Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

43. Telegram From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk, at Bangkok⁰

Washington, March 27, 1961.

We have your Secto 21.¹ Macmillan paper seems to me a real gain over earlier Macmillan letter,² but it is not an agreed paper. In particular we did not agree on any definite form of military consultation with the British on SEATO matters, although we agreed that closer relations in this field would be helpful. Returning with Caccia there was informal discussion of the danger of bilateral appearances in Far East, and advisability of holding bilateral discussions in Washington if at all. This seemed to us a matter for further discussion next week. Macmillan para. D does not imply that we agreed to a British veto over our action, but is rather a statement of agreed conditions for British active participation.

In meeting with Gromyko this morning, he took initiative in raising Laos and made orally what was obviously an instruction from Khrushchev. Gromyko said that they were studying British proposal but found in it a basis for pacific settlement acceptable to both sides. He emphasized several times the importance of exercise of restraint in order to avoid exacerbation of situation with consequent danger of spreading of conflict. In reply to specific question, Gromyko categorically said that this suggestion of restraint applied to both the Soviet Union and the U. S. He indicated that there would be a Soviet reply before the end of the week. I stressed the importance of an immediate cessation of hostilities, and I reiterated that as a power whose interests and prestige were at stake, we could not remain inactive if the threat of a military take-over continues. We will have to await actual reply before judgment, but Gromyko’s presentation was a serious one and devoid of the deliberate evasion Bohlen tells me Gromyko used in talking with you.

In my opinion, the SEATO resolution should be strong enough to hold SEATO together but not so strong as to seem to challenge the Soviets immediately after my conversation with Gromyko.

Following is the text which seems from here to meet the circumstances, subject to your judgment on the spot. We are guided in part by the very strong language of your first rough draft reported in Secto 16,³ because if others have seen it any sharp departure may give trouble in Bangkok. The first paragraph of rough draft seems satisfactory. Then we would continue: “The SEATO Council declares the firm resolve of member countries of SEATO not to acquiesce in any takeover of Laos by an armed minority supported from outside. The Council notes with approval the present efforts for a cessation of hostilities to be followed by peaceful negotiations, and it believes that this proposal offers a sound basis for progress toward a neutral and independent Laos. But if these efforts fail and there continues to be an active military attempt to conquer Laos, members of SEATO will be prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in the circumstances.

Article II of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, September 8, 1954, reads as follows:

“In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.” (American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, p. 913)

“Finally the Council of Ministers records its view that the Council Representatives should continue to keep developments in Laos under urgent and constant review in the light of this Resolution so that their Governments may be fully apprised of the requirements of the situation.”

I think it important for you to assure the Far Eastern members of SEATO that our efforts here have been directed toward strengthening the resolve of our Atlantic allies in regard to Laos. I think it is most important that they should understand that this country’s determination remains clear not only toward Laos but toward Southeast Asia as well. I think it would be most helpful for you to reaffirm to Sarit our clear commitment to support Thailand in particular. You may also wish to indicate to all delegates that in our judgment the serious and businesslike tone of Gromyko’s presentation this morning reflects Soviet understanding of our own strong and carefully stated position, although of course we cannot be sure until we have the definite Soviet answer to the British.⁴

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2761. Secret. A marginal note by McGeorge Bundy indicates this telegram was approved by the President. It was sent via non-Department of State channels. No time of transmission appears on the source text.
1. In Secto 21, March 27, Rusk reported that the SEATO conference was entering a critical phase, but delegations were confused by events happening elsewhere. Rusk asked for information and texts if possible on any Soviet reply to the British note of March 23 (See Document 39); on whether the President agreed to Macmillan’s paper; on Gromyko’s talk with the President; and on the Department’s view on the nature of the SEATO resolution. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/3–2761)
2. See footnote 2, Document 42.
3. The first paragraph in the draft in Secto 16, March 27, reads: “Consulting together in accordance with the obligation of article IV (2) of the Manila Pact, SEATO Council has noted with grave concern the continued offensive of rebel elements in Laos who are continuing to be supplied and assisted by Communist Powers in flagrant disregard of the Geneva Agreements.” (Department of State, Central Files, 379/3–2761)
4. Printed from an unsigned copy.