Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume I, Vietnam, 1964

380. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 16, 1964—1 p.m.

1148. CINCPAC for POLAD. Confrontation which has been developing between Khanh plus Young Turk officers on the one hand and Minh plus High National Council on the other hand, has sharpened considerably in past few days.

Although sparring for position has been characterized by usual Vietnamese indirection and obscurities, picture we have pieced together from numerous contacts appears as follows:

1) The HNC has completed a draft charter and has sent copies to Khanh and Minh. Khanh has confidentially sent Ambassador Taylor a photocopy of what he claims to be charter he has received from HNC. According this document, Chief of State given extraordinary powers to considerable detriment of Prime Minister. Moreover, Chief of State assumes title of Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and appoints all senior military officers.

2) Khanh met with HNC Oct 15, told them their charter “unacceptable” to armed forces and demanded revisions. Although he seems to have offered them several options, his primary suggestion reportedly is based on Republic of China pattern which gives special “position of honor” to armed forces. Khanh has told Ambassador Taylor that he feels armed forces should in effect be a “fourth branch” of government, coordinated with executive, legislative and judicial. This proposal confirmed by sources in HNC.

3) Tran Van Van, and others among our contacts in HNC (who are unaware we have received photocopy of charter from Khanh) insist that draft charter gives only titular authority to Chief of State, reserving basic power, on Bonn government model, to Prime Minister.

They accuse Khanh of threatening them with coup d’etat by armed forces and insist he is reneging on previous intentions withdraw armed forces from politics. While they recognize the problems presented by personalities in current positions of power, they have not been willing to meet these problems head on. Further, appears that group within HNC, Suu, Van, Thu, Nhut, also interested in seeing final arrangements emerge which would permit their group to install Prime Minister and government compatible with their ideas and amenable their direction. They view Khanh as main obstacle in their path and Minh as their principal ally at the moment.

4) Minh attended part of Khanh’s session with HNC Oct 15 but said nothing until Khanh departed. After Khanh’s departure, Minh in effect counseled HNC to ignore Khanh’s suggestions and proceed on basis current draft. One feature of that draft would be to continue triumvirate in capacity Chief of State until Assembly convenes and selects permanent Chief of State, which obviously unworkable.

5) HNC met in rump session evening Oct 15 to consider Khanh proposals. Since Khanh going Pleiku for session on Montagnard affairs Oct 16 and 17, they have scheduled next meeting with him for Sunday, Oct 18.

6) Although Khanh and Minh have had several private bilateral meetings, there is no sense of understanding between them. Khanh is still trying to get Minh out of public office and Minh is trying to get Khanh back to a purely military command position subordinate to government. Johnson and Sullivan met with Vu Van Mau and Pham Dang Lam October 15 to urge them make more active efforts reconciliation between two Generals. It was clear from this meeting that even these two old friends had not been actively in contact in this effort.

7) Some rather vague moves are afoot to propose all-civilian slate as way out of current impasse. Various names are being mentioned for both Chief of State and Prime Minister roles. Among these are Pham Khac Suu for Chief of State (impossible if Chief of State anything but ceremonial), Ho Van Nhut, Nguyen Luu Vien, and Tran Van Huong (Prefect of Saigon) for Prime Minister. All these gropings [groupings?] seem, even by their sponsors, to be considered unrealistic unless and until Khanh and Minh reach some modus vivendi.

Our action to date, pressed upon all personalities we have met, has concentrated upon obtaining general agreement that draft charter should not be published at this time, that remaining twelve days before October 27 should be spent in effort reconcile differences among principal factions and personalities, and that if necessary even more time should be taken.

We are also strongly pressing point that we wish to be consulted, want no surprises, and we expect current protagonists to reconcile their differences in a mature fashion.

Taylor

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 15 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bangkok, Vientiane, and CINCPAC.