Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State⁰

Vientiane, May 3, 1961, 2 p.m.

2011. Ref: Deptel 1202.¹ Following is our best estimate of military and political situation confronting US in Laos at present moment:

1) Military. The FAL is fast approaching ineffectiveness both for offensive and defensive action against enemy. Though some units have fought well against heavy opposition, most units are demoralized by the strength of opposition they face and are convinced they cannot win. Many are untrained. They firmly believe they are fighting enemy strongly supported by Vietminh cadres in PL units down to and including platoon Sien and that actual tactical VM units compose assaulting echelons of each attack. They feel they are out-gunned by enemy artillery, manned and controlled by VM. In our opinion there is much justification for this feeling on part of FAL.

FAL has virtually exhausted its supply of reserve units and must use stopgap measures of weakening one sector not currently under attack to get necessary strength to plug holes in sectors under attack. Enemy clearly has capability seize any population center at any time of his own choosing. Hard evidence of actual imminent attack on such centers is however still lacking. As pointed out in Embtel 1988,² question of cease-fire and conference or large-scale hostilities is now really one of enemy intentions. These in turn will doubtless depend very largely on his political estimate of our determination and how far he can push us.

2) It is clear that the only thing that could stop him if he chose to attack any major population center would be SEATO or U.S. troops.

3) In event such intervention we could not count on FAL for any effective offensive action until after protracted period of refitting and retraining. Meo units would be useful for their special type of activity.

4) It is his recognition of these grim facts of life which probably accounts for Phoumi’s periodic fits of deep depression, as reported Embtel 1986 and Bangkok’s 891.³ He sees US and/or SEATO intervention as only hope for rescuing his position and would probably prefer this solution to the road of cease-fire. However, he has on the whole been cooperative in efforts to bring about cease-fire.

5) Phoumi states his plans for evacuation of Vientiane and other centers north of Savannakhet are contingency plans at this time. No move to implement these plans has been made. If and when plans implemented his aid [aim] is probably to establish government in Savannakhet and consolidate his position in southern Laos. Civil servants at office director level were today ordered (and some assembly deputies requested) take positions MinDef to release military officers for service at front.

6) News this morning indicates fair chance effective cease-fire arrangements can be worked out. Kong Le has ordered Pathet Lao to cease fire at least in Vang Vieng region and asked Phoumi send representative to meet PL near Ban Na Mone which Phoumi accepted yesterday as site of truce talks. It remains to be seen how far Kong Le’s order is obeyed and what will be outcome truce talks.

7) Political. Given bleak military outlook, it is surprising that political situation is not more unstable than it is. Ordinary people in Vientiane and LP continue go about business as usual although there is undercurrent of uneasiness, especially among well-to-do class. At same time, must be recognized there is certain ferment developing in local politically minded quarters. Dissatisfaction with Boun Oum/Phoumi government is increasing among armed forces and National Assembly. We have heard talk in local political circles of possible initiative by deputies, who will reconvene May 11, to bring about change in present RLG. Khamphan Panya and Ngon Sananikone referred to this possibility again only this morning. This kind of approach will undoubtedly be stimulated by inference in Sihanouk press conference yesterday that King of Laos is thinking along same lines. While I agree with concept that at this stage of game we have no choice but to stand four-square behind Boun Oum govt, and that feelings just described are still inchoate and unorganized, it must be recognized that we run at least some risk of having rug pulled out from under us by Lao themselves.

8) If resort to arms does become necessary, it will have to be carried out largely by US and foreign troops. It would, of course, be essential in order to command support of Lao people and world opinion to make our war aims crystal clear.

9) While Souvanna’s real views and hope of salvaging him remain to be tested in his scheduled meeting PPenh with Sihanouk and Amb. Harriman, and any other talks he may have before and during conference, his recent conduct in unabashedly mouthing complete Commie line in Peking, Hanoi and Xieng Khouang, has been discouraging in terms of hope that he can be relied upon to act effectively as leader of stable middle-ground coalition.

He nevertheless remains a key figure to any possible peaceful Lao solution. We will have to decide extent to which he still salvageable and what influences if any we can bring to bear to try to retrieve him.

10) Will send estimate action necessary attempt ensure safety King ASAP. Can say now that main obstacle is likely be attitude King himself who has insisted to me and others that he will never leave Luang Prabang (Embtel 1755).⁴

Brown

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–361. Secret; Niact. Received at 5:33 p.m. Repeated niact to Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
1. In this telegram, May 1, the Department asked for the Embassy’s best estimate of the current military political situation for use at an NSC meeting scheduled for May 3 at 4 p.m. Actually the NSC meeting was held at 4:30 p.m. on May 2; see Document 77.
2. Dated May 1, 11 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–161)
3. Telegram 1986 from Vientiane, May 1, midnight, and telegram 1955 from Bangkok, repeated to Vientiane as 891, May 1, 7 p.m. (Ibid.)
4. Dated March 24. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2461)