79. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State0
1651. Eyes Only for President and Secretary of State. From Harriman.
General Lemitzer has shown me his telegram of May 2 to JCS re Laos.1 I fully agree with his analysis and recommendations. I would only add that with initiative in Communist’s hands, they have capability for complete military victory in relatively short time. RLG could become rattled unless they get some concrete encouragement soon.
On account enemy successes, I doubt if cease-fire can be obtained under acceptable terms unless SEATO takes preventative action, which should be announced as step to insure cease-fire.
I want to underline three points made by Lemnitzer:
- 1)
- Action should be taken by SEATO with participation of all who will join, without waiting for those who hesitate.
- 2)
- It is too risky to await results of UN procedures.
- 3)
- Failure to take preventative action now could be extremely costly in future and far more dangerous.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–361. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 10:28 p.m. Repeated niact to Vientiane eyes only for Brown.↩
- See Document 76.↩
- In a cable that came over non-Department of State channels, May 3, Harriman sent additional advice to the President and Secretary Rusk as a supplement to this telegram. Harriman noted that the cease-fire had occurred in one sector in Laos. While encouraging, Harriman warned that a sector-by-sector cease-fire could be strung out for some days while Communist forces consolidated their positions. Harriman also worried that equipment was continuing to come overland into north and south Laos from North Vietnam and could continue even if the ICC went to Vientiane. As a result, the U.S. negotiating position at the conference would be weaker and the military situation could be more difficult if negotiations broke down. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–361)↩