Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

376. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 12, 1964—11 p.m.

1108. CINCPAC for POLAD. We held a working reception for High National Council yesterday evening. Following members of Council attended: Pham Khac Suu, Ngo Gia Hy, Nguyen Dinh Luyen, Le Van Thu, Nguyen Van Luc, Tran Quang Vinh, Tran Van Van, Ho Van Nhut, Le Khac Quyen, Nguyen Van Huyen, Tran Van Que, and Mai Tho Truyen. Atmosphere throughout was warm, relaxed but serious and responsive in our general discussions.

After initial greetings and private conversations, I made short statement to the group on the historical significance task assigned to the Council, the importance US attaches to successful completion of the Council’s work, and the difficulty of reconciling in a realistic manner the current surge for greater democracy in midst of war. I stressed inter alia: 1) the necessity for strong, stable government suited to a wartime situation; 2) the importance of assuring that the government would endure for a considerable period of time and not have its life span limited either by specific provisions of Provisional Charter or through caprice of the National Assembly when installed; 3) necessity for close cooperation between civilians and the military; 4) fact that US has no preconceived notions as to the particular forms of government or personalities; and 5) our constant availability for consultation should the Council wish to obtain authoritative statement of US views. After brief response from Pham Khac Suu, Council members invited our questions concerning status their work. In ensuing discussion, which was open and much more frank than anticipated, following general impressions drawn from remarks those present:

1) There is considerable area of agreement on the form of government preferred by the Council; namely a single Chief of State who would be designated by the Council; Chief of State with some form of Council approval would appoint a Prime Minister having broad executive powers. Prime Minister designate would then present himself and his program to the Council and after receiving Council endorsement would form his government. Council (and later National Assembly perhaps with Council acting as Senate) would retain power to change government through vote of no confidence but only by substantial majority (2/3 or 3/4) and in conjunction with parallel vote on government which would replace out-going government. (Council members refer to this as Bonn formula.)

2) General agreement exists that new National Assembly cannot be installed by October 27 deadline and should be deferred for 3–4 months beyond that date. Assembly would basically be an elected one but precise method of elections not yet determined.

3) Council had given considerable thought to incorporating safeguard in draft charter so that stability and tenure of provisional government could be maintained and government (and work of the Council) could not be overturned by whim of new Assembly once it is installed.

4) While Council members carefully skirted issue of personalities, they were obviously concerned as to General Khanh’s intentions. Many interpreted Khanh’s letter (Embtel 1092)² as ultimatum and evidence Khanh maneuvering to stay in power regardless of work of Council. All appeared to agree that close cooperation between civilians and military absolutely essential for governmental stability and on need for early consultation with the military concerning Council’s provisional charter. (Suu and Van indicated privately that they would attempt to have separate discussions with Minh and Khanh today.)

5) Council seemed to be shooting for a deadline of October 20 to complete their work and to have some elements of new government actually installed by October 27 deadline. (In individual conversations some members indicated Council could complete draft of charter by tomorrow if all went well.)

In general the group was more impressive, dedicated, and cohesive in their views than we had anticipated. While it remains to be seen whether this sense of purpose can be maintained in their forthcoming discussions with the military on the composition of the government, they appeared to be approaching their task with a real sense of responsibility and urgency. We will follow up on results their meetings with Minh and Khanh. Telegram follows³ on views expressed by Council members in individual discussions.⁴

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Vientiane, Bangkok, Hue, and CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 1092, October 11, transmitted a translation of Khanh’s letter to Minh and the High National Council asking to be replaced as Prime Minister so he could return to the military. (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 1122 from Saigon, October 13. (Ibid.)
4. In his diary for October 11, Taylor noted: “The outstanding impression was the fear of the Council members of the military and in particular of General Khanh.” (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T–272–69)