60. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1
1601. Embtels 2386, 2389, 2391, 2382.2 For what our thoughts are worth, we agree with type of action reported your 2389 to convey to military that we are not with Khanh all the way this time and that we sympathize [Page 129] with concerns of other generals. Risk that such a position will come back to Khanh’s ears and make him if possible even more difficult to deal with seems outweighed by implication silence would have that we are in fact with him.
At same time, we are deeply concerned, as we are sure you are too, at US hand showing too strongly in any outcome. It might be possible convey our position in more generalized form such as that US not supporting any particular individual but rather looking to Vietnamese and specifically armed forces to work out structure and personalities of government on their own. Such formulation would probably be our later explanation any position we take, and may also be wise to use with any military contacts who might turn out in the end to be on Khanh’s side.
Second question would concern who might emerge if AFC did not in fact back Khanh. Previous discussions and cables have suggested Dong or Co might be most hopeful military candidates. If it becomes your recommendation that you be authorized act more strongly than 2389 line to block Khanh complete takeover, it would help us to have your judgment on personalities who might emerge worth our backing. In this regard we have in mind obvious disadvantage emergence any heavily “Can Lao remnant” slate which would only exacerbate Buddhist problem.
One way of getting our point across to generals would be to play up Le Van Hoach angle. It could be brought to their attention that Hoach said last July he was in touch with NLFSVN and implied Khanh’s knowledge and consent this activity. We could stress that we informed Khanh of Hoach’s reported activity and Khanh apparently did nothing about it.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared by Ball, and approved by Bundy. Repeated to CINCPAC.↩
- Saigon telegrams 2382 and 2391 are Documents 58 and 59, respectively. In telegram 2386 from Saigon, February 3, Taylor analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of Khanh “as an individual and as a national political leader” and reviewed his administrative record. Taylor concluded that Khanh had failed to establish any base of popular support and that his motivation was almost exclusively personal ambition. In telegram 2389, also February 3, Taylor reported that Ky had repeated to a CIA officer the substance of what Cao had told U. Alexis Johnson (see Document 58). The CIA officer was planning to contact Ky again to inform him that the United States was “in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion” and that it shared the generals’ concern about the situation. Both telegrams are in Department of State, Central Files,POL 15 VIET S.↩