Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

75. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 2, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Alternative Courses of Action in Laos

The following is the Defense Department position on the above subject:

The Current Situation

Military action is always in support of political objectives. In this instance we assume that the political objectives are:

a. To honor our SEATO commitments;

b. To secure a ceasefire and political settlement in Laos which will avoid complete Communist domination of Laos; and

c. To halt the present Soviet chain of successes and indicate our will not to concede world leadership to the Communists.

Our commitments under the SEATO Treaty, the President’s recent statements, and the Bangkok communique are clear. The patience with which we have explored every possibility of a negotiated settlement now leaves no doubt but that the contingency contemplated by the SEATO Treaty has come about. An unwillingness on our part to act now would clearly be due to lack of capability or of conscious choice, not to any doubt as to the aggression that threatens the survival of a country we are committed to help defend.

Furthermore, the President has stated to Soviet representatives and to the public that our prestige is involved in Laos and that we do not propose to stand idly by while it is overcome by aggression supported from outside. Only as recently as March 25th we took the lead in securing acceptance of a SEATO resolution calling for negotiations but contemplating military action if the negotiations failed.

The location and circumstances of Laos are such as to make it one of the least favorable places in the world for direct U.S. military intervention. The terrain and climate are bad, and logistics are difficult.

Alternative Courses of Action

a. One course of action (non-intervention in Laos) would be to introduce U.S. forces into Thailand and into South Viet-Nam, preferably together with other SEATO forces, at the request of the Thai and South Viet-Nam governments, presumably after the present Laotian government had collapsed.

The force movements and dispositions that would be involved in such an action are outlined in the military annex.

The basic purpose of such movement of U.S. forces would be:

(i) to strengthen the will and capability of these two countries to resist Communist take-over under the shock of a collapse in Laos, and

(ii) to avoid the humiliation of complete U.S. inaction after such a collapse and to maintain some vitality in SEATO and our other alliances.

B. A second course of action (intervention in Laos) would be to set a deadline, say 48 hours, for the conclusion of a satisfactory ceasefire at approximately the present battle lines and, if that deadline passed, move U.S. forces into Laos¹ to protect a number of key communication and population centers, at the request of the Laotian government.

The force movements and dispositions that would be involved in such a movement are outlined in the military annex.²

The purpose of such movements would be:

(i) to meet our SEATO commitment, and

(ii) to hold intact the present situation in Laos pending an effective ceasefire and the establishment of satisfactory controls.

We must be prepared for the worst, however, namely, that no such ceasefire may take place and that the Pathet Lao will continue to press forward; that our forces will become engaged; and that massive support from the North Vietminh, Chinese Communists, and U.S.S.R. will be made available to the Pathet Lao.

Under those circumstances we must promptly counter each added element brought against our forces with a more than compensating increment from our side. If the Pathet Lao keep coming, we must take any military action required to meet the threat. If North Viet-Nam attacks, we must strike North Viet-Nam. If Chinese volunteers intervene, we will have to go after South China. [2 lines of source text not declassified] We must certainly stand firm against any and all threats world-wide that the Soviet Union or the Chinese Communists make.³

During such operations we can anticipate efforts by others to bring about some form of ceasefire and negotiated settlement. The Soviet Union can hardly wish to see an uncontrollable situation develop. It is highly unlikely, therefore, that unlimited escalation contemplated would take place. To achieve a settlement at lower levels of escalation requires us to be willing to conduct ourselves without flinching from such escalation, or threats thereof, even though we should take every reasonable precaution that the situation not get out of hand.

Pros and Cons of the Two Courses

(1) Negative Aspects of the “Non-Intervention Course”.

a. Laos would be conceded to Communist domination.

b. The defense of South Viet-Nam and of Thailand would still present formidable problems. The borders available for infiltration would be long and difficult to patrol or to seal off.

c. The United States would have overtly failed to honor its SEATO commitment and the President’s statement that we would not stand idly by while Laos succumbed.

d. The Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc may be encouraged to believe that it can press on with relative impunity against Iran, Pakistan, Berlin, Korea or where it chooses.

e. Our allies will have reason to doubt the validity of our commitments.

f. It would be more difficult to prevent the Communists from overrunning all of Southeast Asia once Laos has fallen.

(2) Risks and Disadvantages of the “Intervention Course”.

a. The will to resist and the fighting ability of the Laotian forces are low.

b. The terrain of the Laotian panhandle is favorable to guerrilla forces and unfavorable to Western forces and the logistical problems are formidable. U.S. casualties from enemy action or disease may be high.

c. The dangers of escalation are considerable.

d. Even under this course of action, it is doubtful if Laos, in its present form, can long be preserved from Communist take-over.

e. The movement of our forces into Laos would be unpopular at home and would be criticized abroad, whereas public opinion might be brought to understand the introduction of U.S. occupation forces to stabilize the situation in Thailand and South Viet-Nam.

f. The intervention of U.S. forces in Laos is almost certain to provoke some clash of arms with Communist forces. On the other hand, the presence of our forces in Thailand and South Viet-Nam before the occurrence of direct aggression against those countries might deter such aggression, as has been the case with other areas occupied by U.S. forces.

Both courses of action may lead to long-term commitments of U.S. forces to Southeast Asia, with severe drains on our manpower and resources.

Defense Recommendation

After weighing the pros and cons set forth above, we favor the “Intervention Course”.

• Robert S. McNamara
• Roswell Gilpatric

Based on the attached cable, we believe General Lemnitzer supports the “Intervention Course”. The views of the Chiefs of Staff differ one from another, and are reflected in the attached memoranda.⁴

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, Alternative Papers I, 5/3/61. Top Secret. The signed copy is in this file, an unsigned copy plus the attachments are ibid., National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, Defense Papers, 5/61.
1. General White proposes air rather than ground intervention. [Footnote in the source text.]
2. A military annex outlining force movements and dispositions was not found as an attachment to the unsigned copy. Attached was an undated and unattributed memorandum apparently used as background for McNamara’s and Gilpatric’s memorandum.
3. General White states: “The U.S. has overall military superiority now against which all courses of action must ultimately be weighed. Our strengths impose greater risks on the Communist Bloc than theirs do on us.” [Footnote in the source text.]
4. There were also attached six annexes: one from each Chief of Staff of the Armed Services and one each from the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force. For a summary of them, see Document 76.