236. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)1
SUBJECT
- Status of Political Track Discussions
I have prepared the attached compilation of the recent papers on this subject, including the excellent memorandum you brought from Saigon,2 my own memorandum of March 19,3 your paper of April 1,4 the short paper I did as a result of discussions during the week,5 and the exchange of cables with Saigon consisting of the March 19 memorandum and Alex’ reply comments and criticisms.6
Between them, I think these papers at least highlight the status of thinking at the present time and the difficulties we face. I think we should be working on a more comprehensive revision of the March 19 memorandum, and Mr. Green and Mr. Unger will work on this as time permits during the week. I will come back at it after that.
[Page 526]As I see it, your opening discussions with Quat would be exploratory in nature and would be designed to bring out the stages of our present thinking and to elicit his comments particularly on the content of the early stages. The stages appear to be:
1. Conditions for cessation of attacks on the DRV.
On this point, papers 3 and 4 are really not far apart, that our asking price might include withdrawal of units from the South, but that we might settle for cessation of infiltration (de facto) plus a major reduction in VC activity in the South, plus a surfacing and groupment of the major forces in the South, together with a commitment to move rapidly to a stage of withdrawal/demilitarization. If Hanoi did not in fact move to this stage, we would reserve the right to resume attacks on the DRV.
2. Withdrawal/demilitarization stage.
We all agree that, whatever conditions we get for the cessation of attacks on the DRV, we cannot accept a condition in which the VC units were simply left intact in the South. My memorandum argued that the withdrawal/demilitarization phase required a lot of international supervision, and that we would have to move to some kind of multilateral discussion in order to get this. We need to do some more work on whether the multilateral method would have to be a reconvened Geneva Conference, or whether the effort might be made to bring in the UN at this stage.
3. Determination of the political structure within South Viet-Nam.
Alex’ 31777 takes this up at length. I certainly agree that we do not want to concede any DRV voice on this, and I think we all agree that we must stand firm against any legalized role for the Liberation Front. In so doing, however, we probably will want to say that South Viet-Nam should in due course find a way of expressing the popular will to “determine its own future” (the President’s phrase of last week),8 and this forms a pretty good line of defense against legalizing the Liberation Front. I don’t think this is singling out South Viet-Nam or need be phrased in any way that would undermine the standing of the GVN as of that time, points which Alex made. However, we don’t cross this bridge for the time being in any case, and I don’t think we need to be at all specific on it with Quat or the present GVN.
[Page 527]4. International status of South Viet-Nam.
As stated in the March 19 memorandum, I think this is not too difficult.
5. Relations between North and South Viet-Nam.
Here we have one immediate question, whether we might foreshadow recognition of North Viet-Nam, as Tran Van Do has suggested.9 We might also consider whether we should foreshadow the possibility of peaceful trade between the two Viet-Nams. My own feeling is that we could do both of these, and conceivably in a broad form as early as the reply to the 17 nations. It is in the present draft to be discussed.
The really tough problem is the question of eventual unification and “free elections” in all Viet-Nam. This is the main sticking point in our adhering to past formulations about “the essential elements of the 1954 agreement.” I know that the Secretary is troubled about this problem; my own personal view is that we would not be badly off if we stuck to the old position that we were always prepared, in the case of divided countries, to see the will of the people determined by free elections under UN or other international supervision. We would have to worry about taking the position in Viet-Nam different from the strong positions we have taken in Germany and Korea. As a practical matter, I myself think that this formulation would move the issue so far down the road that we would not have to worry about it, although I would wholly agree that we should not accept the setting of a definite date for future elections in any reaffirmed Geneva Agreement, as the setting of such a date, in itself, would have a disruptive effect in the South. This too is an issue that I do not see us facing in the early stages of discussion, and I should think we could go on trying to play the card pretty close to our chest for the time being.
In a sense, all of this—but particularly point 1 and perhaps point 5—relate to the contents of the reply to the 17 nations. We will be discussing this today and perhaps cabling the draft to Alex,10 and you will be carrying it with you.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William Bundy. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, McNaughton, Green, and Unger. April 3 was the last day of Taylor’s Washington visit.↩
- Reference is to an undated paper entitled “Settlement” prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)↩
- Document 207.↩
- Document 226.↩
- Regarding William Bundy’s March 31 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 228.↩
- Document 225 and footnote 2 thereto.↩
- Document 225.↩
- For text of the President’s statement of March 25, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965, Book I, p. 319.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 225.↩
- Regarding the drafting of the U.S. Government’s reply to the 17-nation appeal, see Document 245.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