Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume III, Vietnam, June–December 1965

178. Draft Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 22, 1965.

ELEMENTS OF SECOND PAUSE SCENARIO

A. Positive and Negative Objectives

1. Positive Objectives

a. To remove for an adequate time the element of continued bombing of the North and thus to test the willingness of North Vietnam to reduce its support of the Viet Cong and Viet Cong activities in the South, and to enter into negotiations without preconditions (i.e., to abandon the present conditions particularly on the “four points”). In other words, a second pause is first and perhaps foremost a serious effort to see if there can be real progress toward a political solution.

b. Whether or not this pause brings about such results, to underscore again our willingness to work toward a solution by reciprocal actions.

c. To satisfy domestic and international opinion that we have indeed exhausted for the time being all possibilities of progress toward a peaceful solution, as a prelude to whatever increased action might then become necessary, such as Phase II deployments or further expansion in the bombing of the North.

d. To halt temporarily the possibilities of a wider war. However, this can only be a subsidiary objective because we must envisage that, if there is no response, we will resume bombing and there may be a larger chance of escalation thereafter.

e. By varying the pattern of bombing attacks on the North, to make the resumption of bombing, if and when it takes place, more psychologically damaging and effective.

f. To insert a proposal that may produce substantial disagreement among the various Communist parties.

2. Negative Objectives

a. We do not wish to upset confidence in South Vietnam or faith in our continued firmness as necessary.

b. To avoid any misunderstanding in Hanoi that our action means we are ready to compromise our objectives and are ourselves afraid we cannot or will not stay the course.

c. To avoid getting into a position where we abandon bombing of the North in return for the DRV entering into negotiations while still continuing major support of the Viet Cong. This is an essential point in itself, made more so by our public statements that we would suspend or cease bombing only if Hanoi took appropriate corresponding action with respect to its support of the VC.

d. If a reciprocal reduction in hostilities should result, to avoid getting into a situation in the South in which the GVN was not able to go about restoring its control throughout the country.

Discussion

If our primary objective is to move Hanoi toward a peaceful solution, it means that we must frame our communications to them and all our public discussion in such a way as to play down the threat of stronger action in the event the pause fails; in other words, we must not appear to be delivering an ultimatum. Yet we must recognize that, even if we do not stress what we will do if the pause fails, and even if we do not take preparatory actions for additional measures, it will be widely assumed that we will resume, and we shall almost certainly have to commit ourselves to the GVN to that effect. In other words, we can only seek to play down the element of threat; we cannot fully remove it.

A second consequence in the listing of our objectives as above is that we must put the diplomacy of the pause at the very front of our calculations. Our May pause lost effect in the world because it seemed too short and because the negative indications from Hanoi, while conclusive to us, could not really be spelled out to the world. This time, we must have a pause that is long enough and includes enough diplomatic openings so that the most skeptical will be persuaded that it was a serious and honest try. In this respect, there is no latent conflict among the various objectives, for what we do towards Hanoi, even if it cannot be revealed in toto, will strengthen our case with the world.

B. What We Do at the Outset of the Pause

1. Nature of Military Action

a. Against the North, we would stop all strikes and armed reconnaissance but would continue Lucky Dragon and Blue Springs (as appropriate) for all North Viet-Nam, and low-level reconnaissance (Blue Tree) in the infiltration areas (south of approximately 20 degrees north latitude and west of 105 degrees west longitude), with peripheral low-level reconnaissance elsewhere. Also sea/air ELINT to cover key areas.

b. Air operations against Laos (Barrel Roll and Steel Tiger) would be continued and intensified including any effective means such as defoliation.

c. Air operations in South Vietnam (including B-52 strikes) would continue as required.

d. As to ground operations in South Vietnam, we should continue all aspects, both pacification and search/base area operations. Not only is this almost certainly required in order to secure GVN concurrence and avoid unfavorable developments, but it appears to have no significant disadvantages in terms of effect on Hanoi.

Discussion

There is a serious issue whether operations in the South should be as stated above. Since one of the DRV responses we seek is a major reduction in VC attacks and terrorism the continuation of all US/GVN operations at then current levels (possibly even increasing as a result of our force increases) might make it harder to identify serious VC reductions. Thus, there is a case for some reduction of military pressure, particularly in US actions such as the B-52 strikes, at least for a period of 2-3 weeks at the outset of the pause.

An opposite alternative, if reassurance to the GVN were considered crucial, would be to step up activity to a real maximum.

The proposal above steers between these two and relies on the continuing arrival of our troops as a major reassuring element to the GVN. In practice, it does not appear that it will be too difficult, even with continuing US/GVN operations, to identify what happens to the basic attack-incident rate by the Viet Cong.

