Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

48. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 6, 1961, 3:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• East-West Issues: Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Bruce
  • Ambassador Bohlen
  • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Mr. Foy D. Kohler
  • Mr. John M. Steeves
  • Mr. William C. Burdett
• United Kingdom
  • The Prime Minister
  • Lord Home
  • Sir Norman Brook
  • Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar
  • Ambassador Caccia
  • The Honorable P. E. Ramsbotham
  • Mr. John Russell
  • Mr. Philip de Zulueta

The President asked whether we could assume that we would receive a Russian response on Laos within a week which would be reasonably satisfactory.¹ Lord Home replied he hoped so but the press reported that Khrushchev had now gone off again. He added that perhaps it would be desirable to get our Ambassadors in Vientiane stoking up to form a national government.

The Secretary asked whether the United Kingdom was doing everything it could to get Souvanna Phouma home. Lord Home replied the United Kingdom was trying. The Secretary pointed out that if Souvanna continues to act as he has been doing and visits Moscow and Peking, then it would be difficult for the President to go along with him. Souvanna must establish his claim to being a neutral. Lord Home thought that Souvanna was afraid that if he went home he would be entangled in talks. He wanted to wait for the King to take the initiative. The Prime Minister asked if the King summoned Souvanna home would he go.

Mr. Steeves expressed the view that unless Souvanna went home under some sort of curb by the King he was likely to go home and choose a completely Communist group to form a government. Thus it was necessary not only to get him home but to get him home under enough wraps. The President inquired whether Souvanna as Prime Minister would have the right to pick his government or would this be done by Parliament. Mr. Steeves replied that Souvanna would have wide rights. The President said he assumed the King would not ask Souvanna to form a government unless he had a prior understanding with him. Mr. Steeves thought that Souvanna did not want to go back until he had acquired such prestige that he could do as he liked. If Souvanna formed a Communist-dominated government our position at the conference table would be utterly undercut.

Lord Home reported Souvanna had told him he envisaged a government with two or three Pathet Lao, three or four followers of Phoumi and in the middle a lot of people who would dominate the government. Mr. Steeves cautioned against giving Souvanna’s ideas weight when he spoke of neutrality. He urged that the United States and the United Kingdom agree to bring some pressure on the King to act in getting a really neutral government with Souvanna in it.

The Secretary suggested a message to the King urging him to get Souvanna back. The Prime Minister cautioned that the King should not be placed in the position of bringing Souvanna back as Prime Minister. Perhaps the King could say to Souvanna, come back and consult with me.

The President inquired why it was important to have Souvanna back now. Mr. Steeves pointed to the advantages of having a Lao government which could sit at the international conference. The Prime Minister observed that if we could not get a decent government it was better to have none. Lord Home thought it would be possible to have a conference with Lao observers.

Mr. Steeves suggested the King might issue a general call to all men of good will. The President wondered whether there was any chance that Souvanna would go back if he were not offered the Prime Ministership. He knew the British and French were sympathetic to him and he could certainly count on Communist support. Mr. Steeves advocated letting Souvanna prove himself at the polls. Lord Home maintained that Souvanna was the only person who could command a sizeable majority in the country. We must not kid ourselves. We would get a messy government at best. However, a messy government plus an international mechanism to stop the imports of arms might get us by for a few years. Mr. Steeves observed Lord Home might be overestimating Souvanna’s strength outside Vientiane.

Lord Home said the United Kingdom would certainly join with the United States in trying to get Souvanna back. The President asked if Lord Home was convinced of Souvanna’s desire to keep the Pathet Lao from becoming dominant. Lord Home replied that Souvanna claims he wants to peel the other Lao away from the hard core Communist. He personally could not tell about Souvanna’s sincerity. People who knew him said he was sincere.

The President inquired whether we had asked Souvanna to come here. Lord Home said he had sent a message putting to Souvanna the idea that if he wanted to come to Washington as a private citizen he (Lord Home) believed Secretary Rusk would be glad to see him. All Souvanna replied was that he wanted to complete his tour.

The President asked whether we should indicate opposition to Souvanna if he came to power in a way rather indifferent to our efforts, that is, if he went to Moscow and Peking. If we did so, we would not be in a good position to use our influence with him. We should not look like we are eager to see him. Lord Home said he would send another telegram pointing out that Laos depended largely on United States assistance, thus it would be very foolish for Souvanna not to come to America. The President suggested Lord Home might say that, based on his conversations here, he found the new administration friendly to Souvanna but shocked at his indifference. Lord Home could describe this as his private reaction. Lord Home said he would see what he could do, but he was not sure of the response. Souvanna was terribly hurt at the United States.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1833, Macmillan Visit, April 4–9, 1961. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Burdett. The meeting took place aboard the Honey-Fitz.
1. The President was referring to a response from Moscow to a British demarche to the Soviet Union’s aide-mémoire of April 1. On the evening of April 4, the British Foreign Office instructed Ambassador Roberts to make clear to the Soviets that while the United States and United Kingdom had agreed to go ahead with simultaneous arrangements for a cease-fire, return of the ICC, and the conference, the latter could not be held until the cease-fire was effective. Roberts was also to make representations about venue, level of representation, and date. (Circular telegram 1521, April 5; ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/4–561)