Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

72. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 1, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Laos

This memorandum deals with two alternative situations in Laos—Track No. 1, the possibilities of an early and effective cease-fire, and Track No. 2, courses of action if a cease-fire is not achieved in the next few days.

Track No. 1

Kong-Le, as “Supreme Commander FAL”, has proposed that the military commanders of the interested parties send their representatives promptly under flag of truce to Ban Na Mon on Highway #13, about 11 kilometers south of Vang Vieng to “discuss and decide on the date for the cease-fire and the place, and also the armistice regulations in Laos”.

Although the place proposed is also within Pathet Lao-held territory we have asked Ambassador Brown to advise Phoumi to accept. We have also asked Brown to advise Phoumi to express a willingness to cooperate if Sihanouk initiates arrangements for a meeting of both sides at Phnom Penh.¹

Even though a meeting takes place at Ban Na Mon, a prompt cease-fire will not necessarily follow as it can be expected that the Communists will string out any negotiations and continue their efforts to extract maximum political and military advantage from the present situation.

It should be noted that Souvanna Phouma has also called for a meeting at Ban Na Mon for “talks between the three parties concerned” to discuss “cease-fire regulations, formation of a provisional government and the appointment of the Laotian delegation to the fourteen-nation conference”. The relationship between the Kong Le statement and the Souvanna Phouma statement is not entirely clear.

However, if a cease-fire is in fact agreed this takes us down the ICC-14-nation conference route.

Track No. 2

There are two inseparable elements on this track:

A. In the United Nations the United Kingdom, supported by a Lao appeal, would request an urgent meeting of the Security Council, the objective being to apply pressure on the USSR in favor of the immediate implementation of a cease-fire. We would submit a resolution to the Security Council containing the following principal elements: (1) a call for an immediate cease-fire; (2) a call to the ICC to verify the cease-fire; (3) a request to Burma, Cambodia and Indonesia to help the parties arrange an immediate cease-fire, to help maintain the cease-fire, and to assist the ICC to verify the cease-fire; and (4) a paragraph which would have the Security Council endorse Lao neutrality. This resolution would contemplate, if the countries concerned agreed, the sending of small teams to Laos to be positioned at strategic points between the opposing forces. If such a resolution were vetoed by the USSR in the Security Council, we would wish subsequently to move into the UNGA. (A copy of the resolution and a suggested pattern of consultation are attached.)²

B. In SEATO

There are two alternate lines of SEATO action to support the foregoing UN action. The timing of either line of SEATO action must be closely related to and reinforce the action sought in the UN. It is contemplated that the RLG would simultaneously appeal to both the UN and SEATO. However, action would be initiated in the UN prior to action in SEATO. The timing of phased SEATO action would be dependent on the course of events in the UN so as to act as a spur to effective UN action.

The first alternate is to implement all or such portion of SEATO Plan Five³ as would be feasible under the following conditions:

1. A military objective limited to assisting the FAL in stabilizing the situation along the lines existing at the time of implementation of the plan pending the conclusion of an effective cease-fire or effective action on the problem by the UN (that is, the SEATO forces would not attempt to occupy any areas not held by FAL at time of implementation of the plan).

2. SEATO forces would not take any offensive against the Pathet Lao, and would fight only if attacked.

3. SEATO forces would have no mission or objective of approaching or menacing the frontier area between Laos, North Viet-Nam, and Communist China.

4. SEATO forces would promptly be withdrawn from Laos upon the conclusion of an effective cease-fire or the taking of effective UN action.

All of the foregoing conditions would be made publicly and privately clear. In the event the SEATO forces were withdrawn from Laos all or a substantial portion of them would remain in Thailand pending further developments.

The second alternate line of action would be promptly to move a SEATO force into Thailand without at the time deciding whether it would ultimately be employed in Laos. For maximum effectiveness of this line of action it would be important to say or do nothing to create the impression that, if circumstances required, it would not be used in Laos.

Under either of the foregoing alternatives the following SEATO steps would be necessary:

1. Calling of SEATO Council or Council Representatives meeting to discuss matter.

2. Decision by Council and its communication to Government.

3. Activation SEATO Force Command Structure.

4. Movement of forces.

The timing of each of these steps can within reasonable limits be controlled in light of the parliamentary situation in the UN and the military situation on the ground. While SEATO action is essential to hasten and assure UN action, care must be taken to time any SEATO steps so as not to provide a fresh excuse for the Communists to step up their activities, on the pretext that they cannot act under threat. For this reason, it may be wise to state at the outset, that we are for the moment holding the SEATO response to the RLG request in abeyance, in order to give the UN an opportunity to act.

Comment:

If either Track 1 or Track 2 succeeds in getting a cease-fire we will then face the real issue: what kind of a Laos to envisage emerging from the Conference. Our actions and the realities of Laos will all anticipate a “mixed-up-Laos”. The more we can fracture it the better.

It will be best for the time being for Laos to become a loose federation or confederation of somewhat autonomous strong men. Given the military capability of the Pathet Lao, a centralized government under a coalition government would tend to become a Communist satellite. Even partition would be a better outcome than unity under leadership responsive to the Communists.

A central problem in Laos has been the absence of a “third party” to act as intermediary and arrange between the two parties—and as inspector of any agreements reached. The best arrangement would be to get the UN into Laos as a third party to guarantee its integrity and assist in its development. We have a plan ready setting forth the details.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that while continuing to pursue Track No. 1 and keeping the situation under daily review you now:

1. Authorize transmission of the attached letter from you to Prime Minister Macmillan.⁴

2. Authorize Department of State immediately to enter into consultations with our other SEATO allies, and the RLG to determine the feasibility of Track No. 2 and obtain views on the alternate lines of SEATO action.

3. Authorize the Department of State and USUN immediately to enter into consultations with selected non-SEATO countries, including India and Canada, on the action in the United Nations proposed under Track 2.

4. Authorize the Department of Defense to make such additional disposition of forces and undertake planning so as to permit prompt implementation of either of the alternate lines of SEATO action if and when a decision thereon is reached.

5. Authorize CINCPAC as Military Adviser to the U. S. Member of the SEATO Council to undertake with the other SEATO Military Advisers any necessary contingency planning required to implement the alternate lines of SEATO action.

Dean Rusk⁵

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 5/2/61–5/8/61. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson on April 30 and discussed and revised at a White House meeting on the night of April 30. The April 30 draft text is in Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–3061.
1. In telegram 1194 to Vientiane, April 30. (Ibid.)
2. Not found.
3. See Document 41.
4. No letter was found attached, but on May 2 at 9:44 p.m., the Department transmitted to the Embassy in London a brief letter from Kennedy to Macmillan which stated that the United States was encouraged by reports indicating a cease-fire might be in the making. The President informed the Prime Minister that Washington was considering alternatives should the cease-fire not materialize. The President promised to keep in touch. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.11–KE/5–261)
5. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.