2. Timing and Duration

a. The best time would appear to be toward the end of November, as our Phase I strength nears its peak but while we are still introducing significant forces (to reassure the GVN) under decisions already taken in principle. This timing also allows for an adequate duration before we would have to take or announce further decisions.

b. The duration should be not less than four weeks, in order to allow a convincing time for response by action. At the same time, the GVN would almost certainly be strongly opposed to any significantly longer period. Another element is the desirability of terminating the pause with a month or more then elapsing before we came to major new decisions; the point of this is to avoid the conclusion that we paused simply to permit ourselves to resume at a higher level as had always been planned. On balance, a period of about a month seems optimum.

c. We must consider whether we should not be prepared to resume short of the planning period, if there are clear negative readings from the DRV. For example, our reconnaissance may pick up clear and significant military movements toward the South. Alternatively, the DRV might (although we think it unlikely) give an absolutely explicit negative diplomatic response. There might be marginal cases in between, such as the discovery of additional DRV regular units in the South, sent down prior to the pause. We might also have strident and continued DRV propaganda denunciation of the pause; some of this must be expected and discounted, but at a certain level it might be persuasive of a totally negative reading. We cannot decide now just what would constitute a clearly negative DRV response evident before the end of the planning period. Nor can we decide now whether we should let that negative response sink in for a short time even before we resumed. However, we probably should recognize that there may be developments that should properly cause us to resume before the end of the planning period. (We do not necessarily have to say this to others, as we did to Hanoi in May.)

3. Coordination with the GVN

a. We must bring Ambassador Lodge fully aboard, and wider elements of the Embassy should be briefed so that our contacts with the GVN at all levels are used to keep their reactions under control.

b. Ambassador Lodge should then personally take the lead in explaining the pause to the GVN. (The alternative of a Washington mission working with the Ambassador in the explanation seems less attractive, and undercuts his personal position. But there is a case for this alternative.)

c. The GVN should then be associated in the formal announcement. This seems vital if we are to avoid widespread criticism in South Viet-Nam on the now-familiar basis that the US is acting alone.

Discussion

GVN concurrence could well be the stickiest part of the whole operation. In any event, it must not be hasty or forced; yet, the fact that we would have to mention it to at least four top leaders gives us an immediate security problem. Ideally, we should try to get the Ambassador aboard in a consultation in Washington or Honolulu a few days before he goes to the GVN. The approach to the GVN should then be roughly four days before the initiation of the pause. (If we wish to have GVN couple the pause announcement with a more sweeping declaration of internal policy, as discussed under B 7 below, we would have to allow a longer time to work on that announcement. But it still might be possible to withhold discussion of the pause until very shortly before it was initiated.)

In presenting the matter to the GVN, we should of course make maximum use of our continuing Phase I deployment and of our concurrent plan for continued actions within South Vietnam. We could also point out that the DRV would not be able to take much advantage of a pause without our knowing it at once. Arguments based on domestic and international opinion factors might also be used, but might be less persuasive than the others indicated.

Query if we should indicate to the GVN that we will be prepared to go still further if the pause fails: on the one hand, this would be highly persuasive in bringing them aboard; on the other hand, it forces our hand on Phase II decisions and reduces our flexibility to deal with varied responses to the pause under which, for example, we might wish to resume at a different level and not go forward with major Phase II deployments.

4. Communications with Hanoi

a. In May, we did not alert any third-country channels, apart from the Soviets, who made clear their unwillingness to act as intermediaries. This time, the public and prolonged nature of the pause imposes no security obstacle, and we should alert every possible channel with Hanoi contacts. We would explain to each of these “useful” countries and parties—as a first crack, the USSR, Canada, India, UK, France, Japan, Poland, and U Thant—as to what we were doing and that we would listen carefully for whatever Hanoi had to say. The fact that we would not wish to continue the pause merely in return for Hanoi’s entering into negotiations raises a serious tactical question: Should we make this clear at the outset, or should we say we are interested in any message of any sort? This problem is particularly acute for U Thant. Might the answer be to say that we were interested in indications either of reciprocal action or of willingness to negotiate, but felt highly doubtful that the latter would be persuasive without the former?

Discussion

We do not have to communicate with the Chicoms in any way.

As to the Soviets, there is an issue whether they should be given special treatment. There were some indications in May that they resented being singled out, and they have subsequently stressed that they are not intermediaries and that we must deal with Hanoi. It can be argued that they might be more helpful than otherwise if they were treated simply on the same footing as a number of other interested nations, and were told in so many words that this was the case. On the other hand, our over-all relationship with the Soviets might benefit if we sent a private Presidential message noting repeated Soviet references to this very action, expressing the hope that Hanoi would be responsive (while not suggesting any specific action by the Soviets), but equally making clear that we could not lay off indefinitely if action continued in the South.

b. There is a question whether we should ask any third country or party to make public appeals to Hanoi. U Thant might have the urge to do so, and of course in the last analysis we could not stop him. However, the adamant rejection of the UN role by the DRV seems to make this most unpromising, and it is also likely that U Thant would pitch any appeal (even privately) on the basis of the DRV getting the bombing stopped for good if it would only agree to negotiate, without taking any other action.

