Office of the Historian

74. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State0

Vientiane, May 1, 1961, 10 p.m.

1985. Eyes Only President and Secretary from Harriman.

In my talks with King and with Boun Oum and Phoumi, each one made it quite plain that he considered military situation now beyond the Lao capacity to control. This is confirmed by MAAG. The Laos maintain that they no longer fighting the PL but Vietminh invasion supported by China and Russia. In opinion our military here, PL have been so reinforced by cadres of personnel that they have professional military competence beyond anything known before. Certain FAL units have fought bravely and effectively but with untrained units resistance has been ineffectual. In sum, present military situation is in hands of PL initiative to take any or all positions in Laos. PL intentions however are still not clear but a reasonable guess would be that unless SEATO reacts, or unless cease-fire arranged promptly, they will extend their control to position from which they will be able take Mekong River key points at will.

Under these circumstances, we will not be in good trading position at Geneva Conference. I find myself in agreement with judgment of Ambassador Brown, MAAG [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Time has come for SEATO to take firm position. Communists undoubtedly know of division that has existed in SEATO. If agreement could be reached in SEATO for united positive action, it might check advance and speed cease-fire. The prompt movement of SEATO forces into Thailand might be agreed to. Further protective steps under Plan 5 should be constantly reviewed.

King emphasized that split in SEATO had encouraged Communists whereas united front in SEATO might well stop them.

Ambassador Brown agrees that statements of King as well as RLG of gratitude to President for my visit here are sincere and that visit gave a temporary morale lift. It also may have encouraged other side to make recent improved cease-fire offers. We are satisfied, however, beneficial effect will be short-lived unless cease-fire is arranged soon. We are fearful however that prompt cease-fire will not take place without some positive action by SEATO.

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–161. Top Secret. Received at 1:54 p.m. Repeated niact to Bangkok eyes only for Charge.↩