Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

59. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, February 3, 1965, 10 p.m.

2391. Embtel 2382.²

1. Although the info reported in reftel may not be a true blueprint of coming events, it does have enough plausibility to warrant us deciding now what attitude we should take to a new govt headed by Khanh. My following comments have in mind such a takeover under circumstances suggested by reftel but are generally applicable to the broad question of whether we can do business with Khanh as the controlling partner of a de Gaulle-Pompidou line-up. We know that he has yearned for such an alignment at least since last August and his present alliance with the Buddhists, shaky though it may be, may lead him to believe that now is the moment to try for it. What are the likely consequences of such a move insofar as U.S. interests are concerned?

2. First, let us assume that General Khanh succeeds and establishes himself as Chief of State after the De Gaulle model. His ability to stay in power will depend largely upon two groups—the Buddhist Institute leaders and the generals. To keep both groups in line appears to present contradictory requirements. The Buddhist leaders will not long be satisfied with a govt which does not comply with their behests and such subservience is likely to offend many of the generals. If Khanh does not play along with the Buddhists, sooner or later they can be counted upon to take to the streets and present Khanh with the same problem which he faced in August, 1964. At that time, he capitulated quickly under Buddhist pressure to the disgust of ods [his?] generals. If this situation were to be repeated, we would expect the generals to split on the issue of Buddhist domination with unpredictable results other than confusion approaching anarchy.

3. Let us suppose that Khanh, in spite of these obvious difficulties, somehow succeeds in keeping the generals in line while satisfying the Buddhists. In that case, the Catholics, the Hoa Hao, the Cao Dai and the other elements generally suspicious of Khanh can be expected to cause him trouble. Whether their opposition would be sufficient to overthrow his govt may be doubtful but the consequences could well be serious and possibly include bloody outbreaks of religious strife.

4. [Garble] combination in which Khanh is maintained as the governmental leader with Buddhist support. We foresee a likely trend toward neutralism and anti-Americanism. The Buddhists are suspect on both counts and are so notified [identified?] in the public mind. We know General Khanh’s deep feeling about the necessity of Buddhist support and have long suspected him of wishing to become the Sihanouk of South Vietnam able to treat the U.S. with similar disregard.

5. In summary, I can see no good coming out of a Khanh govt—not even that minimum stability which would allow us to continue the struggle against the Viet Cong and Hanoi at present levels of success. The probable outcomes as we foresee them would be either civil disturbance approaching anarchy or a neutralist Khanh in a Sihanouk role. Both are unacceptable solutions from the point of view of the U.S.

6. With this conviction in mind, we next raise the question of how to avoid a Khanh govt? Only with the acquiescence of the large majority of the influential generals can he accede to head of state. We know that he is politicking now to see whether he can get the necessary support. Unless the U.S. reps decide to let matters run their course without an attempt to influence them and take the heavy responsibility of doing nothing, it is most important that we communicate a timely message to the generals to persuade them to withhold a vote of confidence for Khanh and to prevent his coming to power. While the exact text of such a communication would have to be tempered carefully to the character of each of the generals contacted, the bare bones of such a message would be that the U.S. govt will not recognize and will not support a govt headed by General Khanh. It is our opinion that such word conveyed at the proper time to selected generals and perhaps also to certain civil leaders would accomplish our purpose.

7. There is, of course, always the possibility of an unfavorable reaction. The generals might rally to support Khanh because of this “foreign pressure.” Then, if in spite of our efforts, Khanh came into power, we would have to do what we had promised, namely, withdraw recognition from the govt and await developments. It would not be necessary to withdraw all support at once because we would still have the hope that Khanh’s opponents would shortly drag him down, although with the danger of civil disorders which has been cited at the outset of this paper.

In summary, I feel that the U.S. cannot win with Khanh as Chief of State and that every possible action should be taken to prevent his accession to power. Our main weapon available for this purpose is the use of the message referred to in para 6 above. If we fail, the consequences will be no more serious than if we had not tried. This matter will be made the first item of business with Bundy. After a full discussion, I will forward appropriate recommendations.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIETS. Top Secret; Flash; Limdis. Repeated to the White House, CIA, DOD, and CINCPAC. Received in the Department of State at 10:06 a.m.
2. Document 58.