Office of the Historian

31. Memorandum of Conversation0

Washington, March 12, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • Situation in Laos

PARTICIPANTS

  • (See page 4)

The following are highlights of a two-hour meeting which began at 2 p.m. under the chairmanship of the Secretary:

1.
The Secretary opened the meeting by saying that recent news stories about the situation in Laos were not at all encouraging and, in fact, the situation appeared serious. There was a need to strengthen the position of the government’s troops on the ground in order to make political efforts successful. However, it appeared that, as a cover for military action, the Soviets were engaged in delaying tactics as shown by the time involved in discussing the ICC proposal and the relaxed fashion of Mr. Khrushchev’s talk with Ambassador Thompson.1 The situation was such that we must prepare for the contingency of a major Communist drive in Laos.
2.
The Secretary said we needed better and faster intelligence since the information we were getting was twelve to twenty-four hours old. The Secretary felt intelligence from Laos should be received at intervals of no less than eight hours and that every third report should be analytical; we would leave to the experts how this was to be done. [6 lines of source text not declassified]. Mr. McNamara emphasized that it was most important to have frequent appraisals of the situation.
3.
The Secretary said that if our intelligence information should indicate a strong Communist effort in Laos, we had a number of actions in mind:
a.
Early publication of a statement of warning.
b.
Consider referring the matter to the UN.
c.
Consult with the British and French as quickly as possible and with other SEATO members.
d.
If we decided to step up military action, we would do so unilaterally or through SEATO.
e.
USIA might consider a program on Communist intervention, including the preparation of a White Paper emphasizing the Soviet airlift and North Vietnamese participation.
f.

On the military side, we would review the decisions reached at the White House on March 9, each one of which was already being acted on.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

5.
In discussing the employment of the T–6 aircraft already provided the RLG, Mr. McNamara reiterated the Defense position that these aircraft should be free to bomb military targets. Mr. Parsons explained the position taken by the Ambassador and most of the members of the Country Team against the use of bombs, which was largely based on a fear of retaliation against key airports, especially Vientiane. General Lemnitzer thought that these T–6 aircraft should not be committed for bombing missions [less then 1 line of source text not declassified].
6.
The Secretary outlined his concept of three phases of action which we might have to take:
  • Phase 1 would involve the maximum acceleration of the steps authorized by the President on March 9 and the review by the military [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of these steps. The military plan prepared by CINCPAC would have to be modified to meet new circumstances.
  • Phase 2 would involve the overt commitment of outside forces, especially Asian ground forces, with U.S. logistic and air support. The Secretary raised the question of whether at this phase to move a Marine combat group into the area as a demonstration of our seriousness of purpose.
  • Phase 3 would go into operation if there were sufficiently serious escalation in Laos or in Viet-Nam as to require us to consider military action against the whole complex. How could we intervene most effectively? How would our air arm be most effectively used? The Secretary felt that there was a possible overestimation on our side since (1) we could not guarantee the steadfastness of any Lao, even Phoumi, and some of his troops were discouraged and weary; and (2) we should not count too heavily on the effectiveness of air action in this terrain. (General Lemnitzer said that air action in itself would not be sufficient and that there must be adequate forces on the ground.)
7.
In a discussion of intelligence reports, General Lemnitzer said there was nothing to indicate the imminence of the fall of Luang Prabang. The Pathet Lao who had taken the road junction were fanning out north and south but could not move any faster than the road would permit.
8.
In discussing Admiral Felt’s plan to attack the Plaine des Jarres, it was agreed that the plan would have to be changed in view of the capture of the crossroads. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]
9.
There was a brief discussion of the possibility of eliminating Souvanna as the “legal Prime Minister”, possibly by inducing him to become a Deputy Prime Minister under the King or a relative, with Boun Oum as the other Deputy Prime Minister.
10.
It was agreed that the President’s [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] authorizing the T–6’s to use bombs would be taken up with him tomorrow.

PARTICIPANTS

  • White House
    • Mr. McGeorge Bundy
  • Department of State
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Charles E. Bohlen, Special Assistant
    • Mr. J. Graham Parsons, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
    • Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs
    • Mr. Theodore C. Achilles
    • Mr. Roger Hilsman, The Director—Intelligence & Research
    • Mr. John M. Steeves, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
    • Mr. Daniel V. Anderson, Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs
  • Department of Defense
    • Mr. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
    • Mr. Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary of Defense
    • General L.L. Lemnitzer
    • General Paul J. Fontana
  • Central Intelligency Agency
    • General C.P. Cabell
    • Mr. Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
    • [1 line of source text not declassified]
  • United States Information Agency
    • Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Director
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1261. Top Secret. Drafted by Anderson and approved in S on March 29.↩
  2. March 10; see Document 27.↩