Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 13, 1965, 1:30 p.m.

1269. Subject: Vietnamese attitudes.

1. Completion of Ky government’s first hundred days seems an appropriate moment to review Vietnamese attitudes toward the government. In general, on the basis of contacts with opinion molders within key groups, one is forced to the conclusion that the Vietnamese continue to be fence-sitters. There is no evidence of any rise in public acceptance of Ky government, and the various key groups appear to be awaiting some demonstration of performance on the part of the government, although there is little clarity as to what form such performance might take. It seems noteworthy that there was little editorial reaction to Ky’s hundred day speech in vernacular press and what comment there was seemed perfunctory and unenthusiastic. One can only deduce that the editors chose not to react to the speech because they were aware that critical commentary would be censored. Press, in general, continues to be somewhat unsympathetic toward the Ky government. This unhappiness has, in part, a selfish base, stemming from government’s attempts to control the number of newspapers and their opinions.

2. Within individual groups, general attitude seems to be as follows:

A. Catholics. Ky government is for the moment acceptable to some Catholic groups but there is no great enthusiasm for it. Northern refugees and southerners alike are still devoted to idea of civilian government. They are prepared to give Ky a further grace period but they will be watching every move the government makes and will be prepared to criticize when they feel their interests are in danger. Catholic daily Xay Dung continues to display friendly attitude toward Ky but paper is the personal vehicle of Father Nguyen Quang Lam, a friend of Ky’s, and no great importance should be attached to it.

B. Buddhists. Tri Quang continues to indicate his displeasure with present government. However, he has not shown any inclination to mount a full-scale campaign to bring it down. He has taken line that it will, in time, collapse of its own weight. Fact of matter probably is that Quang has not been able to find an issue with which he might rally a significant following in an anti-government campaign. Quang probably found instructive the failure of the student campaign in Hue in August to achieve much backing. Tam Chau continues to talk on what is apparently a friendly and frequent basis with Prime Minister Ky. Chau has told Ambassador Lodge that he believes Viet-Nam needs a government that can stay in place at least two years, thus signalling his intention not to oppose the GVN. The GVN is extending substantial support to the UBA (e.g., Van Hanh University) which undoubtedly makes it easier for Chau to support it. There seems to be a parallel between the current state of play within the UBA vis-a-vis the GVN and that which existed during the early days of the Khanh government. At that time, Chau was able to assure that the UBA would not oppose the GVN. This equilibrium proved fragile then and could prove equally fragile now, especially since preparations are now underway for the biennial meeting of the Unified Buddhist Association (UBA) in December at which Chau will be re-elected or a successor will be chosen.

C. Sudistes. There is no great affection for Ky government amongst southern politicians or southerners in general. Ky is regarded as a brash young man from the north and despite the presence of certain southerners in the Cabinet, his government is not considered representative of the southerners. As has so often been the case in the past, the southerners lack the organization and energy to make their displeasure known in any concerted fashion. Nevertheless, their attitude prevents Ky from being able to rally support within mass of the Vietnamese people, ten million of whom are, after all, Cochin-Chinese.

D. Military. In wake of the September 11 Armed Forces Convention at Saigon, the army continues to give the impression of being unified. Directorate members also provide a public impression of unity. In August and September, General Nguyen Chanh Thi supported GVN against agitators in Hue, and this display of Directorate unity undoubtedly contributed to easing the situation. Lately, however, we have heard rumblings that command changes announced by Ky at his October 1 press conference were not well received in some quarters (e.g., certain southern officers view appointments of Generals Nguyen Bao Tri and Nguyen Duc Thang as further evidence that northerners are gradually taking over all key positions within the military). All this demonstrates that Directorate unity is a fragile thing, constantly subjected to divisive forces. It will require frequent reaffirmation.

E. Student-intellectuals. Student-intellectual group has recorded its unhappiness with the Ky government. Hue student newspaper is continuing to publish despite general Thi’s open expression of displeasure and has not restricted its criticism of the military regime. Intellectuals, after their late August seminar in Hue, have not as yet organized a promised follow-up meeting in Saigon. Individually, however, they continue to voice their dislike of the military and wish for a civilian government. This group, despite its articulateness, has little power unless it can draw on the Buddhist mass.

F. Labor. Tran Quoc Buu’s CVT raised threat of general strike at the beginning of September. Immediate cause for CVT grievance was rigid enforcement by government of a Diem era decree prescribing 48-hour advance notice before trade union meetings could be scheduled. CVT felt this procedure unduly restrictive if applied to public meetings held in union offices. Behind this issue, however, were other grievances: workers’ dissatisfaction with regime’s failure to cope with rising cost of living and to provide solutions to accumulated specific labor problems, denial of exit visas to permit attendance at international meetings, and GVN refusal to discuss grievances.

3. By and large, Vietnamese populace seems convinced that the VC will not now be able to achieve a military victory. Thus, this fear no longer preoccupies their attention. Neither is there any longer any doubt about US intention. Main preoccupations of the Vietnamese now are their concern over the damage being inflicted on VN as the war intensifies and their concern over their economic problems. Cost of living has risen sharply in last year, particularly in period since Ky government came to power. Costs of basic commodities have increased an average of 33 percent since this time last year. Significant fraction of that increase has been registered since June 19, when Ky government was formed and great build-up of American forces became apparent. In the minds of the city dwellers and those Vietnamese in regions where the American buildup has been most obvious, an unfortunate equation of American presence with rising prices has asserted itself. Editorials have begun to appear in certain Saigon dailies (notably the Buddhist Institute organ Chanh Dao) which, though they do not directly criticize the American presence, nevertheless take line that the sharp increase in the number of foreigners in Viet-Nam endangers Vietnamese culture and national way of life. Hanoi and the VC can be counted upon to encourage public dissatisfaction, building upon daily irritations and complaints about the cost of living, in order to develop an active hostility to the American presence, something which has not previously been a factor here.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Confidential. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.