Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

66. Telegram From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McCone¹

Saigon, February 4, 1965, 7:10 p.m.

Saig 1533. To Mr. McCone from McGeorge Bundy.

1. Thank you for your message.² Only an interim answer is possible overnight, but you should know that the immediate problem does not appear to be more than the quiet prevention of a total Khanh takeover which no one here believes would produce kind of government the President wants.

2. We have pressed throughout the day to see whether any member of Country Team believes that we can prevent continued deterioration in the absence of a “reasonably effective and stable government.” The Country Team appears to share the President’s judgement that such a government is necessary on all counts. Getting it is something else again.

3. In particular, I think you should tell the President that a day of inquiry reveals no present prospect of a government acceptable to us which would also be acceptable to the leaders of the Buddhist Institute. The current situation among non-Communists forces gives all the appearances of a civil war within a civil war.

4. In this situation, the construction of a government of national unity may well require sharp confrontation with Buddhists before, during, or after the construction job.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy—Saigon, Vol. I. Top Secret; Immediate; Nodis. The source text bears the handwritten notation: “Seen WP Bundy 2/5.” Attached to the source text is another copy of the telegram forwarded by McCone to the White House for Bromley Smith’s attention. A stamped date and time on this copy indicates that it was received at the White House at 4:07 p.m. on February 4.
2. Document 62.