Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

63. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Washington
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. Leonard Unger
  • Mr. John McNaughton
  • Lt. Gen. Goodpaster
  • Mr. Chester Cooper
  • Mr. Colonel Jack A. Rogers
• Saigon
  • Ambassador Taylor
  • Ambassador Johnson
  • General Westmoreland
  • Mr. Killen
  • Mr. de Silva
  • Mr. Zorthian
  • Mr. Herfurt
  • Mr. Manfull

TIME & PLACE

• 0900 February 4, 1965, Embassy Conference Room

SUBJECT

• Agenda Item I—Current Political Situation—Imminence of a New Khanh Government

After reviewing essential elements of situation as reported on February 3, Ambassador Taylor called for reports on results on contacts with key Vietnamese during the previous evening. Mr. de Silva, General Westmoreland, and Mr. Manfull supplied following new information:

(a) General Ky had been contacted by arrangement previously made and the following two points conveyed attributing them to Embassy (Embtel 2389):²

1) That we are in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion, and

2) that we share the concern that General Ky says he and his colleagues have about the situation.

Ky received the information with welcome approval and said he was most happy to hear this expression of U.S. views. He said he would be seeing other members of the Armed Forces Council (AFC) on February 4 and would have more information at the next meeting.

(b) General Pham Van Dong had been contacted and a full account of the conversation had been circulated.³

(c) General Stilwell saw General “Little” Minh who gave the impression of not being in the inner circle and unable to impart significant information.

(d) Colonel Metaxis saw General Co, Commander II Corps, who conveyed the impression that he had not been contacted by other members of the so-called “watchdog group” of the AFC.

(e) Luong Trong Tuong, Hoa Hao leader and respective Military-Civilian Council (MCC) member, said that the MCC had not officially convened as yet but was expected to convene today. He added that he personally would refuse to participate but that Hoa Hao would be represented by two or three others yet to be selected.

(f) One member of the AFC had observed that if General Ky took a firm position in opposition to Khanh, the floodgates would be open for the other AFC members to line up against Khanh.

In response to a question from Mr. Cooper as to the extent of Khanh’s support in the military and as to what form AFC opposition to Khanh might take, it was pointed out by Ambassador Taylor that:

(a) Firm support for Khanh to date has been based primarily in the Marines, Airborne Brigade, Armor and Navy—not the Army;

(b) Opposition in the AFC to Khanh would probably take form of a vote of no-confidence in Khanh as a candidate for Chief of State and perhaps as Commander-in-Chief;

(c) The departure of Khanh from the scene would still leave problems since the Young Turks as a group were not particularly well-disciplined or responsible.

Mr. Bundy inquired whether Khanh had in the past played the card of strong US backing and apparent lack of any suitable alternative. Ambassador Taylor responded in the affirmative.

Mr. McNaughton asked whether the U.S. press was under the illusion that the U.S. was backing Khanh. Mr. Zorthian replied that the U.S. press was under no such illusion; however, other members of the international press and a considerable number of the local press believed this to be the case. Therefore, the state of public opinion was somewhat confused on this question.

In response to a question from Mr. Unger, Ambassador Taylor noted that Khanh’s failure to obtain a representative MCC need not impede Khanh in attempting to dominate the Government. Khanh could either force the issue with the MCC as it exists or he could stand on the status quo with a pliable “Jack” Oanh as Acting Prime Minister. The latter was a likely possibility.

Ambassador Taylor then suggested the meeting address two problems:

(1) Should we proceed forthwith in conveying the same message as that conveyed to General Ky to other key military officers and to selected civilian personalities;

(2) Should we now request of Washington authority to invoke withholding of recognition of a Khanh Government should this prove necessary emphasizing at the same time that we would use only minimum U.S. pressure necessary to forestall a Khanh bid to become Chief of State.

With respect to (1) above it was the consensus that the immediate focus of action rests in the AFC and that approaches to civilians at present should not be made with the possible exception of Nguyen Luu Vien.

With respect to (2) above, it was questioned whether it is necessary to request such authority at this time. If Ambassador Taylor in effect puts in a PNG for Khanh, it might stop Khanh or on the other hand it might backfire. It was noted that there had been various Chiefs of State to date but none have wielded much power. Ambassador Taylor observed this was not the basic issue and reviewed in detail the analysis contained in Embtel 2391.⁴ Ambassador Johnson added there is no magic formula, that we faced the dilemmas set forth in Embtel 2391. In response to Mr. McNaughton’s question as to how confident the Saigon team was that Khanh’s succession to the position of Chief of State would ultimately lead to chaos, Ambassador Taylor said this was the unanimous view of the Mission.

Mr. McNaughton then referred to the possibility that Khanh’s position as Commander-in-Chief might be in jeopardy and inquired as to likely successors. General Westmoreland replied that the prime candidates were General Co, General Pham Van Dong, and to a lesser degree General Thieu. Westmoreland felt that the first two were well qualified and that Thieu was bright, popular with his colleagues and nimble enough to keep himself in an uncommitted position so that he is not swept away in changes of regime. He had done an effective job on previous assignments and could be voted into office by his colleagues, although this is likely to prompt a Buddhist reaction since Thieu is both a Catholic and a Dai Viet. General Westmoreland believed that General Khiem also has a role to play in South Viet-Nam but not necessarily at the present time.

