Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

47. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, April 1, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Forward Thinking on Laos

This memorandum sets aside the question of whether, when, and how we react to the reported resumption of the enemy offensive and to the Soviet reply to the British. It isolates some of the key issues in the probable diplomacy beyond, which may arise in the Macmillan discussions.¹

1. The nature of the Lao Government.

The United States and SEATO nations in Asia favor the continuation of the Boun Oum Government or a government of different personnel and similar anti-Communist point of view. The Soviets continue to regard the Souvanna Phouma Government as the legal government and are generally supported in this preference by such Western powers as the UK and France. Consequently, some formula must be found for broadening the government without creating a government sympathetic to or subject to the USSR. Souvanna Phouma is persistently put forward as the only neutral leader in the situation. However, the Lao King and Thai and Vietnamese officials friendly to the U.S. distrust Souvanna Phouma, believing that at best he is weak and at the worst he may be a tool of the Communists.

The only Lao who might head the government during the period of negotiations is King Svang himself. The King is not a brilliant man but he understands his own people and the leading Lao personalities. The King has the prestige of being father to his people and of having in his possession in his royal palace the palatine of the nation, the solid gold image of Luang Prabang, after whom the capital is named. The King and the Lao people in general credit this sacred image as being the principal defender of the nation and of being responsible for the mysterious withdrawal of Viet Minh troops in 1957 from the Plain of Jarres.

The King, as prime minister as well as monarch, would presumably be objected to by Moscow because that situation would end their claim to be supporting a legal government, but, if done as a fait accompli, they might find it hard to make it a sticking point. However, the King would need to have as representative a cabinet as possible. Presumably Souvanna Phouma should be included in the cabinet, without portfolio, to satisfy the Communists. We should try to include Phoui Sananikone. General Phoumi and the other members of the present cabinet should be continued in their present positions, with the exception of Boun Oum who might be made Deputy Prime Minister without portfolio, or otherwise dealt with. This would dispose of him without denigrating him. If the Communists insisted on some other representation beyond Souvanna Phouma, then Captain Kong Le, and possibly Souvanna Phouma’s half-brother, the Communist, Souphanouvong might be included as members of the cabinet without portfolio.

2. What should be the role of the International Control Commission?

The ICC consists of the representatives of three nations—India, Poland and Canada—who were commissioned by the Geneva Conference powers in 1954 to supervise the implementation of the Geneva agreements. The principal role of the ICC would be to observe the effectiveness of the cease-fire and to determine what infringements, if any, occurred during and presumably after the period of negotiation. The Indians can be expected to play a stronger role than they have played in the past because of India’s growing realization of the threat to India of hostilities in Southeast Asia between the Communist and Free Worlds. A crucial point—on which we shall have to stick—is an enlargement in the surveillance powers of the ICC. The control of the Viet-minh border will be difficult enough; but impossible unless the ICC is permitted to get out of the headquarters towns.

3. The ICC can be effective only with respect to overt action. Although helicopters could improve the effectiveness of the ICC in covering all parts of the country, it should not be expected to be able to retard the continued infiltration and indoctrination of Communist elements in Lao villages throughout Laos. Consequently, while the ICC may report that no overt action of an aggressive nature is taking place, the Communists might be consolidating their control over all of Laos.

4. There is little likelihood that the ICC could be expanded to include representation from other nations unless the Geneva Conference were reconvened. On the other hand, the Indians, Poles and Canadians might be persuaded to increase their representation numerically to provide the maximum observation possible in outlying areas. The Indians particularly might be able to provide personnel who would be able to live at the village level and to observe any continuing Communist efforts to obtain control of Lao communities by infiltration and subversion.

5. How neutral could a neutral Laos become?

Effective neutrality in Laos must consist in a policy of positively avoiding involvement with either side. Neutrality in the sense of permitting both sides to infiltrate and jockey for external influence would yield a situation as unstable as Czechoslovakia in 1946–47 not an Austrian neutrality. The emphasis, therefore, should be on an actively “unaligned” Laos. If this is impossible, then the Asian members of SEATO, including Cambodia, would probably prefer a divided Laos with the southern half definitely non-Communist.

6. How much of Laos should we attempt to salvage by negotiation?

The ambiguity about neutrality vs. non-alignment may lead to a hard decision as to whether, in the end, we should consider negotiating a fall-back position of a divided Laos. In a divided Laos the Communists would presumably be regrouped in the northern part and the non-Communists in the southern.

