Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

381. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 16, 1964—7 p.m.

1150. CINCPAC for POLAD. This morning (October 16) before the opening of the combined session of the NSC and the U.S. Mission Council, I talked to Khanh briefly with regard to his meeting with the High National Council yesterday. He confirmed what we had heard through other sources.

He has informed the High National Council that the draft charter in its present form is not satisfactory to the armed forces and, if promulgated, is likely to generate a coup. Khanh considers that under the charter the Chief of State is vastly more powerful. than the Prime Minister and does not resemble the position presently held by Minh; because of its primacy the post must be filled by a civilian. In fact, all military officers presently in the government must “return to the barracks”. Furthermore, the armed forces cannot be submerged as planned under the charter but must be given the special status reported in Embtel 1137² whereby they depend directly from the Chief of State and are independent of the rest of the government.

Khanh was particularly eloquent in attacking the provision of the charter whereby the old triumvirate would assume the powers of the Chief of State until the latter can be selected by a National Assembly. This provision would mean that a divided, discordant committee would attempt to direct the government for a period of months while elections were being held and arrangements completed for the National Assembly.

I asked Khanh how we can end the apparent impasse. Would he still be satisfied with the formula which he had apparently accepted in a recent conversation with me at Cap St. Jacques; namely, that Minh would remain as nominal Chief of State and he, Khanh, would assume the offices of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief while a strong civilian with full powers would run the government as Prime Minister? Khanh said that this formula was still acceptable to him.

Following the meeting of the NSC/Mission Council, I went to see Minh and found him plunged in gloom. He described Khanh as having behaved very badly the previous day in threatening the Council with a military coup if he does not have his way. He verified the nature of Khanh’s demands essentially as Khanh had described them, but argues strongly that Khanh is wrong in his evaluation of the importance of the powers attributed in charter to Chief of State. In his view, under the charter, the Chief of State would “reign and not govern”. He also insists that under the terms of the decision of the Military Revolutionary Council of September 8 the triumvirate is obliged to remain in place until “the national institutions set forth in the provisional charter have been set up.”

I asked Minh the same question as I had Khanh, namely, would he accept the formula of a strong civilian Prime Minister with him as nominal Chief of State and Khanh the number one military officer? Minh said he would but did not believe that Khanh would go along.

Minh described the Council as being discouraged and disgusted. He suggested that we Americans should contact key members and encourage them. We are trying to set up an appointment with the four recognized leaders for a meeting tomorrow, October 17.³ We will sound out their willingness to adjust the charter to the governmental formula described above, provided Minh and Khanh will really line up for it.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC.
2. Document 379.
3. At the meeting on the afternoon of October 17, Taylor stressed to the four leaders the need for accommodating Khanh, emphasizing in particular the powers of the Chief of State, the elimination of the triumvirate, the personalities in the new government, and the length of their tenure. Taylor described the session as useful, but noted that he would have to maintain pressure on the Council to fulfill its mandate. (Telegram 1175 from Saigon; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S)