably be a step away from getting Hanoi to seeking a peaceful solution.

Still a third element would be the US domestic reaction. There would be a lot of rumbling below decks and among the harder-action school of critics. This might be kept under control during the pause, but it could also mean that the pressures would be enormous thereafter to “really clobber” the DRV.

B. Finish up Phase I deployments and proceed to Phase II decisions and actions without any major action such as a pause, or any appreciable change in the bombing pattern against the DRV.

In terms of effect on Hanoi and Saigon, this might quite well be the best course. It would indicate steadiness and firmness, as well as patience, and it can be strongly argued that this will bring Hanoi to a peaceful solution more surely and perhaps even sooner than any other course.

The major adverse argument is that the President would have to go through another round of major decision-making in which our soft-line critics, both here and abroad, would raise a great deal of noise that we were not leaving the door sufficiently open to negotiation and that we were really moving inexorably to a wider war. It is hard to say just how serious these pressures would be, but at the very least we should give thought to some less dramatic alternative to a pause—such as another third country mediation effort—that would somewhat dampen these pressures without the adverse effects we might see in a pause in terms of Hanoi and Saigon reaction. It is far from easy to see just what such a “pause alternative” might be, and one cannot identify off-hand any effective or persuasive mediator who would be willing to act in the absence of a pause.

C. Complete Phase I deployments and stop at that point for perhaps three months before going further, while continuing the present bombing pace against the North.

This course, too, can be argued persuasively. It will be January before the weight of our full Phase I effort really comes into play, and, despite the gaps identified in the Depuy analysis (notably the total absence of effort in the IV Corps), we might see at least a significant adverse morale trend in the VC that would indicate we were getting somewhere.

Moreover, it may be useful to give ourselves time to digest the impact of 200,000 men in terms of their effect on the Vietnamese psychology and economy. This is a factor that some reports, notably a recent cable from Saigon on inflationary and labor/diversion problems,⁸ suggest may be becoming very serious, even to the point of being a real limiting factor on our basic effectiveness in appealing to the people.

Thirdly, the GVN would have additional time, hopefully without serious frictions with us, to get on with its part of the job and to build up a GVN contribution that would not be dwarfed by the US role, a present tendency sharply highlighted by Depuy’s presentation.

On the drawback side, deferring additional US deployments—particularly in the face of military recommendations that would almost certainly become known—raises extremely grave problems in our domestic situation. This is not solely a question of the war dragging on—which it can be argued it would be likely to do even with Phase II deployments—but rather, a question of our confronting the 1966 Congressional elections without having clearly done all that our military thought was wise just on the ground alone (leaving aside the problem of extended bombing of the DRV). It would be still more serious, of course, if the rate of progress slowed down, as is certainly a significant possibility.

Variance of B and C in terms of bombing in the North and Negotiating Actions.

As noted above, Course B needs the best possible “pause alternative.” Course C, just by the passage of time, has somewhat the same problem but far less acutely.

Both courses, in addition, raise questions on the policy of bombing the North. The Soviet and international argument against expanding our bombing will remain very cogent. But we have always agreed that they might be outweighed by the arguments in favor of a final “coup de grace” when Hanoi and the VC really find the going in the South extremely difficult. On balance, the objective case would seem to favor not expanding the bombing except as a “coup de grace” or conceivably on a one-shot reprisal basis for some really serious VC outrage for which we could find some parallel target. In one respect, the continuation and growth of US domestic pressures is an asset to us, in that they will keep alive Hanoi’s fears that “hawk” views would ultimately prevail in the USG.

III. Knowledge Gaps and Variables

There are a number of factors that could vary the situation, which we should follow closely, and on some of which we simply are not adequately informed. These include:

A. What is really happening with respect to DRV infiltration. We probably need to stress the bombings of Laos very heavily, and may wish to divert some part of our DRV air effort to this end. We also need a much better intelligence picture than now exists of how much equipment and reinforcement is really coming down, and how.

If we become convinced that individual targets such as Phu Quoc Island are really heavily contributing to infiltration, might we not conduct a specific amphibious operation against these?

B. We need to follow extremely closely what the ChiComs and Soviets are doing in the DRV. This may well increase, and could suggest at any point that we were nearing some kind of flash signal.

C. South Vietnamese popular reactions to the process will have to continue to be followed extremely closely. We are reasonably satisfied with our current reading that we have not triggered significant adverse reactions either by our presence or by our military tactics, including air attacks on villages. But we surely need to have an acute watch on this and perhaps—as MACV is looking into—tighter control on the use of air.

D. The extent of civilian damage resulting from our DRV attacks also needs a great deal of watching and possibly a review of what we are doing. The recent compilation of photographs of Nam Dinh casts grave doubt on any claim that we can hit urban areas in any surgical fashion. Another cause for concern is the number of unspecified “buildings” being hit by our armed recce. Apart from humanitarian considerations, the degree of civilian damage in the North probably tends to stiffen DRV toughness, and may increasingly give the DRV a propaganda weapon against us, which it now seems they are making a considerable effort to mount.

E. In addition to the civilian damage element, our DRV bombing pattern is being looked at from the standpoint of simple effectiveness. It is disturbing to get reports that bridges have been re-built in the southern areas of the DRV and then not struck again. Are we focussing enough, as a primary and irreducible objective, on keeping key LOC out of action?

F. Even the possibility of a pause, or a “pause alternative,” means that we must look hard again at our over-all negotiating position. Ambassador Unger’s special group has done some further work on this, but our thoughts are not nearly as clear as they should be, nor—perhaps above all—have they thoroughly been shared with Saigon, as Lodge’s 1377 highlights. It may be that Alexis Johnson would be the man to pull this together into a much more definitive script than we now have. I do not myself see any major change or “give” that we should now display. This, too, needs a hard look in addition to the question of tactical arguments and handling.

IV. Decision-Making Procedures

The pause scenario has suggested that the best time for such action, if taken, might be late November. This means bringing Ambassador Lodge aboard in the middle of November, and it may well be that this could only be done at Presidential level. Another factor is the absence of Secretary Rusk from November 13 till November 25, roughly. How and where are we to consult with Lodge, and how are we to get through to him a somewhat different outlook on the whole subject, even if we should eventually decide not to do the pause itself? Washington seems indicated, but we must decide very soon.

Obviously, a major factor is the degree of visibility of our decision-making. With the President in Texas, major and prolonged gatherings are much more difficult to conceal.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Top Secret. According to a note attached to another copy of this paper, William Bundy sent it “Strictly Eyes Only” to Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Thompson on October 26. (Department of State, Bundy Papers: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron)
2. On October 21,MACV J-3, General Deputy briefed Rusk, McNamara, the JCS, Taylor, and others on COMUSMACV’s Phase II program for deployment of U.S. forces to Vietnam. He stated that, with the exception of a few elite units, ARVN forces would be mainly employed in pacification activities behind a fighting screen of U.S. forces. The U.S. troops would carry the battle to the war zones and wherever VC main forces were found. The GVN favored the concept. (JCS telegram 4827 to CINCPAC, October 22; Department of Defense, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
3. Document 178.
4. Document 176.
5. See footnote 2, Document 152.
6. Thompson’s account of this meeting as related to him by Kleiman on October 22 is in Department of State, INR Files: Lot 81 D 343, Vietnam—October 1965.
7. See Document 164.
8. Not further identified.