Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

64. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, April 27, 1961, 7 p.m.

2657. Saw Gromyko 1630 and spoke along lines Deptel 1833.¹ He said he had already received Menshikov’s report. Gromyko said he did not understand US position on Laos. Following my talk with Khrushchev and his with President and Secretary² both sides had agreed to support development of neutral Laos and documents had been drawn up for calling conference reconvening ICC and call for cease-fire. On very day this had been agreed, US had appointed military advisors to Laos troops. This was military step and was only understandable if our purpose was to stir up trouble. He characterized facts to which I had drawn attention as routine and said to best his information there were no major military developments taking place in Laos. He also dwelt at length on continued presence Chiang Kai-shek troops in Laos. President had informed him these were being withdrawn but this had not taken place—at least many were still in Laos. We had not been able to inform Soviet Union officially that all ChiNat troops had been withdrawn. If one summarized actions taken on what he called rebel side, Soviet claims (presumably meaning grounds for complaint) were 10 times ours. Soviet position had been expressed clearly and particularly by head of Soviet Govt. He referred not only to continued presence ChiNat troops but also other foreign troops. He said he knew nothing of Peking broadcast to which I referred.

I pointed out we had reports of presence of many Vietminh troops in Laos. I said I knew many Chinese had been evacuated from area but did not know total number. I said speaking personally and frankly I thought there was suspicion in Washington that it was intended to keep on military activities with objective of taking over virtually all Laos. I pointed out that such action would be extremely dangerous. Our actions in support of neutral Laos had doubtless been discouraging to some elements in Laos and this and continued scale of military operations doubtless accounted for our action concerning military advisors. I said that clearly if we both maintained our objective of a neutral Laos important thing was prompt cease-fire.

Gromyko said doubtless our information concerning DRV was one-sided. He pointed out that with respect to cease-fire there had been no meeting of two sides as yet and they had not even agreed on date or place. He pointed out both Souvanna and Souvanna Vong had made statements supporting cease-fire but he did not think statement of our friends was as clear. He concluded that important thing was for two sides to agree on date for cease-fire. I stated I agreed and hoped they would use their influence to see this was done promptly. He said he wished to emphasize as he had previously that it was most important no steps be taken to aggravate situation.

Comment: In view of rapidly deteriorating situation would appear to me important that RLG immediately propose date for cease-fire and meeting place between lines as attempt to obtain agreement on Luang Prabang would only cause further delay.

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2761. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received at 1:12 p.m. Repeated to London, Paris, New Delhi, Bangkok, and niact to Ankara and Vientiane.
1. In this telegram, April 27, 12:19 a.m., the Department of State gave the Embassy an account of Bowles’ discussion with Soviet Ambassador Menshikov at 9:15 p.m., April 26, Washington time. The Department instructed Thompson to seek an appointment with Gromyko and make a similar representation. (Ibid.) The memorandum of conversation of the Menshikov-Bowles meeting of April 26 is ibid., 751J.00/4–2661.
2. For the Thompson-Khrushchev discussion, see Document 46; for the Gromyko-Kennedy discussion, see Document 43; and for the Gromyko-Rusk discussion, see Document 34.