5. US Domestic Handling

Congressional leaders might be consulted prior to decision, and the full Leadership should certainly be informed prior to public announcement.

6. Notifications of Key Allies and Others

Subject to security considerations, key Asian and NATO allies should be informed in advance leaving off only any special stress on keeping their ears open to Hanoi. We might try to make a rather special production of notification also of countries that have been pressing us on a pause, such as Yugoslavia, India, Ghana, etc.

Most of our key allies could be informed only just prior to the pause. [3 lines of source text not declassified]

7. Public Announcement and Press Backgrounding

a. The public announcement should include the following points:

(1) GVN and US have agreed that bombings of the DRV should be suspended “for a significant time” in order to demonstrate GVN/US desire to seek a peaceful solution and in order to see if there will be a constructive response from Hanoi. The length of the pause would not be specified nor would we attempt to indicate just what response was required or anticipated.

(2) The announcement would make clear that we would continue to conduct necessary reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam and necessary air and ground operations in South Viet-Nam. We could add some general sentence that “all other relevant operations will continue” to hint clearly that we would go on acting in Laos.

b. Backgrounding of the press should not go beyond the public announcement. One point of particular difficulty here is that we are on the public record as insisting on an action response, and not simply a willingness to negotiate. Press speculation may find in our failure to reiterate this position a suggestion that we are ready to settle for the latter.

Discussion

Several points in the above script are open to question. The arguments against naming a specific duration publicly seem overwhelming. The opposite alternative of making the suspension entirely open-ended has some appeal, but increases the already-present chance that the GVN would leak the agreed duration. Moreover, we have to reckon that we will be dealing with pressures to turn the suspension into a cessation in any event, and resistance to these might be harder if we had left the thing entirely open.

As to the methodology of the announcement, there is the alternative of avoiding formal announcement until press inquiry made it compulsory. On balance, though this had some merit in May, the fact that the press would probably now be considerably more alert, and the fact that this is intended as a much more prolonged operation, argue for putting it right out in the open at the outset.

The third issue concerns possible additional elements in the US/GVN announcement. We have been hoping for some time that an improved military climate would provide a good setting for the GVN to make a more public and forthcoming statement addressed to the individual members of the VC, to the general effect that they would be received back into South Vietnamese life if they stopped their armed action and accepted an independent SVN without DRV influence. If military actions have continued to go well in the period up to the initiation of the pause, we might well be urging such a statement in any case, and it might be a most effective rounding out of the total message (“DRV get out, but deluded brothers come in”) against a background of continuing strength and firmness in pursuing actions within SVN. On balance, this looks like a good addition; to do it properly will require careful consultation with a wider circle in the Saigon Embassy than we might otherwise bring in at the outset (notably Lansdale).

C. What We Do As We Go Along

1. Probable Communist responses.

a. Chicoms will almost certainly attack pause as US/GVN “trick.” We should ignore and play down such statements, but react promptly and hard if Chicoms take any military action, separating such reactions from continuation of pause against the DRV unless the latter has taken some action itself.

b. Soviet response may include some public denunciation to keep in line, but will almost certainly be reserved and cautious. One of our hopes must be that the Soviets will get busy with the DRV to suggest at least a somewhat forthcoming response and even a serious beginning toward a peaceful solution. As stated earlier, any special effort by us with the Soviets to this end would probably not be fruitful, however.

c. NLF/VC may well oppose DRV attempts to make any significant response to the pause; they may see any such DRV action as unjustified surrender to the implied US/GVN threat to resume bombing, i.e., that the DRV would have decided “to save its own skin.” The VC might, on their own, seek to disrupt the pause by some specific terror actions in SVN. We should probably strive, necessarily in consultation with the GVN (which could be hard), not to respond specifically against the DRV to such VC actions. However, a really major event in the South might compel us, consistently with our over-all theory of Hanoi responsibility, to make a one-shot interruption of the pause in reprisal. This is a tough issue.

d. Hanoi’s response is of course the most crucial. It is hard to see Hanoi making no response whatever, or confining its response merely to propaganda denunciation. Alone or in combination we might have any one of the following;

(1) At attempt to indicate willingness to talk but without any clear change in position. Hanoi might choose this time to say somewhat more clearly that it does not insist on US withdrawal, and it might use a gentle formulation on NLF representation in negotiations. The crux of the matter would be, however, whether there was any change in the insistence on acceptance of the third point, the NLF entering a coalition in Saigon.

