Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

51. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union⁰

Washington, April 12, 1961, 10:55 a.m.

1722. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. We are becoming increasingly concerned at the effect in Laos of the delay in definitive Soviet reply to the British proposals in regard to Laos and with particular regard to the proposed call for a cessation of hostilities.¹ You should, therefore, seek an appointment with Gromyko in view of Khrushchev’s absence and point out to him our concern in this matter. You should remind him of his talks in Washington with the Secretary and particularly the one on March twenty-seventh with the President.² You should recall to him the statement which he made repeatedly to the President of the importance of avoiding actions which could complicate or exacerbate the situation in Laos, and remind him of the President’s statement that while we seriously and wholeheartedly supported the goal of a neutral and independent Laos, free from any foreign alignment or domination, the United States as a great power could not stand by if forces hostile to the United States sought to take over the country by military means.

You should draw Gromyko’s attention to the fact that during this period of diplomatic discussion with a view to a negotiated settlement of the problem the Soviet airlift which in our view has no basis in legality has not only continued but has sharply increased and has included the use of Soviet planes, piloted by Soviet military personnel, for parachute drops in active combat. You should point out in this connection that US has exercised great restraint and has held back from a series of possible actions in Laos while discussions for political solution were under way. Should Gromyko raise question of US flow of supplies and use of helicopters you should state that this is in conformity with longstanding agreement with legal Laos Government.

You should also state that the United States Government is unable to perceive any valid reason for delay in setting in motion the mechanism for peaceful solution of this problem set forth in the British proposal which would involve three simultaneous actions by the British and Soviet Governments, as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference:

1. Call for cessation of hostilities.

2. The reactivation of the ICC through a meeting at Delhi as soon as possible, and

3. The issuance of invitations for a 14-Power conference, specifying a definite date and place.

You should likewise remind Gromyko that the President made it clear to him that he hoped very much that the procedures for a pacific settlement and that restraint on the spot by both the Soviet Union and the United States would render unnecessary even the contemplation of decisions of a graver sort. The mechanism proposed by the British and agreed to in principle by the Soviet Union in their aide-mémoire of April first, a copy of which was given to you by Khrushchev personally, seemed to provide the basis for such a settlement.

You should endeavor to elicit from Gromyko the causes of the present delay and when a definitive reply to the latest British proposals might be expected. You might mention in this connection that the British proposals were very much along the line of the earlier Soviet ones but at that time there had not been any US-Soviet understanding as to the goal of a neutral and independent Laos which now seems to exist. You should try to get over to Gromyko the thought that if the procedures envisaged by the British proposals for pacific settlement cannot be agreed speedily developments in Laos itself might render such procedures inadequate to deal with the situation.

Therefore, FYI you should avoid in this presentation any tone of ultimatum or threat but you should make clear to Gromyko we are quite unable to understand why this delay in putting into effect a program in conformity with what seemed to be the joint purpose of the United States and Soviet Union. But we will leave to your discretion the manner in which it is done.³

President has approved this message. End FYI.

Rusk

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1261. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bohlen, cleared by Steeves and Kohler, and signed by Rusk.
1. On April 5, British Ambassador Roberts gave Soviet Deputy Minister for Southeast Asia, Georgi M. Pushkin, draft texts of an appeal for a cease-fire in Laos, a report to Nehru concerning the ICC, and an announcement of the conference. Roberts left no doubt that the cease-fire must be verified before the conference could begin. (Circular telegram 1533, April 7; ibid., 751J.00/4–761)
2. See Document 43.
3. In telegram 2493 from Moscow, April 13, Thompson reported on his meeting with Gromyko at 4:45 p.m. on April 13. Gromyko responded to Thompson’s presentation by stating that the Soviet response would come in the very near future. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–1361)