Office of the Historian

382. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

Saigon, October 17, 1964—3:20 p.m.

MAC 5532. 1. Your JCS 4804–64, DTG 161746Z Oct,2 received Saigon during visit of CINCPAC. This reply jointly drafted following exchange of views.

2. We agreed with the JCS that “present programs will not of themselves suffice to reverse the unfavorable trend in South Vietnam.” On the other hand an expanded U.S. military effort will not alone reverse the trend.

3. Unless there are reasonable prospects of a fairly effective government in South Vietnam in the immediate offing, then no amount of offensive action by the U.S. either in or outside South Vietnam has any chance by itself of reversing the deterioration now underway. On the other hand VNAF, Farmgate, and U.S. air strikes against infiltration associated targets in the Panhandle of Laos and in DRV are in order under any circumstances. Also to keep the general atmosphere clear on the fact of U.S. military dominance in the area, the DeSoto patrol should be continued with full preparation for retaliation. At [Page 839] least the prospect of a reasonably effective government in South Vietnam is prerequisite to mounting major overt U.S. military action against the DRV except in retaliation for attack on U.S. forces.

4. Time is running out; however, the situation is not yet desperate and in our opinion we can and must wait at least until December before we will know with any certainty whether a government will emerge from the current effort. Although we do not expect that all problems will be solved by December, we do believe that it will be clear to us on the ground whether or not some sound beginnings have been made which offer reasonable prospects of further development and eventual success.

5. If a government seems to be pulling itself together then stepped up U.S. military action would give impetus to this favorable trend and should be undertaken.

6. This matter has been discussed with Ambassador Taylor who generally concurs with this reply. His detailed views are contained in his message of 16 October to the President,3 info you.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to Goodpaster and repeated to CINCPAC for Admiral Sharp.↩
  2. This cable asked for Westmoreland’s views on whether “some dramatic military action” would assist in creating a stable government and whether a stable government was a prerequisite or merely desirable for launching overt military action against North Vietnam. (Ibid.)↩
  3. Presumably this is JPS 303, 161030Z; see Document 388.↩