7. An essential consideration here is the point of view of the Lao people and of the King. In all probability the King will refuse to leave Luang Prabang and the sacred palatine, the Prabang image. It is inconceivable that the King would be willing to remove himself and the sacred image to the south. The image has left Laos only once in its modern history when it was captured by General Chapri [Chakira] in 1778 who became the first monarch in the present Chapri Dynasty in 1781. The Prabang brought such bad luck to the Thai that a later Chapri monarch sent the image back to Laos in care of a Lao prince. We should, therefore, attempt to exclude from the negotiations any idea of a divided Laos, beyond the two northeastern provinces which have been under Communist control since 1954 and are somewhat like the loss of a limb.

8. When should an election be held?

Under present conditions an election would put the Communists in substantial political control of the government because they have effective control in many villages. Consequently, all steps should be taken to avoid an early election. We should insist that an election must follow pacification, a solid diplomatic agreement, and the creation of a situation where political choices can be offered the people within an international framework guaranteeing neutrality and independence.

9. What should we do if the Communists continue to improve their position?

The monsoon rains began prematurely in March and unless there is an unforeseeable cessation and a dry spell, the terrain in Laos will become so saturated by the third week in April that further movements of substantial equipment will become extremely difficult. It is probable, therefore, that any stalling by the Communists will not be carried beyond the middle of April and certainly not later than the end of April. They will have accomplished all they can by major military action.

10. The Communists will probably use the monsoon season to consolidate their positions politically in the villages. This will give them until late October or November to achieve virtual political control of Laos in the villages under their influence. Although monsoon travel is difficult it is not impossible for small teams engaged in minor guerrilla operations or subversion. Lao personnel who are anti-Communist should be trained to counter such small-scale Communist operations during the monsoon period. Our PEO [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activities should continue full tilt.

11. In view of French reluctance to support a strong SEATO resolution and to provide military support to a SEATO operation, French participation should be limited to the negotiations unless there is a marked change of heart. Including France in the negotiations and consulting President de Gaulle fully with respect to the negotiations will probably improve our relations with France and satisfy President de Gaulle.

Additional Comments:

1. Under existing circumstances it is inconceivable that the USSR will refuse to negotiate or at least to talk with the U.S., or at the UN, about the Lao situation. The Soviets could possibly use the device of continuing negotiations throughout the rainy season in order to obtain their objectives, blaming the U.S. “imperialists” for any continuing disturbances in Laos.

2. The Soviet Union in agreeing to negotiation believes that it can secure eventually what it is taking rapidly by military action. Consequently, we should consider immediately what encouragement and hard assistance might be given to Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam to strengthen their position with respect to a “neutral” Laos which will provide a bridge to their borders for Communist subversion and guerrilla operations. A “neutral” Laos may prove to be fatal very soon for South Vietnam which is already in serious trouble.

3. The Soviet Union might agree to negotiate while disclaiming any control over “Lao patriots” engaged in military action. This would face the SEATO nations with a dilemma especially if the “Lao patriots” held their guerrilla or military action at a low enough key to continue to take Laos while not being provocative enough to warrant intervention by SEATO or the U.S.

4. We should not consider taking any UN action unless the recent scale of military action is continued or enlarged and we and the SEATO nations concert in undertaking counter action. However, it would be useful to have in being various kinds of draft resolutions for use in the UN Security Council or General Assembly if we should find it necessary to act suddenly. Any UN action of this sort should follow and not precede SEATO action in order to avoid Soviet efforts to prevent SEATO action.

5. The impact of what happens in Laos over coming months on the rest of Southeast Asia depends—above all—on the success or failure of the counter-insurgency effort in Viet-nam. If we succeed in Viet-nam the erosion in Laos might, in time, be sealed off; if we fail in Viet-nam, our arrangements in Laos will surely collapse as well as our position in Thailand and the rest of southeast Asia.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 4/2/61–4/20/61. Secret. Sent under cover of a handwritten memorandum by Bundy which reads as follows: “Although dated in one or two places by Soviet answer [see footnote 2, Document 46], this look at the next steps in Laos may be useful to you. It comes from Sam Belk in my office, with revisions by Walt [Rostow] and me. It may ask for more than we can get—but not for more than we need—which of course is exactly the trouble with Laos.”
1. During Macmillan’s visit to Washington, April 4–9.