226. Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)1
In constructing our political track leading to the ending of hostilities, we should first remind ourselves of the terminal situation which we [Page 504] wish to create. We would like to be assured that the DRV has ceased its support of the VC insurgency, that the main force VC units and all VC personnel so desiring, move back into North Viet-Nam, that the former VC remaining in South Viet-Nam are prepared to become law-abiding citizens, that the Communist commnications network between North and South Viet-Nam is dismantled and that some form of international inspection exists to verify the consummation of these actions. Likewise, there should be some arrangement subject to verification that Laotian territory will no longer be used as a channel of infiltration into South Viet-Nam.
To attain these objectives, we have three blue chips to offer Hanoi: cessation of our bombing attacks, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam and political and economic assistance for North Viet-Nam. The question is how best to play these chips in order to get in return the objectives indicated above.
In exchange for the cessation of bombing we would like to get the cessation of DRV support for the VC and the withdrawal of main force VC units. While this demand might be our initial position, it seems highly unlikely that both of these concessions could be obtained. In lieu of the requirement to withdraw main force units, an acceptable modification might be an agreement that the major VC forces would “surface”, identify themselves to the ICC and remain in place pending an arrangement for their evacuation to the North. Implicit in this procedure is the prior presence in South Viet-Nam of a strong ICC type mission capable of monitoring this entire procedure.
Also, we must be prepared to resume bombing if negotiations break down or if the DRV does not live up to its agreements.
Thus, under the foregoing concept, the first phase would consist of our cessation of bombing in exchange for the termination of aid and direction by Hanoi to the VC (to include the requirement that all Communist radio traffic be in the clear) and for the surfacing, identification, and immobilization of the main VC units in South Viet-Nam. VC incidents would have to cease and government forces would circulate freely except in the immediate vicinity of the areas occupied by the identified VC units. The second phase might consist of the actions necessary for the withdrawal of all main force units and supporting VC guerrillas to the North in exchange for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Viet-Nam. Such a withdrawal could be increments, possibly based on percentages of total strength. The VC units could depart honorably with their arms and colors flying.
Upon the completion of phase 2, there would be the pay-off whereby the United States would engage itself to provide political and economic support for both North and South Viet-Nam to assure the viability of both countries as independent, recognized states.
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, Political Track Papers. Top Secret.↩