49. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Laos
PARTICIPANTS
- U.K.
- Lord Home Ambassador Caccia
- Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
- Lord Hood
- A.C.I. Samuel
- Honorable Peter Ramsbotham
- Mr. Charles Wiggin
- Mr. John Thomson
- U.S.
- The Secretary
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. McGhee
- Mr. Kohler
- Mr. White
- Mr. Burdett
- Mr. Swihart
- The Under Secretary
The Secretary expressed concern about the shape a new government might assume. We do not wish it to get around that having a lot of Communists in a government can just be taken for granted. If this were to happen we can say goodbye to neutrality and for that matter U.S. aid. We could agree to one or two in the government but not a gang of them. We have heard that the Secretary General of the Communist party (Nouhak) amongst others is being seriously considered. We have to avoid getting too far down the line on this one. Lord Home commented that so far the U.K. has done nothing on this problem. Souvanna Phouma did indicate that he planned to include one or two Communists. The Secretary said that the numbers were not the only issue but the particular job held by any Communist in the government had also to be looked at. Lord Home wondered how we could control the King. The Secretary responded that the latter had some reluctance to assume an active role and it was going to take a good deal of dickering with the King remaining behind scenes. Lord Home thought if the King could indicate which of the two or three Communists would be acceptable at the outset this might do the trick. The Secretary reverted to the importance of which position they might hold. Vongvichit for example would be very bad as Minister of Defense. Mr. Steeves observed that if the messages we are now receiving mean anything we would have to rule out the King. He takes the position he cannot constitutionally assume the Prime Ministership. Lord Home thought this still did not rule out knocking heads together. Mr. Steeves countered this was an absent [Page 120] quality. When the current government resigns normally the King would ask for a new government and refer it to the assembly which then acts. The King then rubber-stamps their action. In our view Phoui Sananikone would be the most neutral. Souvanna Phouma seems to have no appreciation of the Communist problem. Lord Home understood that it was Phouma’s idea to have about three Communists, some middle-of-the-road people and some of Phoumi’s. Mr. Steeves said the more we hear he is not prepared to take any of the latter. Lord Home inquired whether the King might not call for a “national ticket”. Mr. Steeves thought the only possibility of anything along this line would be by elections. The Secretary inquired whether Souvanna Phouma was now planning to continue his leisurely trip in view of his intention not to come to the U.S. Lord Home thought possibly he is afraid of getting tangled up in the situation in Laos. Mr. Steeves took his hat off to him. By his travels he was increasing his stature. The Secretary asked whether Souvanna Phouma “snarled at us” when he was asked to come here. Lord Home replied Phouma said he found difficulty dropping his planned tour in order to come here although he very much admired President Kennedy’s Administration and was touched by Mr. Rusk’s message.1 The Secretary observed that he may have been touched but he was not moved. He wondered whether Ambassadors Brown and Addis might talk to the King and ask him to bring together the four leaders (Souvanna Phouma, Phoumi, Souphanouvong, and Phoui) to negotiate the composition of a new government. Lord Home agreed we should do this and in the meantime if Phouma would be willing to go back it would be helpful. The Secretary suggested that Steeves and Warner draft separate messages.2 Lord Home said he was not clear about the state of military planning. The Secretary pointed out that the British were in close consultation with the Pentagon and that no decisions had been made. The general approach is to step up on a planning basis. The Department of State did not want to escalate military action beyond the possibility of a successful political result. Para-military forces would be used and they would stay within the ground rules of the enemy’s action. Lord Home inquired whether there are any para-military forces there now. The Secretary said there were none and would only be contemplated if the enemy keeps it up. If a cease-fire occurs then their activities would stop. Lord Home expressed general agreement with our planning and reported the British military believe Plan 53 is the minimum that could be done. He commented there seems to be a suggestion that Admiral Felt wants to alert the troops. Unfortunately this alert would go [Page 121] to Pakistan and in view of its bad security get to Nehru. The Secretary expressed doubt that Admiral Felt would alert Pakistan and Mr. Steeves added this would take place only if Plan 5 were put into effect. The Secretary added before it could go into effect it would have to be approved by Governments. Lord Home reiterated he understood Admiral Felt has intentions to issue such alert. The Secretary thereupon asked Mr. Steeves to check into this matter. (Subsequently the Secretary reported that Mr. Steeves has been informed Admiral Felt had been in some communication about planning for Plan 5 if and when governments approve.) The Secretary reported that we have not ground up any military plans about which the U.K. are not fully informed. We have stepped up supplies by helicopter, etc. We do not want to do anything to interrupt the possibility of a cease-fire or break it up if one occurs. There are a number of steps possible without getting into M5. Lord Home expressed satisfaction and hoped we would keep an eye on any possible “alerts”.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–661. Secret. Drafted by James W. Swihart of EUR/BNA and approved in U on April 19 and S on April 22. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library)↩
- Apparent reference to Document 32.↩
- Steeves’ message was telegram 1547 to Vientiane, April 19. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–861; see Supplement)↩
- See Document 41.↩