Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

182. Memorandum From the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (Schwartz) to Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, October 25, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Viet-Nam and the ICRC

This report reviews the main points on Viet-Nam matters emerging from my talks with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others in Vienna and Geneva. Most of the topics were reported in telegrams to the Department. However this report may be useful as a summary and as an indication of possible actions.

1. Compliance by GVN with Geneva Conventions. This subject is rapidly approaching a critical state. In a letter to President Gonard of the ICRC sent August 10 Secretary Rusk stated “In regard to the hostilities in Viet-Nam the U.S. Government is applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise.”² In a subsequent letter the Secretary told M. Gonard that, “In view of the fact that prisoners taken by United States forces are transferred promptly to the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, we think it is more appropriate for that Government to supply such lists and to arrange for such visits by International Committee representatives, and we have every reason to believe that it will do so. You will recall that the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam informed your representatives on August 11 that it will fulfill its obligations in this regard under the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”³

Up to the present the GVN has failed to comply with the Conventions in a number of important ways. It has not furnished the ICRC with lists of prisoners. It has refused to permit the ICRC delegate in Saigon to make the kind of unescorted visits to prisoner camps that he believes are his responsibility under the Conventions. As far as I know it has taken no steps to transmit prisoner mail to relatives. Nor has it established a central office for collecting names of prisoners as required by the Conventions. In addition, the GVN thesis that all but a handful of the thousands of prisoners in custody are refugees or criminals subject to trial under domestic law is unlikely to convince the ICRC.

The matter is acute for several reasons:

(a) The ICRC may publicly criticize the GVN for failure to comply with the conventions. This would reduce the GVN’s already precarious standing in the eyes of many other countries.

(b) As long as GVN compliance is incomplete U.S. military forces in Viet-Nam are obligated not to turn over prisoners they take to GVN custody.

(c) GVN non-compliance inhibits our ability to take public or private actions to obtain better treatment for American military personnel held by the Viet Cong and the DRV.

The GVN attitude on this subject, while understandable in light of what their country has endured at the hands of the Viet Cong, and conceivably explainable to someone on the spot who can see at first hand the character of this ugly war, is however virtually certain to be unacceptable as a permanent answer to the ICRC’s repeated entreaties on this subject. This will be all the more so if the DRV, which already is substantially complying with important parts of the prisoners Convention by furnishing in some instances at least names, photographs, statements, and mail, takes specific public steps to comply formally with the Conventions. It is by no means out of the question that the DRV will do this. From their own point of view there is little reason (beyond their own fanaticism) why they should not.

Nor is there any valid reason why the GVN should not comply. The steps outlined in Deptel 863 of September 25⁴ should be fully acceptable and could serve to enhance the GVN’s reputation with its own population. A change in definitions so that the bulk of prisoners taken in military operations be classified in the first instance as subject to the protection of the Conventions should not cause serious inconvenience. Since education or indoctrination programs free of duress are not proscribed by the Conventions the Chieu Hoi program could continue. Individual terrorists convicted of specific acts could still be charged as criminals and handled outside the Conventions. Refugees who are rehabilitated could of course be freed to return to their villages.

It is worth noting that the narrowness of the GVN category of prisoners undermines our thesis that this is more than a civil war. Our critics can be expected to fasten on to the fact that only 74 of the thousands of prisoners captured or in custody represent an external force and use this as further evidence of DRV non-involvement. By altering the language of the definition large numbers of detainees could be classified as affiliated with Viet Cong-DRV armed forces fighting in South Viet-Nam against the GVN. This would not only have important legal and propaganda advantages, it would also square with the facts as we know them.

If the ICRC delegates in Saigon are not satisfied with the degree of GVN compliance very soon the US Government must examine its own position very carefully. For one thing, our mission should take care not to place itself between the ICRC and the GVN, explaining the one to the other and, ultimately, satisfying neither. The ICRC should go direct to the GVN, the Ministries of Defense and Interior as well as the Foreign Office, to explain their obligations under the Conventions and in turn to hear from the Vietnamese themselves what they are doing to comply. The U.S. position must be squarely on the side of the Conventions. If the ICRC delegates aren’t able to make their case with sufficient force to the GVN Ministries of Interior and Defense, the U.S. mission should be instructed to approach the Saigon Government at the highest level to explain the importance of full and prompt compliance.

In the meanwhile, consideration should be given to having U.S. forces keep prisoners they actually capture. The present policy set forth in the Joint State-Defense message of September 24 (Deptel 858 to Saigon)⁵ provides that lists be kept of prisoners turned over to the GVN. The additional step of holding at least some prisoners would not only keep us in compliance with the Conventions during the time that the GVN is in the process of working itself up to this, it would also provide us with a small amount of additional leverage for use in connection with a possible exchange of prisoners with the DRV or even, conceivably, with the Viet Cong.

