Office of the Historian

42. Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State0

Bangkok, March 27, 1961, 2 a.m.

Secto 9. Eyes Only Acting Secretary from Secretary. Having talked with Brown, Felt, Trapnell and others here about situation Laos, I don’t believe major UN effort such as you suggest is called for at this stage.1 Sudden shifting of gears could create considerable confusion especially among SEATO allies. Believe our first step should be obtain maximum solidarity SEATO for taking most serious view Laos and agreeing to act jointly if necessary. Eight nations acting together would be in much stronger position in UN. If Soviets refuse British proposal or delay reply and allow offensive to resume, some action on ground would be necessary while UN is deciding what it will do. Your timing also out of step with Deptel 1489 to Bangkok. Strongly urge President not present matter to UN on Thursday2 since events may make it appear much ado about nothing.

After further consultations here will submit Monday our thoughts SEATO resolution3 with which we might reaffirm SEATO in direct relation to Laos and prepare way for prompt SEATO action when necessary. Believe everyone but French would go along with agreeable resolution. Whether French will eventually come along rather than be isolated is highly speculative. Couve de Murville was entirely negative any SEATO involvement during our first talk; indeed, entirely negative any French involvement.

There is a great deal which can be done in Laos without serious risk of drawing Chinese into major effort, even within ground rules already set by actions other side in support Pathet Lao.

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Preparatory planning presentation case to UN all to the good but would strongly urge no action this direction for present.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2761. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Rusk was in Bangkok for the seventh meeting of the SEATO Council, March 26–29.↩
  2. In Tosec 12 to Bangkok, March 25, Acting Secretary Bowles sent Rusk an outline of his views on strategy. Bowles saw the principal danger as a Chinese Communist takeover in Laos and a general Chinese threat to Southeast Asia. Bowles opposed both U.S. and SEATO military action in Laos because he believed it would be countered by a challenge from North Vietnam, unless the Soviet Union vetoed it. If the North Vietnamese did not react, Bowles believed the Chinese would. Bowles suggested as an interim step before “Millpond” action and then military intervention, the United States should take the Laos problem to the U.N. Security Council, or if the Soviets vetoed it there, to the General Assembly. As a means of encouraging U.N. solution to the Laos problem, Bowles suggested the United States accept a government under Souvanna which would include some Pathet Lao or partition of the two northern provinces. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2561)↩
  3. March 30.↩
  4. For text as approved, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, pp. 940–941.↩