Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

62. Telegram From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), at Saigon¹

Washington, undated.

Please pass this message in one copy only to McGeorge Bundy from Mr. McCone:

1. After reviewing all current traffic and today’s Watch Report,² I advised the President in a long private discussion³ that there appeared, first, a high probability of continuing political instability in Saigon and that serious dissension existed among the general officers. Secondly, analyzing Kosygin mission which includes high ranking party officer and officials of Defense, Civil Air Transport and Foreign Economic Relations, we were inclined to predict Soviet assistance to augment subversion and guerrilla activities, that they would warn Hanoi against overt military moves which would invite U.S. reprisals. President stated that we must exhaust every possibility of assisting the establishment of a Saigon government which would bring together discordant groups, most particularly military and the Buddhists, and felt that the USG, having had experience in SVN, might suggest particular military or civilian leaders who could accomplish this objective. President continues to feel that a reasonably viable and stable Saigon government is an essential prerequisite to other actions and asked me to communicate this view to you with the suggestion that you give attention to devising a cast of characters which might be able to accomplish this objective.

2. In discussion with my staff, they point out that this is an extremely sensitive problem because of the nationalistic and latent anti-American feeling now existent in Saigon. Furthermore we are not at all sure that Khanh is quite as flat on his back as today’s cables indicate. Indeed it is considered possible that he might find his way through the present crisis and come out with some measure of strength. On the other hand, it is obvious that a political crisis precipitated by Khanh’s opponents, which caused his removal would, in the absence of constructive planning along the lines mentioned above, create a vacuum in Saigon which would do grave damage to U.S. interests. The President therefore feels that you, in consultation with the Embassy and the Station, should attempt to identify and construct a list of individuals who could be brought together with some assurance they would work together in formulating a government; then to consider how the views so developed could be planted or otherwise communicated in Saigon in an unattributable but effective manner.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy—Saigon, Vol. I. Secret. The date and time stamped on the source text are February 4, 11:13 a.m., which is apparently the time of reception in Saigon. This would make the time of transmission in Washington in the late evening, February 3.
2. Not found.
3. See Document 61.