2. Prisoner exchanges. The ICRC is aware of our interest in this subject. They also understand the problems. The fact that we hold no prisoners, and that the GVN so far has not asked their assistance in this regard, does not help matters. The ICRC understand the special nature of the Hertz case, though the argument that he as a bona fide civilian held by the Viet Cong is unique is beginning to wear a bit thin now that Dodd, the civilian construction firm employee, has been captured, to say nothing of the three other civilians believed held by the VC.

3. Blockade of medical supplies. This is obviously a most difficult and delicate matter, which was raised several times by the ICRC, both in conference and in private conversations. Without seeking to examine the pro’s and con’s of the policy, let me just note that the legal argument justifying it will be subject to the ICRC’s critical scrutiny. The moral question depends to some extent at least on how the policy is carried out and what consequences it has both for the Viet Cong wounded and for civilians in Viet Cong-held areas.

To be sure, to some extent it depends on how the policy is stated. The ICRC is less likely to object if emphasis is put on the fact that captured medical supplies are not marked with a Red Cross and are comingled with military supplies, in contravention of the Conventions. But the policy cannot be phrased that way just for the benefit of the ICRC. This is not a subject on which it would be wise to try to delude or mislead the ICRC, for short as well as long run reasons. However, a policy carried out on such terms could very likely lead to the interdiction of virtually as many medical supplies as are presently blockaded.

4. ICRC donations to DRV and Viet Cong. Using its own funds the ICRC has donated 50,000 Swiss francs ($11,500) each to the Red Cross of the DRV and GVN. This gift to the DRV was deposited in a DRV bank account in London and the DRV acknowledged receipt. The gift to the GVN is in the form of supplies.

As a result of a communication sent to National Red Cross Societies on August 11 concerning relief action on behalf of victims of the war in Viet-Nam, the ICRC had received by September 20 donations in cash and in kind of a total of about 600,000 Swiss francs ($140,000). These donations came from National Red Cross Societies of: Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland; and from the Governments of Sweden and Switzerland as well as from the Viet-Nam Relief Committee in Finland and the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief in Britain. Many of the donors requested that the goods in kind or funds be made available to “all three sides”, apparently not including the U.S. as a party to the war. From these gifts the ICRC sent a consignment consisting mainly of medical supplies to the Viet Cong through the NLF representative in Moscow. It has not yet received any acknowledgment. If an acknowledgment is received, it may well be the opening of a channel of communication to the Viet Cong. Several members of the ICRC pointed out to me that they are hopeful that gifts to the Viet Cong may help gain the confidence of the Viet Cong—an essential precondition for any useful actions by the Red Cross with regard to prisoners or other aspects of the Conventions.

5. Cambodia. I was informed that the Cambodians feel that if they act as a channel to send packages to U.S. prisoners held by the Viet Cong, and even more if they help send medical supplies to the Viet Cong, the U.S. will view this as confirming evidence of our charges, which they deny, that their country serves as a pipeline for supplies going to the Viet Cong. Whether or not any of this is accurate, either as a statement of the facts or as a characterization of their views, it might well be useful, and could do no harm, to have an intermediary act on our behalf to assure Sihanouk that, far from criticizing efforts by his Red Cross to get packages to our prisoners, we would be most grateful, and that we would not be publicly critical if bona fide medical supplies went to the Viet Cong at the same time, if in fact that is our view.

6. ICRC initiatives. The ICRC and its delegates are using a number of means to establish contact and establish a relationship of confidence with the DRV and the Viet Cong. They have sought out the DRV and NLF representatives in Moscow, Prague, Budapest, Paris, and Phnom Penh. They used a forum like the Vienna conference to make additional contacts. They have enlisted the Red Cross leadership of the USSR, Cambodia, Indonesia, France, Britain, and other countries for this purpose. They have applied for a visa to Hanoi in Warsaw and elsewhere. While they remain wholly realistic and thus non-optimistic about these efforts the possibility remains that one or more may at any time bear fruit. Most likely would be an invitation from Hanoi for an ICRC visit, possibly accompanied by a request for supplies, conceivably accepting our proposal that the ICRC inspect their allegations of hospital and leprosarium bombings. If such a visit occurred the ICRC would seek to visit prisoners (including Americans) held by the DRV, and would attempt to take them packages and mail. It would also discuss conditions of prisoners and related matters with the DRV. It is not too soon to consider additional matters we might wish the ICRC to explore if such a visit were to take place.

