Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

164. Paper by the Ambassador at Large (Thompson)¹

Washington, October 11, 1965.

“McNamara also received a copy, which indicated that he saw it on October 26. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Vietnam 381)

CONCLUSIONS²

The increased military power we are bringing to bear in South Viet-Nam must have made the Viet Cong realize that we are going to make a determined and serious effort to destroy their capability. As this power makes itself felt, they will probably decide in the near future to break up most of their large units and to move toward one or the other of two strategies: They may change their tactics in the direction of small acts of terror and sabotage; or less likely, they could adopt an even more passive strategy of apparently “fading into the woodwork.”

The purpose of the latter strategy would be to cause a cessation in United States pressures, north and south, until a more propitious moment. This would not be easy for the Viet Cong to accomplish; they would have problems of morale, organization, etc. But if it were attempted it would face us with a critical point of decision with regard to bombing of the north. Two sharply divergent theses could be argued. On the one hand it could be argued that a step-up in bombing of the north would be justified in this circumstance since we could not permit the VC to turn the pressure on and off at their convenience. Stepped up bombing would be designed to force the issue. On the other hand, it could be argued, probably more convincingly, that the bombing should be reduced, perhaps in proportion to the reduction in military activity in the south. This would assume that the pacification program could be pursued successfully and that the United States could persevere in its political and military commitments recognizing that to effectuate the pacification program will take a long period, perhaps years. Though we do not believe we are yet at the preceding point of decision, we do believe that it should be anticipated and the groundwork laid for reaching the necessary policy decisions when and if required.

It is unlikely, however, that our actions in the south have made them ready to switch from a military to a political strategy, and they are unlikely to do so for a matter of months at best. They will in all likelihood recede from “Stage 3” and pursue a strategy of active guerrilla hit-and-run strikes, terror and sabotage. They will continue to oppose negotiations except upon their own terms until such time as it becomes clear to them that we will stay the course and successfully, if gradually, push them back into the woodwork and begin a discernible trend toward pacification of most of the country. The more immediate question, therefore, is what our policy should be with regard to bombing the north in the interim, that is, during the period when the intensity of our own effort in the south is growing, when the VC are pursuing a “1963-4” or “Stage 2” strategy, and when the question whether the VC will recede to “Stage 1” is still unclear.

It is now obvious that we shall probably be faced with the prospect of a continuation of our present courses of action, including the bombing of North Viet-Nam, for many months more. The present rate of escalation of our bombing, however, is bringing us to a point where in a few months further escalation will be possible only by attacking sensitive targets which may pose, in acute form for the other side, the issue of greater Chinese and/or Soviet involvement. We are beginning to attack the last remaining geographic area apart from the area around Hanoi and Haiphong. We may be able to recognize the optimum time for exerting further pressure by increasing the level of our bombing but an increase in our bombing of the North at the present time may bring matters to a head too soon.

It does not appear to us necessary that there be a pronounced escalation in our bombing at the present time since our present activities, while not destroying the military and economic capacity of North Viet-Nam, are causing great strain as indicated in the letters quoted in Annex B.³ (As noted below, Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would interpret the permissible continuing level of bombing somewhat more narrowly than would General Taylor and Mr. McNaughton.) Moreover, the effects of our present attacks are to some extent cumulative and are bringing a steady increase of pressure on Hanoi. The impressive reports of the growing number of targets destroyed or damaged in the daily armed reconnaissance reports illustrate this. We therefore believe we should more or less level off at about the present rate of bombing in the North. For the present, we should not attack the most sensitive targets, large dams, Phuc Yen and the Hanoi/Haiphong area before January 1, 1966. Though we would not initially recommend hitting such targets as thermal power plants, as we begin to exhaust profitable targets, we might begin very gradually to nibble at some of the industrial targets.

The northeast quadrant presents a special problem. Mr. McNaughton would favor maintaining approximately the present level of attacks; i.e. about four or five missions every two weeks against major LOC targets, to assure destruction of the railroad. These missions should include specific armed recce to prevent daylight movement on the roads. General Taylor would prefer a slight increase from the present level. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy feel that the present level of activity might well tempt the North Viet-Namese to throw their MIGs into the equation and that this, aside from its intrinsic disadvantages, could lead to a succession of events broadening hostilities still further. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Bundy would favor a reduction to approximately one attack on the railroad every two weeks and no armed recce except in very special cases and limited to specific targets.

We also conclude that serious consideration should be given to employment of a pause. Though it would have to be carefully managed, its objective would be to provide an opportunity for the north to give concrete evidence of a willingness to come to terms, an evidence which it is difficult, in a political and psychological sense, for it to give while under the pressure of our bombing. We would have to exercise great care that a mere willingness to initiate negotiations would not in and of itself qualify for an indefinite moratorium on the bombing. We would have to convey our intent to reinstitute bombing if the North Viet-Namese refused to negotiate or if their willingness to negotiate is not accompanied by a manifest reduction of VC aggression in the south. If it is necessary to reinstitute bombing, we should be prepared to consider increasing the pressure, e.g. through striking industrial targets, to make clear to Hanoi our continuing, firm resolve.

In summation, we conclude that:

1. the present escalation in the bombing of the north is likely to become increasingly out of phase with the progress of our military operations in the south. It would thus run the risk of forcing the other side prematurely to face the issue of negotiations or greater Chinese and Soviet involvement.

2. we should therefore level off our bombing of the north (with some variance of views among us as to permissible levels in the northeast quadrant, see above) for the interim.

3. we may well be faced with the prospect of altered Viet Cong strategy in the south which will require a reevaluation of our policy on bombing of the north and that this problem should be anticipated and study of its implications begun at once and finally,

4. that a pause in the bombing should be considered, recognizing that it may be a prerequisite to establishing the political and psychological framework for initiating negotiations, but recognizing also that unless carefully managed it contains dangerous pitfalls.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XVI, Memos (A). Secret. Thompson sent this paper to Bundy under cover of a memorandum that reads: “The attached report was largely prepared in State and was reviewed by General Taylor, Mr. McNaughton, Mr. William Bundy, Mr. Unger and myself.
2. This is part VII of a nine-part study, of which only the conclusions were distributed to the White House and Secretary of Defense. The other parts were: I. Historical Background, undated; II. Aims and Interests of the Communist Countries Involved, October 8; III. Aims and Interests of the U.S., October 9; IV. Alternatives to be Considered, undated; V. Communist Reactions, undated; VI. Discussion (not found); VII (a). General Taylor’s Views 10/11/65; and Annexes, undated. (Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Thompson Study, 1965)
3. Not found.