Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia²

Washington, March 12, 1961, 9:04 p.m.

805. For Moore from Secretary. Please arrange see Souvanna Phouma alone and give him following message orally from me:

“As Secretary of State of new Administration I have been much preoccupied with unhappy situation in which Lao people now find themselves. Since I know you must be similarly concerned, I am asking our representative to give you my views. President Kennedy has unequivocally declared his policy in support of genuinely neutral and independent Laos. Basis his declaration is complete absence of any selfish United States interest or ambition in that country and our deep feeling that Lao people should be allowed by others to live in peace. This has been the purpose of efforts we have made to obtain acceptance by other powers, including Soviet Union, of neutral and independent country, as well as to bring about reconciliation all patriotic elements without which Laos cannot survive.

Unfortunately, there is strong reason to believe that Communists either do not comprehend or are unwilling to accept genuine neutrality as that term has long been understood among nations. The introduction into Laos of large reinforcements of personnel from DRV and heavy Soviet arms supply are to establish such a Communist position in Laos as to enable them to subject it forcibly to their control at will. We know Your Highness as dedicated, patriotic man. We know that Your Highness has also sought to preserve independence of your country. Yet we greatly fear, quite frankly, that Communists are using your name as a facade behind which to accomplish purposes you yourself do not endorse. I have been told of the many times you have told our Ambassador that as a Royal Prince of Laos you could not possibly become a Communist or support their cause.

It has not been my privilege, since I have only recently assumed my present office, to have worked with you on these difficult problems. But I should like to give you categorical assurances that the Government of the United States has no other purpose than to allow the Lao people to work out their own destiny without being caught up in the turbulent struggles which are in course in other parts of the world. It is with this in view that I should like to make certain personal remarks which I would hope you would consider to be in the best interests of your country.

My first hope would be that you could find it possible to cooperate with others who are trying to build an independent Laos and to be a part of a government serving the King and the nation under acknowledged constitutional processes. I have been told of certain suggestions that have been made to reorganize the government which offer fruitful means for accomplishing this cooperation and which I would hope Your Highness would entertain seriously.

Alternatively, if, as reported in press from Phnom Penh, you plan to undertake a world trip and not return to Laos, I sincerely believe that you could best serve your country and establish your place in its history if you declined to accept formal responsibility for what is being attempted in your name by declaring that you do not consider that those who are bringing in heavy arms by plane and road to attack Vientiane and Luang Prabang have any right to act in the name of the Royal Lao Government. In this contingency, I can assure you that United States influence and assistance will be used in the direction of a broadly based government motivated by a sincere concern for the Lao people and for the neutrality and independence to which they are entitled.

I have taken the somewhat unusual step of this personal communication because I see other alternatives looming on the near horizon which could lead only to severe suffering and tragic violence among the people of Laos. The peoples of Southeast Asia no more than the people of Laos want a Communist-controlled Laos imposed by an armed minority with massive external support. Other nations, and also the United States, which has for years been trying to assure that the various peoples of the world be left free to work out their own destinies, do not wish to see and will not in my opinion readily permit another chapter in the long history of Communist aggression.

I do hope that you will reflect upon what I have said and do your utmost to assist in bringing this dangerous and distressing situation to an early, peaceful and satisfactory conclusion.”³

Rusk

2. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1261. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Rusk and cleared by Parsons, Anderson, and Chapman. Repeated priority to Vientiane.
3. In telegram 1186 from Phnom Penh, March 14, Charge Moore reported that he had met with Souvanna Phouma and read him a French translation of Rusk’s message. Souvanna stated that he would not return to Vientiane as a member of the Boun Oum government and he suggested that the establishment of the Neutral Nations Commission and convocation of a 14-or 13-nation Conference on Laos should be concomitant. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1461)