Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965

237. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, April 3, 1965, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dean Rusk
• Mr. McGeorge Bundy
• Ambassador Taylor
• Assistant Secretary Bundy
• Ambassador Unger
• Mr. H.F. Matthews, Jr.

Secretary Rusk began by saying he thought Ambassador Taylor would now have an impression of the problem facing the political leadership in the United States on policy toward Viet-Nam. The President felt that he must not force the pace too fast or the Congress and public opinion, which had been held in line up to now through the President’s strenuous efforts, would no longer support our actions in Viet-Nam. Ambassador Taylor agreed that he understood the situation in the United States. Secretary Rusk said he hoped Ambassador Taylor would therefore not be too specific in relating the Washington decisions to Prime Minister Quat and that he would inform the Vietnamese of specific events, such as the 21-point Johnson program, only just before they were about to take place.

Ambassador Taylor then showed Secretary Rusk the paper entitled “Subjects for Discussion with GVN” dated April 3 (attached). Ambassador Taylor said the additional Marine deployments would require clearance from Quat. There was discussion of the revised Marine mission, as summarized in the memorandum of April 3 prepared by Ambassador Unger.² Ambassador Taylor said an instruction to the Marines was necessary to encourage them to patrol deeply, in cooperation with ARVN units. There was agreement that the Marines should be used in 1) local counterinsurgency in a mobile posture and in 2) strike reaction, and that they should have an “active and aggressive posture”. Secretary Rusk said later in the discussion that he did not yet want to give up the ability to describe their mission as defensive.

Secretary Rusk said the Ambassador could mention the reinforcements (points A 2 and A 3) to Quat, but said the President has not yet cleared the idea of further offensive enclaves, so any discussions with the Vietnamese should be ambiguous and emphasize the logistic aspects of point A 5. The remaining points under overall heading A presented no particular problems, but implementing messages from Washington will be required for some of them.

The discussion then turned to the draft reply³ to the 17-nation proposal and the Secretary said the replies of the United States and the GVN should be consistent but different. The Vietnamese could be more shrill in their response. Various changes were made by the participants in the draft reply.

With regard to points B and C under overall point B, the Secretary said our and the GVN’s actions toward the DRV concerning negotiations should be parallel and consistent; we should consult together but our responses need not be identical and we should not get tongue-tied.

The Secretary digressed to say he wanted Ambassador Taylor to make clear to Quat in the course of consultations about future actions that we realized that the war in SVN was one in which the GVN’s responsibilities were paramount and in which they were taking the heavy casualties; however, the United States would bear 100% of the responsibility and repercussions in case the war “escalated”. The Secretary emphasized that the GVN should understand this point clearly.

Ambassador Taylor asked whether the GVN should be the mouthpiece in any discussions with the DRV (point C) and the Secretary said not necessarily except perhaps with the NLF. In this connection, the Secretary said, and he returned once again later to this point, that we should explore with Quat whether there was any possibility of the GVN’s talking to Front leaders and persuading a couple of them to defect. Such defectors, who would say publicly the whole Front was a fraud and a sham, would be worth a great deal—perhaps several mission [million?]dollars in Switzerland.

As to point D, it was agreed that it was not yet possible to determine how we would play our high cards in any negotiations and what we hoped to get for each card.

The discussion turned to the draft NSAM,⁴ which was accordingly revised. Ambassador Taylor reminded the group that clearance of the GVN was required on a number of the items included in it. Mr. McGeorge Bundy emphasized the need for very tight public information controls on these matters.

Attachment⁵

Washington, April 3, 1965.

Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Unger)

SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION WITH GVN

Upon his return to Saigon, Ambassador Taylor should initiate discussions with the GVN for the following purposes:

A. To explain recent USG decisions and obtain GVN concurrence and cooperation as required.

(A) Military Decisions

1. 21-point Johnson program

2. 18–20,000 U.S. personnel increase

3. Additional Marine deployments (2 battalions, 1 squadron)

4. Revised Marine Mission

5. Logistic development of certain coastal enclaves

6. Possible third-country contributors, Australia, New Zealand, Korea

7. Route-blocking activities in Laos

8. Increased naval surveillance

(B) Non-military decisions (41 points) New Chancery

(C) Rowan Program

(D) Leaflet Drops

B. To develop thinking of GVN with regard to possible political courses of action.

(A) 17 Nation proposal. Agreement of GVN should be obtained to a coordinated response.

(B) General attitude toward negotiations or communications with DRV.

(C) Possible procedures and timing of such communications.

(D) Possible elements of a negotiation package.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cables 1965. Top Secret. The drafter is not indicated, but apparently Matthews drafted it on April 6. The meeting was held in the Secretary of State’s office.
2. Document 238.
3. See Document 245.
4. Apparently a draft of NSAM 328, Document 242.
5. Top Secret. Drafted by Unger.