379. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State1

1137. CINCPAC for POLAD. Today (October 14) I called on Minh in the morning and Khanh in the afternoon to hear their accounts of meeting with the High National Council yesterday.

Minh reported that the visit went off amicably and that he was able to assure members of his complete support.

Minh explained that the new charter may not be ready today but should be very shortly. His version of the probable course of future events is as follows:

The charter will be announced with the explanation that the triumvirate remains responsible for the general conduct of the government until convocation of the National Assembly. During this interval, the Council will serve as the legislative branch of the new government but the problem remains how to constitute the executive for this interim period.

Since the triumvirate remains in existence, in Minh’s mind there is no question but that he will remain as Chief of State. As a way to constitute a cabinet and choose an interim Prime Minister, he visualizes a small team (“equipe”) of leaders getting together, forming a trial government with an aspirant Prime Minister and producing a governmental program. This team would then present itself with its program to the triumvirate (less Khiem) and the Council and ask for acceptance as the interim government. If approved, it would be in business; otherwise some other team would have to try.

I then tried to draw him out on the subject of personalities. According to Minh’s statements, it is quite clear there is such a team in formation now, probably headed by the Prefect of Saigon, Tran Van Huong, who under this plan would hope to become Prime Minister. [Page 833] The other members whom Minh regards as being on the team are not clear. Minh referred to them as being some from the Council and some on the outside. I gathered that Vu Van Mau may be on the list as Prime Minister and Nguyen Luu Vien, the present Minister of the Interior, will have some key position.

As to the role for him and Khanh to play, Minh agrees that the ideal solution would be for him to remain as Chief of State and Khanh to be the principal military figure of the government. He expressed some doubts however that Khanh would accept this relatively subordinate role.

I asked Minh upon leaving whether he expected an orderly transition from the present government on October 27. He hesitated a moment and then said that he anticipated no disturbance. As previously reported, we hear rumors that pro-Khanh government demonstrations are possible.

In the afternoon, I went to see Khanh to compare his story of events with Minh’s. He said that he, too, had had a pleasant meeting with the Council and felt that he had assuaged their fears of military intervention.

He added that the Council had urged him to remain in the government as Chief of State or Chief of Government. He refused to entertain the proposition saying he could not send his Generals “back to the barracks” and exclude them from political activities if he did not do likewise.

We then went over his understanding of what the Council was about to do and it differs considerably from other interpretations. He understands that the High National Council after promulgating its charter (presumably today) will name the Chief of State who will be of the Gaullist type with extensive powers. The Chief of State will choose an aspirant Prime Minister who will put together a cabinet and a program for presentation to the Council acting as substitute for the National Assembly. The Council will accept or reject the government and its program; in the latter case, someone else will have to try again.

Khanh verified that the Council will act as the legislative branch until the convocation of the National Assembly some months later. Apparently safeguards to assure stability are in the plan and the new National Assembly will accept the existing government unless it can be overturned by a two-thirds vote. The Chief of State 1s independent of the government and is not subject to removal by the Assembly except for some extreme offense such as treason. He, on the other hand, can dissolve the National Assembly if the latter overturns the government too frequently.

The Chief of State also presides over the cabinet and, according to Khanh, is the real source of policy direction, in fact, a De Gaulle.

[Page 834]

I tried to find out whether Khanh knew anything about Minh’s “team” headed by the Prefect of Saigon. He would only concede that he had heard the Prefect mentioned as a possible candidate for Prime Minister.

Khanh confessed to surprise as I did at this new concept of the government. He said that his only suggestion to the Council had been to give a more “honorable” position to the army by having it depend directly from the Chief of State. Thus, he would remove the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from the control of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense, the latter becoming strictly an executive and administrative official.

I told Khanh that such a government would be criticized as establishing a dictatorship as rigid as that of the rejected Vung Tau Charter. Khanh conceded that point but seemed to enjoy the idea. Asked about personalities in key positions, he would only say that he does not intend to accept the position of Chief of State, but would be happy to be Commander-in-Chief. I am not at all so sure of his sincerity because from an early date he has shown an interest in the De Gaulle-Pompidou formula, with Khanh in the role of De Gaulle.

I am afraid that the foregoing cable presents a confusing melange of views on the formation of the government. We should receive a copy of the charter shortly which I hope will be explicit enough to clarify what is intended. Although we have stressed the importance of breaking news of the charter to the public after adequate public relation preparations, I am afraid this one is likely to appear with as little preparation as the ill-fated Vung Tau Charter.

Taylor
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to CIA, the Department of Defense, the White House, and CINCPAC. According to another copy, this telegram was drafted by Taylor. (Ibid., Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8)