Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

65. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk, at Ankara⁰

Washington, April 27, 1961, 10:31 p.m.

Tosec 23. Eyes Only Secretary from Bowles. Following NSC meeting this morning which briefly discussed Laos,¹ President called in Congressional leaders.² President briefed group on developments and actions taken along lines set forth Tosec 6,³ including reading to them all of Brown’s telegram 1943 and pertinent portion ChiCom broadcast.⁴ Also briefed them on my meeting with Menshikov (Tosec 14).⁵ McNamara briefed them on US military capabilities for intervention in Laos. Admiral Burke briefed them on military situation, strongly and repeatedly throughout meeting expressing view that unless US prepared intervene militarily in Laos, all Southeast Asia will be lost. However, also pointed out extreme difficulty military operations in Laos and, if battle started there, must be prepared for tough, long and hard war which may well involve war with ChiComs. I expressed views set forth Tosec 6.⁶ During course of meeting President received your Secto 7, and President briefly summarized your views therein.

While expressing different shades of views, with Mansfield at one end of spectrum and Bridges at other, there was complete unanimity and strong view among all that, even recognizing possible consequences to our position in remainder Southeast Asia, we should not introduce US forces into Laos. In addition to military problem, Congressional group also seemed strongly influenced by general impression among them that Laotians unwilling to fight for selves. However, it appeared there would probably be considerable support for introduction US forces into Thailand and South Viet-Nam.

President made clear no decisions had been reached and suggested possibility another meeting with Congressional leaders on Saturday.⁷

Bowles

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751.00/4–2161. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted and approved by Johnson and cleared with Bowles. Rusk was in Ankara, Turkey, April 25–29, for the CENTO Conference.
1. See Document 63.
2. A memorandum of conversation of the President’s meeting with the congressional leaders is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton Series, Conferences with the President, Vol. I.
3. Tosec 6 to Ankara, April 26, 9:03 p.m., provided Rusk with an account of the meeting on Laos with the President; see Document 62. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2661)
4. See footnote 2, Document 62. The pertinent part of the Chinese broadcast of April 26 was as follows: “in order to bring about and to secure a ceasefire in Laos it is imperative that the US, Thailand, and South Viet-Nam immediately stop their assistance to rebel clique in Laos and immediately withdraw their military personnel and military equipment from Laos,” as quoted in telegram 1172 to Vientiane, April 26, 10:52 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2661)
5. Tosec 14 was a repeat to Ankara for Rusk of telegram 1833 to Moscow, April 27; see footnote 2, Document 64.
6. In Secto 7 from Ankara, April 27, received 11:38 a.m. Washington time, Rusk stated that “fundamental decision is whether we should fight before allowing all Laos to be taken over by Communist armed action.” The United States needed to find a way to stop the military advance without destroying the possibility of a cease-fire and a negotiated settlement, Rusk maintained. He doubted that the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese had elected to take all of Laos, but he could not assure the President that was the case. Rusk recommended an immediate U.N. Security Council meeting to call for a cease-fire and negotiations between the Lao factions. Simultaneously, Rusk recommended alerting SEATO and beginning implementation of SEATO Plan 5, including movement of SEATO troops into Vientiane and southern Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2761)
7. April 29.