(Note: while the visa application is in the name of an ICRC delegate (Maunoir, I believe) my understanding is that if the visa is granted President Gonard might himself seek to make the trip, accompanied by staff and possibly by other members of the Committee.)

7. Character and Role of ICRC. It hardly needs saying that the ICRC as a private Swiss organization with unique legal and international responsibilities acts independently on the basis of its own judgment consistent with its well known principles. What may be less obvious is that constituted this way and behaving this way the ICRC is almost certain to serve our own interests. Plainly, this is a point to be made quietly. Any prospects for success the ICRC may have in the delicate undertakings that it is broaching in connection with the Viet-Nam conflict would be shattered if the other side were given public cause to doubt its independence. But the fact remains that individually and collectively the ICRC is, in the most basic sense, on our side. This is very specifically true of the President, Samuel Gonard, formerly the commanding general of the Swiss armed forces, and of his leading associate of the Committee, Vice President Jacques Freymond, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. (Freymond’s views on wars of national liberation, and the urgent need for the countries of Europe to find ways to get together on a united policy for the West to fight them, as expressed in a paper he wrote for a recent Ford-sponsored conference, are wholly congenial to U.S. policy—and somewhat unusual coming from a European intellectual.)

In light of this I believe that the ICRC does not at present need additional specific proposals. A suggestion like that in Deptel 651 to Geneva,⁶ besides being overtaken by the ICRC’s own initiative in sending medical supplies to the Viet Cong, might well sound a wrong note among the more conservative members of the ICRC, who in the reductive tradition of European intellectualism might well conclude the proposal was a deal partial to U.S. interests and thus not for them to implement. Our present relationship with the ICRC is such that it can best be served by maintaining an open channel of discussion with them, with occasional nudges from us to point them in directions we consider fruitful and/or essential. And by getting the GVN to comply with the Conventions.

8. Publicity. As a corollary to the previous point, publicity now for our efforts to work with and through the ICRC might well interfere with their efforts to gain the confidence of the other side and thus obtain better treatment for our prisoners. The argument that maximum publicity will help get better treatment for U.S. prisoners and will make it harder for the DRV to conduct mock war crimes trials and carry out executions, even if valid, does not contravene this view, since such publicity could be sought without reference to the ICRC.

The domestic U.S. problem is more serious. The families obviously want to know what we’re doing to help the boys, as do the military services. Congressional interest is building up. To a point this can be handled by quiet off-the-record briefings. But that point will soon be reached.

I discussed this problem with members and staff of the ICRC. They themselves are becoming more public relations conscious than has been their tradition. They are interested in our own methods of backgrounding and news dissemination. At the right time I believe they will release on their own initiative, or can be gotten to release some information on what they are doing for the benefit of U.S. prisoners. By coordinating in advance we could then give their release our own emphasis here. I am convinced this would be more satisfactory for the present than for us to attempt to background here.

9. Strengthening South Viet-Nam’s Red Cross. Without going into details of present shortcomings, suffice it to say that a lot can be done to beef up the South Vietnamese Red Cross. And at relatively little cost or difficulty (with respect to the Conventions, for example) to the GVN. The areas of need are obvious: refugees, direct material aid, children, separated families, etc. Putting the South Vietnamese Red Cross more into the picture would assist efforts being made by other private groups, would enhance the RVN’s image abroad, and would deflect attention from shortcomings of the GVN in other areas. Both the ICRC and the American Red Cross would do much more with the Vietnamese Red Cross. But the requests should come from them. A specific project within their competence would be to set up a tracing service to reunite families, both now and when the fighting ends. The ICRC could provide technical assistance for this.

10. Protecting Power.ICRC experts on this subject see no reason not to explore this possibility. They suggest we consider asking an Eastern European country (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania) to take on the job. They have no illusions that any such arrangement will be accepted by the DRV or do much good if it were.

11. Mail, clearing house, official Bureau for Prisoners. Noting that letters from U.S. prisoners have reached their families in a variety of ways, the ICRC thinks it would be useful if a more comprehensive and efficient effort were made to keep track of the mail flow. I am exploring this with the American Red Cross and DOD. The ICRC is seeking to find out what kind of “infractions” regarding mail the DRV is citing as reason for halting the mail flow.

The ICRC also recommends that an official Bureau for Prisoners as provided in the GC be established here and in Saigon. While this would be a formality on our part, it would be an additional argument for the ICRC to use when it tries to get compliance by Hanoi.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Secret. Also sent to McNaughton, William Bundy, Unger, Meeker, and Assist-ant Secretary of State for Public Affairs James L. Greenfield. Drafted by Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.
2. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, September 13, 1965, p. 447.
3. found.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27-7 VIET)
5. Not printed. (Ibid.)
6. Not printed. (Ibid.)