(2) An attempt to indicate willingness to talk with some clear change on the third point, but possibly without any indication of reducing support to the VC.

(3) A suggestion that limited responsive action was being taken such as failure to send additional regular units.

(4) A suggestion that real responsive action was being taken such as withdrawal or lying low of the 325th Division.

Perhaps the most troublesome of all possible Hanoi actions would be a message (perhaps through channels sympathetic to such an approach, such as the French) that Hanoi was indeed willing to talk but only if we undertook not to resume the bombing.

2. Responses to Variations in Hanoi’s Action

The variations are so great that it is almost impossible to spell out how we would handle these possibilities. The point would be to shoot down any idea that we would settle merely for willingness to negotiate, while at the same time losing no opportunity to pin Hanoi down to compromises in its present position. Whatever message was conveyed by Hanoi, we would have to weigh carefully what channels to use in reply and how to determine just how far Hanoi was ready to go, without letting ourselves get drawn into a dilatory and fruitless exchange designed on their part to make it extremely difficult for us to resume.

The possibility that we might be drawn into at least preliminary negotiations requires that we review again our negotiating position and see if there are any areas where we could show further “give”—as we have done during the summer on the reunification issue and, verbally at least, on NLF representation.

3. Third-Country Pressures

Most of the “useful” countries would probably not put pressure on us to extend the suspension into a cessation. However, there would undoubtedly be many countries and voices raised in this direction. Our general course of action would seem to be to avoid getting drawn into the issue, let our announcement speak for itself, and keep our mouths shut. However, we might be faced even with UN resolutions or other formal actions that we would have to combat.

A second form of international pressure might arise to extend the suspension into a “ceasefire” in SVN. Apart from the obvious GVN opposition to any such extension, we ourselves would be squarely opposed to it because of the difficulties we have always seen, notably the danger that a total “ceasefire” would consolidate the VC position in secure areas and get us into a Pathet Lao type of situation. Our line of defense should probably be that the GVN and we are entitled to go on dealing with the VC as long as it continues active, and that any suggestion of a complete “ceasefire” is premature until we have seen whether a more limited reduction of hostilities is possible first. On the whole, it would appear probable that we could contain pressures for a complete “ceasefire” at least from our responsible domestic critics, but the general heat on this subject is one of the significant difficulties in the operation.

4. Continued US and GVN Actions

By hypothesis, we would be continuing already decided Phase I deployments during the pause. Beyond this point, even the possibility of decisions for Phase II deployments may require preparatory measures that will become known. We need an assessment from DOD on this point.

D. Conditions and Method of Resumption

1. Basically, we would expect to resume at the end of the agreed period unless we were satisfied that the DRV had made a response that gave really serious and continuing promise of leading toward a peaceful solution. Undoubtedly, the DRV will have tried to muddy the record as much as possible; however, it would have to weigh any attempt to portray itself as having changed position or taken action against the morale drawbacks, particularly vis-a-vis the VC, of such a public position. It might not be too difficult to make up our own minds that the DRV was not responding, but we should be thinking always of the kind of record we could make with key allies and other countries to prove that our reading was correct.

2. When and as we decided to resume, we should probably make a clear and firm public announcement of just what we were doing and why.

3. The pace of resumption needs careful thought. From the military standpoint, renewed destruction of the LOC in the southern areas of the DRV would appear the first requirement. However, we might start with some targets at the northern limits of present strikes to emphasize that we were resuming at least on the old basis.

There is an issue whether we should resume with a “bang”, by some strike beyond present geographic and category limits. This cannot be decided in advance. The case for such extension would be strong if Hanoi had been drastically negative, but even in this case we would have to weigh whether such action, in an atmosphere where tension would go up automatically, might be more likely to produce air battles or Chicom responses that we would still not wish to have to deal with.

Another element in our initial targeting might, of course, be the intervening extension of the SAM system. If we had to hit a number of SAM sites for reasons of military necessity, this in itself would give a considerable psychological “bang” although with much less chance of escalation risks that might attend geographic or category extensions.

4. Finally, there is the question of what additional actions we would then take to increase our pressures in the South. If the pause had made our case clear to the world, we would be in a stronger position to go ahead with greater reinforcements along Phase II lines. But, as noted earlier, we would probably do well to allow a period to elapse before we announced major new decisions. One factor here is that we must not, for future purposes, get our pauses characterized as simply devices to justify major new measures. If the pause does not work this time, its usefulness for the future should still be preserved if possible.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XLI, Memos (A). Top Secret. According to a typed notation on the source text this was a second draft. A copy of the first, dated October 20, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ADMIN Files: FRC 70 A 1265, Vietnam 380.