76. Editorial Note
Attached to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s and Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric’s memorandum to President Kennedy, May 2 (Document 75), were five memoranda and one telegram from the Chiefs of Staff and two of the three Service Secretaries. The memoranda were addressed to McNamara, but a note on one of them reads: “Returned by M[axwell] D[.] T[aylor] (these were sent over for the Atty Gen’l).” In a memorandum, May 2, Chief of Staff of the Army, General George H. Decker, recommended presenting the “Communists” with an ultimatum for a cease-fire within 48 hours and concurrently moving SEATO troops into Thailand along the Lao border opposite key communications centers such as Vientiane, Paksane, and Savannakhet, and into South Vietnam through Tourane. In addition, Decker suggested deployment of air forces into Thailand and South Vietnam, and a carrier strike force near Laos so that if the initial actions failed to produce a cease-fire, direct intervention into Laos by SEATO ground forces could be possible.
Air Force Chief of Staff, General Thomas D. White, stated that the best that could be hoped for was to force a cease-fire. Intervention by ground forces in Laos on mainland Southeast Asia would be a “maldeployment.” Therefore, if a 48-hour deadline failed to produce a cease-fire, he recommended deploying U.S. air power against Pathet Lao supply centers and military concentrations in Laos. Should these [Page 170] actions still fail to achieve a cease-fire, White recommended threatening Hanoi and South China with air and naval action. It these threats failed, White recommended striking Hanoi even though he considered it would mean war with China, which White considered “inevitable” if the United States was determined to take decisive action in Southeast Asia and avoid the mistakes of the Korean War.
In telegram 021215Z from Saigon, May 2, to Admiral Burke, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer doubted that a cease-fire could be obtained in Laos without direct intervention by SEATO forces into Laos to secure territory held by the FAL. Lemnitzer, who was on a tour of Southeast Asia, concluded from his talks there that the Armed Forces of the Royal Lao Government were “falling apart.” Lemnitzer recommended that such SEATO intervention occur as soon as possible even if not all members agreed. Although SEATO forces would not initially attack Pathet Lao or North Vietnamese forces, if attacked themselves they should be permitted to counterattack strongly.
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke, in his memorandum of May 2 to McNamara, recommended landing U.S. troops in Thailand and South Vietnam immediately and within 48 hours moving them into Laos to protect key population centers. U.S. forces could counterattack if attacked, but not in such a way “as to pose direct threat to North Vietnam or Red China.” If a cease-fire was not obtained, Burke recommended air attacks on the Pathet Lao. If North Vietnamese or Chinese forces retaliated, the United States should escalate to defeat their action.
Commandant of the Marine Corps General David M. Shoup informed McNamara in a memorandum of May 2 that he favored the nonintervention course, but if it failed to achieve a cease-fire, he then recommended bombardment by U.S. aircraft and the movement of U.S./SEATO forces into given areas of Laos.
In a May 2 memorandum to McNamara, Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert favored the air strike strategy and opposed sending ground troops into Laos. Secretary of the Army Elvis J. Stahr sent undated comments to McNamara in which he recommended sending U.S. forces along with other SEATO troops into Thailand and South Vietnam, and if a cease-fire was not forthcoming, moving them into Laos with air and naval support if they were attacked. (All in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, Defense Papers, 5/61)
There was no memorandum found from the Secretary of the Navy. For additional background on these memoranda and the meeting at which they were considered, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, page 337, and Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy, pages 644–645.