Office of the Historian

73. Notes on the 481st National Security Council Meeting0

Washington, May 1, 1961, 4:10–6 p.m.
1.
I proposed move by SEATO into panhandle, recognizing that if we do we must be prepared to win, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].
2.
Allen Dulles said we must anticipate a Chinese response if we move into the panhandle.
3.
Bohlen: whatever action we take should not be based on fear of what the enemy will do in retaliation to our moves.
4.
Chet B[owles]: are likely to face full-scale war with the Chinese in 4 to 5 yrs; should have neutrals with us (India, Burma, etc.); Laos, inclu[ding] the panhandle, is not the place to start.
5.
Dean [Rusk]: will start the destruction of our alliances if we do not provide SEATO support to Laos.
6.
Maxwell Taylor: opposed to US troops to Laos.

Felt’s wire: Vientiane—adv. elements in 24 hours[;] Seno—1 Blt 3–4 days[;] no mention of B–26’s.

Risk in view of:

a.
Potential PL moves during our action endanger and outflank US & Thai troops
b.
Chicom jet bomber moves
c.
Chicom fighter attacks on B–26’s

Don’t take half-step which will lead to retreat.

What are the chances of improving our political position by military action & what are the chances of weakening it—

a.
unlikely to avoid a Communist-dominated gov’t.
b.
unlikely to avoid a uncontrolled Laos-SVN border.
c.
may lose support of Britain, Fr. & Western world.
d.
may not have support of US—note attitude of Cong. lders
e.
run risk of
a)
temporary military reversals
b)
long debilitating war [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

1.

For US to win a war in SE Asia against the NVN & Laotians may possibly require use of nuclear weapons.

[2 paragraphs (3 lines of source text) not declassified]

4.
U.S. involvement in SE Asia may be handled in such a way as to lead us on [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to a long and debilitating action.

Can probably move US troops into V[ietnam] w/o excessive loss but this hasn’t developed a strong enough base [?] from which to bargain to achieve the pol. obj.

Laos is place to fight the war.

1. 1000 men per day for 3 days unopposed 3000
2000 men per day for 4 days unopposed 8000
11,000
[Page 164]

2. To enter in Laos is dangerous, outcome is uncertain, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. But if objective is to hold SE Asia, 2 of the Chiefs believe we should move in & 2 do not.

3. George D[ecker]: “if move into any part of Laos, will very likely draw in the North VN & the Chinese.” [19 lines of source text not declassified]

1.
Move our naval forces closer into position. OK
2.
Alert our forces for air movement. OK
3.
Discuss with Sarit potential moves & alerting of Thai forces to save 24 hrs. Save
4.
Alert Paks. Save
5.
Alert Commonwealth Brigade.
6.
Develop a plan to support Thailand & So VN if we lose Laos
a.
start negotiation with Sarit & Diem now
b.
draw up a movement plan now
c.
discuss plan with British.

Pres—

a)
talk to UK & Fr—explain & ask what they rec.
b)
talk to McM[illan?]

2. State—Stev[enson] to talk to Br, Fr, Indian, & Lao re Sec Council action on prompt cease-fire.1

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/A Miscellaneous Sensitive Files: FRC 71 A 6489, Laos 381 (Sensitive), April-May 1961. Top Secret; Sensitive. These notes were handwritten by McNamara. The meeting was held at the White House. Additional notes of this meeting, prepared for Vice President Johnson by his Military Aide, Colonel Howard L. Burris, are in the Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, National Security Council Records of Action.↩

  2. According to NSC Action No. 2417, the following decisions were taken at this NSC meeting:

    “Discussed the current situation in Laos and agreed that no final decisions as to U.S. courses of action with respect to that situation should be taken at this meeting, pending further developments in the cease-fire negotiations.

    “Noted that the President would be prepared under certain conditions to deploy U.S. forces to Thailand.

    “Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should prepare, for presentation at a meeting of the National Security Council to be held on Tuesday, May 2, 1961, at 4:00 p.m., an appreciation of the military implications of various measures that might be taken in Laos, Thailand, and other countries of Southeast Asia.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)

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