Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 13, 1964—9 a.m.

1109. CINCPAC for POLAD. On October 12, Alex Johnson and I took up a number of questions with General Khanh on a visit to his headquarters at Cap St. Jacques. After disposing of a number of secondary matters reported in other cables,² we opened a discussion of the new govt.

I reported to him our meeting with the Council at my residence on Oct 11 (see Embtel 1108).³ He showed a lively interest in the matter saying that he was still out of touch with the Council, and asked how the work was proceeding.

I summarized the general nature of our discussion with the Council members and stressed their uneasiness over the attitude of the military. I reported that his recent letter to them guaranteeing the support of the army for a govt which received “the approval of all the people” had caused them some concern.⁴ Did this suggest the military leaders were about to pounce upon the dissatisfaction of some minority as a reason to oppose a govt which the Council might propose? Because of their obvious apprehensions, I thought they were greatly in need of a heart-to-heart talk with Generals Khanh and Minh.

General Khanh answered at once that his position was perfectly clear. He had no personal ambition for any public office and would take any assignment which he was offered. He agreed to the need of a frank discussion with the Council and indicated that, while up to now they had not conferred with him, he had an appointment with them on the morning of Oct 13. He will first meet with General Minh and will then join the Council.

Khanh expressed surprise that they intended to publish a charter this week. Recalling his unfortunate experience in surfacing the Vung Tau Charter against our advice without laying adequate political and public groundwork, he expressed hope Council would not repeat same mistake. He said he thus far had no idea of what they intended to come up with in way of charter.

There followed the discussion of governmental formulas under consideration. I told Khanh that apparently the Council had in mind a govt with a Chief of State and a Prime Minister. He replied that he would definitely oppose any parliamentary system which would be subject to the instability of the French Fourth Republic. Alex Johnson pointed out that it was possible to have a parliamentary system with built-in restraints such as the German system which would not have the disadvantages that General Khanh seemed to fear. We ended by agreeing that there are a number of formulas which might satisfy either a Presidential system, a system on the French “De Gaulle-Pompidou” pattern or one on the German pattern.

I then made the point that agreement would probably not be difficult on the matter of the governmental formula. The hard debate would center about the personalities to occupy the principal posts in the new provisional govt. Khanh asked if the members of the Council had shown any desire to discuss personalities, and I replied in the negative. He then asked what Alex Johnson and I thought.

I took the opportunity by the forelock and replied it seemed to me to be a problem of properly relating three key individuals-General Khanh, General Minh and a presently unidentified civilian who could qualify as Prime Minister. Operating on the premise that it is preferable to have a civilian Prime Minister, then it becomes a question of how best to use the talents of Khanh and Minh. There are at least two ways to do so. The first is to leave Minh as Chief of State generally with his present functions and make Khanh the chief military figure of the govt, perhaps as both Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief. The second solution would reverse the roles although in this case the position of Minister of Defense might go to Minh and the position of Commander-in-Chief to some other General. I said I would favor the first solution unless indeed the overall formula for the govt followed the De Gaulle pattern, in which case I would prefer General Khanh as the Chief of State.

General Khanh did not hesitate to say that he preferred the first solution in which he could be the military leader and leave Minh in his present role as Chief of State. He explained his preference by saying that the army would never accept Minh again as their military leader. They know too much about him and no longer respect him. He, Khanh, would be very happy to fulfill a purely military role which would allow him to unify the army once more. He feels deeply the need of purifying the army after the experience of the Sept 13 coup and feels that he is the man to do it. He repeated his conviction that the army must be got out of politics and kept out of politics. No military man should enter the govt unless he has first resigned his commission.

General Khanh went on to say that, of course, his willingness to serve in the govt would depend on its composition. He would have to know who would be the civilian Prime Minister and decide whether he is a man under whom he would be willing to serve. Also, he would have to know the program of the govt, professing that this was more important than the personality of the Prime Minister. We pointed out that he would probably have to be content with a statement of principles at outset as it would take time to elaborate a program.

In the course of the discussion, we raised the matter of assuring the duration of the leadership chosen at the outset by the High National Council. Johnson and I emphasized the points which we made with the Council, namely that it would be most unfortunate if the leadership chosen now were changed a few months later by the new National Assembly. Khanh got the point and seemed to agree entirely.

In summary, we found Khanh in one of his best moods, seeming to talk frankly and without reservations. If he is out to sabotage any govt in which he is not the chief, he dissembled very ably. He has promised to inform us by Wednesday the outcome of his discussions with Minh and the Council.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Also sent to CIA, the Department of Defense, and the White House and repeated to CINCPAC. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 96C.
2. telegram 1102 from Saigon, October 12, reported on the brief discussion of air operations in the Lao corridor. (Department of State, Saigon Embassy Files: Lot 68 F 8) No other cables on the discussion with Khanh have been found.
3. Document 376.
4. See footnote 2, Document 376.