Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, April 1, 1965, 7 p.m.

3177. For Ambassador Taylor only from Alex Johnson. Deptel 2121.² Regret delay in replying but other events have intervened (as matter of fact was working on reply when explosion came). With all due respect to drafter of memo, I frankly find it confusing, in places seemingly internally contradictory, and thus in short compass, I find it somewhat difficult to come to grips with it. Among problems I have are following:

1. Implication that DRV is entitled to have voice in “future political organization in the South” (paras B-9; D-2) and that “fairly substantial international machinery” for which we “should possibly welcome and seek conference situation” would be involved in “an appropriate determination of the will of the people of SVN” (all the first portion of para III). It seems to me that all of this calls into question the legitimacy and mandate of this or any other GVN which may be in power at time of negotiation. I do not see how any GVN could accept this which is far different from a GVN itself unilaterally making future provision for a constitutional structure and general elections. As we both know, desirable though general elections may be at some future time, they are no remedy for the ills of SVN which for a long time is going to require a “strong, effective and stable” government as opposed to some theoretical “democratic” government. Much of the philosophy on this embodied in the memo tends, in my view, to move toward the DRV thesis with respect to the 1965 elections provided for under the 1954 Geneva Agreement, that is, that SVN should be subjected to the test of elections, but no similar tests should be applied to the DRV. It seems to me our position should continue to be that the DRV, which directs, controls and supports the VC movement, should get out of SVN in order to leave SVN free to determine its own future in its own way the same as any other country. I emphasize that we should do nothing that calls into question legitimacy of GVN.

2. Based on our past experience, I feel that it is misleading and pursuing a will of the wisp to speak of “reliable” international supervision and inspection of cessation of infiltration (para B-5 and latter part of para III). I am also not clear on how it is proposed that this concept be applied to Laos which will remain the principal problem. An attempt to negotiate this with respect to Laos will open up the entire 1962 Laos Accords and in fact I wonder whether we will be able to get anything better on paper than that accord with respect to Laos. The principal problem on inspection of cessation of infiltration through Laos is not the 1962 agreement but its implementation. I would think that we would do better by insisting on its effective implementation with respect to freedom of ICC movement rather than seeking to negotiate a new accord on Laos.

3. I have difficulty with the emphasis throughout the paper on “infiltrators” from the DRV as opposed to the VC in general. For example, para B-7 speaks only of withdrawal or de-militarization of the infiltrator and in the third paragraph of para III, “some procedure of regroupment and repatriation to the north of those who had come from there”. Pursuing our thesis that the VC are an organization organized, controlled, supported, and directed by the DRV, the question is not where a VC happened in recent time to have come from, but for whom he works. What happens to him and in fact his own desires will presumably be heavily affected by this fact. That is, if the DRV calls off its VC dogs here, many who are now in the VC, even though locally recruited, will presumably desire to proceed to the DRV and it is in our interest to do the maximum to encourage this. Thus instead of laying stress on return to the DRV only of “infiltrators”, I would lay the stress on free choice for the VC, that is, either acceptance of an amnesty here or a return to DRV. The mechanics of such an operation will obviously require negotiation and international supervision will be very desirable. It has been my own view that mechanics could be worked out at bilateral DRV/GVN “military level” negotiations and that international supervision readily provided by a simple request from both sides to the existing ICC (personnel of which could be augmented) thus obviating the necessity of a new international mechanism.

4. The cessation of our air attacks on the DRV is based on two very vague and difficult to establish conditions, first the stopping or dwindling to a trickle of infiltration and the “cessation of organized unit action of any significant size” (para II). As noted under para III, “this would leave enclaves of VC control scattered throughout the country.” While the memo exhorts US “not to accept hardening of somewhat legalized VC control” and not to “let the VC dig in”, as well as not to accept a “legalized role for the liberation front”, it seems to me that these results will be inevitable under this sequence of events. If we accept that the DRV has carried out its obligations (cessation of infiltration and organized unit action of any significant size) and we have thus stopped our air attacks, the DRV will no longer be under any pressure to negotiate on behalf of the VC. We will have to negotiate with somebody and this inevitably leads back to negotiation of some kind with the Liberation Front. An international conference on the subject can go on indefinitely while the VC do in fact “dig in”. It thus seems to me absolutely essential that in some way or other the original negotiation encompass in some form the cessation of VC attacks as well as VC regroupment and disposition, that is, a choice between acceptance of an amnesty or repatriation to the DRV.

I fully understand and am in sympathy with the effort in the paper to find some formula that will appear to be less than complete capitulation by the DRV and to leave the DRV a “golden door of retreat”. However, I feel that the draft memo is on the one hand so vague and imprecise and on the other hand so full of pitfalls for the future that we should urge a fresh attack on the problem of finding a formula. Some of the suggestions Tran Van Do made to you could be considered.³

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive analysis and I have not attempted to repeat the recommendations we have already made to the Dept or the analysis that I made in the memo you took with you.⁴ Thus if you feel that anything more from me would be helpful, please let me know. In any event, I do hope that while you are there you will be able to arrive at a meeting of the minds on this most important and fundamental subject.

Johnson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 8:42 a.m.
2. Telegram 2121, March 29, transmitted William Bundy’s memorandum of March 19 to Rusk (Document 207) along with Taylor’s request for Johnson’s comments on the memorandum, which Taylor said had as yet no formal status. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
3. In telegram 3096 from Saigon, March 26, Taylor described his conversation the previous day with Foreign Minister Tran Van Do, who said that the key problem was how to give Hanoi a face-saving way out of the war and at the same time to end the insurgency in the south on terms favorable to the South Vietnamese Government. One of Tran Van Do’s suggestions was to have the Soviet Union or China urge Hanoi to end the Viet Cong insurgency. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S)
4. Presumably an undated paper entitled “Settlement,” prepared by the U.S. Embassy in Vietnam. (Ibid., FE Files: Lot 69 D 74, EA)