72. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
M. Bundy: Is there anything that we need to know on the President’s press conference?2
W. Bundy: No, the President made a general statement of our sticking to our present course and our determination and also was asked what would happen if the Government ever asked us to get out and he did not deal with that question, he said he did not think that this was likely to happen. That was all that was really substantive and I think that it came out in the evening papers as his sticking to the basic line.
M. Bundy: We should not expect any impact back from that. What did he say on other subjects—what did he say about visiting the Soviet Union?
W. Bundy: He did say that there had been exchanges about his visiting the Soviet Union and the strong implication was that this was a very active possibility.
M. Bundy: Those are the two questions which I have immediately in my mind. Do you have further instructions or guidance perhaps and in particular do you know what the plans are for next week?
W. Bundy: No, we do not have particular instructions for you. As to next week’s plans, there is nothing set up at the present time on your return. Secretary Rusk has gone to Florida and does not now plan to be back before Thursday,3 but if you bring back action recommendations, either he might come back or the President, of course, might wish to go ahead without him so the short answer is really no definite plan and if you have suggestions that will require adjustments of schedules, it would be helpful if you let us know by way of at least a general indication before you leave.
M. Bundy: We will try to make a summary—I have—incidentally this is a classified line—we will try to get a summary of our current thinking [Page 151] to you tomorrow because Sunday4 we will be going back into the field and we should have as much of the picture as we would like you to have in outline at least by that time. My current estimate is that we will not return with urgent and immediate requirements for decision making meetings because of the continuing fluidity of the local situation here. On the other hand we may, we will I think, wish to have some development of alternatives, and I think therefore that the current pattern in which the Secretary will be out of the town for two or three days is an acceptable one, certainly for our purposes today. Have you got all that?
W. Bundy: I understand you perfectly. We will do nothing to change our schedule unless you indicate otherwise in terms of what you might propose. I of course will be on hand Sunday morning—and indeed tomorrow and Saturday—to get your messages. If you have some indication, well and good, otherwise we will just sit tight and wait until you arrive.
M. Bundy: I missed your last transmission, would you say again?
W. Bundy: I said that we will do nothing to change Secretary Rusk’s schedule unless you so indicate in your message which we presume you will send tomorrow night.
M. Bundy: That makes good sense. I would like to shift to another subject and say that our first bare impression is that the confrontation which was foreshadowed as a possibility in one of the Ambassador’s telegrams (Saigon 2391)5 is not immediately likely. It appears that other local forces, military primarily, have indicated strong opposition to the contingency which troubled us. There is no immediate likelihood that contingency will happen. On the other hand, there is no indication either as to what a resolution of the present interim status will be and there is no agreed opinion that I can solicit on our side as to what the preferred solution is. We hope to direct attention to the development of preferences but we do not expect during this business to engage in active indication of positive US preferences. I would be glad of your comments on this.
W. Bundy: I agree completely with your suggestion that you take no active role while you are there. As you can see from our cables we are very concerned about any appearance of an active US political role in any case, and we were concerned, as you have now cleared up, that the issue stated in Saigon 2391 was not likely to be immediate and was somewhat more black and white than any case that we would be likely to confront in the immediate future. Your evaluation of the immediate situation does seem to confirm what we have been getting principally from CAS reporting. I should think we had to see how the situation settled down before [Page 152] any of us could be sure how we would like to use US influence and whether we would want to take any risks of having our hands show very clearly. Those are just preliminary reactions but I think they accord with your thinking.
M. Bundy: That is exactly the way we see it here. We have had a serious exchange of messages with McCone6 and I think it would be worth your while to have a talk with him directly and to say that I mentioned this exchange to you.
W. Bundy: I understand that and I will be in touch with Mr. McCone. The message that he sent after seeing the President was seen by Mr. Ball and myself and I have not seen your reply but I will get in touch with him in the morning and will be brought abreast of that.
M. Bundy: There is no reason to view it tonight your time. Tomorrow is OK, I just wished to be sure you were aware of his transmission and his view of thinking there.
W. Bundy: Yes, we were fully aware of that and I think we also saw the difficulty in producing the results suggested immediately and I have not yet seen your response but I will do so tomorrow morning the first thing.
M. Bundy: In essence what I said was precisely that. It was easier to make the prescriptions than get the answers and in particular it was not so clear that we could have won for them a working alliance that would be practical for us between the two parties specified in his message, but you will be over to see my answer. This conversation has been exactly what was needed for our guide. I am very grateful to you.
W. Bundy: All right I have nothing further at this end. If you have nothing further I guess we can call it quits now.
M. Bundy: That is all I have. Thank you again. Over and out.
W. Bundy: Over and out.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy—Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret; Exdis. The source text indicates the conversation was conducted over a secure line. The conversation apparently took place at about 8 p.m. Washington time, or 9 a.m. February 5 Saigon time, and was tape recorded at the National Military Communication Center. A draft transcript made at the NMCC is in Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S.↩
- See footnote 6, Document 71.↩
- Rusk was suffering from the flu. The Thursday referred to was apparently February 11.↩
- February 7.↩
- Document 59.↩
- See Documents 62 and 66.↩