68. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1
2400. Reference: A) Embtel 2391; B)Embtel 2389; C) Deptel 1601.2 Feeling that message conveyed to General Ky last night (Ref B) had fallen on fertile ground and sensing need for broader coverage today, I authorized similar message to be conveyed discreetly to seven other key generals. We have not yet heard their reactions thereto but will have round-up at end of day. Unless there is fairly clear indication that some stronger action on our part is necessary to give reasonable assurance that Khanh will not be choice tomorrow of Armed Forces Council for Chief of State, I do not see any present likelihood of requiring authority mentioned in Ref A).
We should not be under any illusion about possibility of maintaining secrecy of these contacts we have made or to believe that General Khanh will not perceive our action. Except for Khanh’s reaction, I would not anticipate any flare-up from other generals who, during show-down with Khanh last August, were openly seeking US position with regard to retention of Khanh. Fact that we supported him at that time was subject for open discussion in their debates. Hence, I am not particularly concerned now over an excessively conspicuous showing of US hand.
With regard to possible successors to Khanh, three leading candidates in our judgment remain Co, Cong and Thieu. We would not rule out Ambassador Khiem but his absence from scene makes him definitely dark horse.
In concentrating attention on possible selection of Khanh as De Gaulle-type Chief of State, we have perhaps commented insufficiently on possibility that Khanh will prefer to keep Suu and “Jack” Owen in office and continue to pull strings from behind. This situation will not require sudden and dramatic action on our part but will present us with problem which cannot be allowed drag indefinitely. I can well visualize necessity at some time of utilizing full US leverage to include that mentioned in Ref B) to induce our Vietnamese friends to get Khanh out of [Page 143] position of Commander-in-Chief (from which he pulls the strings) and to install their very best governmental line-up.
In past slates, they have never used all their best people.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to DOD, the White House,CIA, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Received in the Department of State at 7:32 a.m.↩
- Telegram 2391 is Document 59; telegram 1601 is Document 60. Regarding telegram 2389, see footnote 2, Document 60.↩