Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

378. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Vietnam Coordinating Committee (Forrestal) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

• General Khanh

At the risk of getting out on a limb, I thought I would put on paper some personal thoughts about General Khanh and his place on the Saigon political scene. Some reporting from the field has suggested that General Khanh demonstrated indecision during the August and September difficulties, that he never has been much of a politician, that he has shown inability to mobilize significant popular support, and that he is pretty well finished. The implication of such an assessment would be that we must search for alternate leadership in Vietnam.

I am not at all sure that such an assessment and conclusion are justified. On the contrary, I think it may very well be that General Khanh is turning into one of the shrewder modern Vietnamese political figures. Sufficient time has now passed since the events in August, beginning with the ill-fated promulgation of the Vung Tau Charter to suggest that Khanh may be playing a deeper and longer term political game more successfully than we have suspected. Consider what his refusal to act during the public disturbances in August has accomplished. There is evidence that Tri Quang, the militant Buddhist leader, has become more and more moderate and apparently concerned over the adverse political reaction in the coastal cities to the rioting, which he himself probably encouraged. There is beginning to be evidence that Thich Tam Chau is making capital out of publicly espousing a moderate line in the Buddhist community and may be regaining control over the Buddhist organization (particularly insofar as the students and newspapers in Saigon are concerned).

Dr. Quyen is in Saigon on the High National Council. In the meantime, the People’s National Salvation Committees which he spawned from Hue and other northern cities show signs of falling apart. In some of the central provinces officials are cracking down on the unruly elements which showed their heads last August, apparently in response to orders from Khanh

Finally, the coup attempt of September 13th was such a comic failure that one begins to suspect whether the Can Lao/Dai Viet “remnants” didn’t fall into a carefully prepared trap. In any event, the vestiges of influence they had left, including General Khiem, have been removed.

It is possible to argue that all this has happened without any action on Khanh’s part and merely confirms his inability to make decisions. This proposition does not strike me as being the most likely explanation. We know that when Khanh was Commander of the Second Corps, he was considered to be among the most decisive of corps commanders, as well as the most politically effective. We have recently learned that Khanh was not the prime mover of the January coup from which he emerged as Prime Minister. On the contrary, the leader now appears to have been General Khiem. This may account for the apparent lack of effective action by Khanh during the period when he was supposed to be in charge of the government. In fact, he may not have been, certainly not of the civilian side.

At present Khanh may be continuing his waiting game in an effort to create a political situation which will enable him to return to power in answer to a draft, under conditions where he owes as little as possible to any single supporter, including the U.S.

He has done an effective job of telling Ambassador Taylor he has no ambitions to remain as Prime Minister. He has already acted in such a way as to make some of the members of the High National Council suspect that his public demonstrations of his intent to resign on October 27th are merely designed to encourage a popular demand (which Khanh himself might stimulate) for his return to power.

In short, I don’t think Khanh is going to pull a Coolidge. He might well return as the country’s principal leader with Vu Van Mau, who is now said to be his closest political advisor, as a civilian front.

The main question in my mind is where this leaves General Minh, and I suspect that this is the main question in Khanh’s mind as well.

Whether or not this analysis turns out to be correct, I think there is enough in it to suggest that we should not get too fixed on the proposition that the man we once embraced as the most effective leader in Vietnam is going to opt for early retirement from political life.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Vietnam Country File, Memos, Vol. XIX. Secret. Also sent to William Bundy, McNaughton, and Colby. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 107D.