Mr. Unger inquired whether the Buddhists would not present a problem regardless of what evolved from the current situation. Ambassador Taylor responded that Huong was on the verge of success in his confrontation with the Buddhists until Generals Khanh and Thi deliberately withheld military support of the Government in mid-central Vietnam. General Westmoreland observed that General Thieu had informed him that the Generals had “learned a lesson” with regard to standing up to the Buddhists.

Mr. McNaughton asked for an estimate as to what would happen if we pulled out all stops and invoked threat of non-recognition of a Khanh Government. Mr. de Silva said that it depended a great deal on how we handled the situation. If American views were communicated informally but authoritatively our views would fall on receptive or fertile ground and could force a showdown tomorrow. Mr. Bundy inquired as to Khanh’s reaction should information concerning our actions get back to Khanh. Mr. de Silva replied that Khanh would undoubtedly try to use it and to play up the anti-American theme to his advantage. General Goodpaster inquired whether the Generals to whom we would be conveying the “message” would fully understand the reasons lying behind the U.S. statement of views. It was pointed out that this could best be handled by confirming on our part the fears and concerns expressed by the military officers themselves. It was also noted that a communication of our views informally today, following the arrival of the Bundy party, would have a greater impact than similar statements made previously. Ambassador Taylor suggested that early action be taken to contact the key military figures believed to be receptive to our views in order to provide the necessary information on which to base judgment as to whether he should request authority from Washington to invoke the non-recognition threat if absolutely necessary. Ambassador Taylor emphasized that once a threat was invoked he would have to make good on the threat. It was further noted that the U.S. would be placed in an awkward position should Khanh succeed despite U.S. efforts.

Mr. Killen stated that the impression in Saigon and in the countryside is that Khanh is now running the country regardless of the position he occupies. The Vietnamese people are becoming more demoralized and discouraged. From his conversation with public spirited citizens, both high and low, it is evident that Khanh is thoroughly distrusted. Mr. Killen believes that regardless of the position Khanh holds he will, because of his power, be the effective chief of the ship of state. If we take a longer look regarding the necessity of reorganizing and revitalizing the government, in removing distrust of the government on the part of the people and in getting on with the struggle, it is evident that Khanh must be removed from positions of power. Mr. Killen believed that discussion of desirability of Khanh as Chief of State was only formalistic one, since Khanh exercised effective power.

Mr. Bundy asked whether anyone around the table differed with the above estimates of Khanh. Ambassador Taylor replied that no one from the U.S. Mission disagreed and in fact our objective was not only to prevent Khanh’s becoming Chief of State but to work toward a better government.

Ambassador Johnson noted that if Khanh does not succeed in his ploy to become Chief of State his days are probably numbered as Commander-in-Chief. Mr. Bundy asked whether it would not be sufficient for Khanh’s stock to go down dramatically if he fails in his ploy. Mr. Manfull observed that in this event Khanh would merely begin again to maneuver to assume power and would create further difficulties and instability in the future. Khanh will never give up in his drive for power. Mr. de Silva noted that it is significant that recently there has been a decided change of heart among the people who provide Khanh’s base of support—the military.

Mr. McNaughton inquired as to what evidence exists that Khanh would tend toward a neutralist solution were he to assume power. It was noted that there was no hard evidence but plenty of smoke, which could be adduced from his alliance with the Buddhists, and activities of his brother-in-law Pham [Phan?]Quang Tuoc, and the fears of his colleagues. In response to Mr. Cooper’s query, Ambassador Taylor said that Khanh would try to exploit publicly U.S. interference should he succeed in being appointed Chief of State and we in turn withheld recognition.

Mr. Unger noted the possibility that Khanh might be driven faster along the road to a neutralist solution if he becomes aware of U.S. action to block his path to Chief of State. Ambassador Taylor replied that he always had a feeling that Khanh was prepared to consider alternate solutions in any situation. General Westmoreland said that Khanh had accomplished many improvements in the strictly military field (better care for dependents, spot promotions, decorations for valor, etc.) but despite these actions his popularity with his colleagues has continually eroded. In his view the only commander of troops who would support Khanh in a pinch is the Commander of the Airborne Brigade, Dong. Dong was currently taking great pains to avoid his American counterpart.

Ambassador Taylor then posed the proposition: Should we proceed with conveying the “message” of last evening in the hopes of preventing Khanh from obtaining a vote of confidence at the AFC meeting on Friday. Mr. Bundy noted that there was a lot of territory between the statement conveyed yesterday and the flat statement that the U.S. would not recognize a government led by Khanh. He believed there were many things we could say but which would avoid a situation in which Khanh could say that Ambassador Taylor had tried to unseat him. In this connection it was pointed out that in effect the U.S. emissaries were merely associating the U.S. with the views these key military figures had already voiced in opposition to or concern over Khanh’s motivations and intentions. It was recognized, however, that Khanh would undoubtedly become aware of our activities.

It was agreed to proceed with conveying the “message” of the previous evening to selected military officers; namely, Generals Pham Van Dong, Thieu, Ky, Linh Quang Vien, Cao Van Vien, Marine Commander Khang, Commodore Chung Tan Cang (through Ky) and General Co.⁵ It was further agreed that based on results of conversations with the above officers a decision would be made at the end of the day regarding the necessity to request standby authority from Washington concerning non-recognition of a regime led by Khanh.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 68 A 5612, Org 7 Visits. Secret. Drafted by Manfull. According to Taylor’s diary he had a private meeting with Bundy at 9 a.m., and the general meeting began at 9:30 a.m. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-274–69)
2. See footnote 2, Document 60.
3. See footnote 2, Document 58.
4. Document 59.
5. See Document 68.