Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

27. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, March 10, 1961, 1 p.m.

2138. Laos. After commenting on President’s letter,¹ Khrushchev invited me discuss specific issues. I set forth our views on Laos (Deptel 1439²) with exception para 3 which I worked in later in discussion. I ended presentation with statement I could personally assure Khrushchev US position not manoeuvre but sincere and genuine effort arrive at secure and neutral Laos.

Khrushchev replied US Declaration on Neutral Laos appears new and differs agreeably from position US adhered to before in its attitude toward neutralist policies of individual states. As for concrete questions, he said King’s proposal, supported by US, does not seem realistic since other govts do not accept this position. He then described Boun Oum as not serious man but drunkard and libertine and added US intelligence must have already told us this.

He then described Souvanna as serious man, type like Sihanouk, and not Communist. He said they believe Souvanna govt real govt since it had been approved by Parliament and overthrown only by force from direction Thailand. He added Boun Oum govt has no legal basis since military forced King and Parliament approve it.

Khrushchev said they sympathize and support Sihanouk proposal for 14-power conference. He said that to end fighting there must be agreement between us to exercise influence on others and said mechanism could be devised along lines of “Polish-Canadian-Indian Commission.” In a word, he said, we share same desire as you, namely to end fighting which only sheds blood, gives neither you nor us anything, and hurts relations between us. We welcome, he continued, a Laos that pursues neutral policy on model of Austria. He said to achieve agreement on Austria not difficult and in case of Laos situation can be brought to beneficial end.

If another approach of aggravating military conflict was chosen, he did not know what would be end but was certain it would lead to defeat of Boun Oum. Souvanna controls two-thirds of Laos now, but not capital because it lies across river from Thailand where artillery can support Boun Oum. Souvanna has people with him because of his neutralist position and his interest in welfare of peoples. Khrushchev ended with statement Laos should pursue neutralist policy like Cambodia and Burma. He said USSR does not have nor seek any interests—territorial or economic—in Laos and US has no real interest there other than prestige.

I replied we have differences over what happened in past concerning govt and pointed out sequence events contained para 3 Reftel but did not use last two sentences that para. I said we had in mind Laotian Govt should be broadened and this would be one of main tasks of NNC to bring about.

I raised possibility King might establish govt of former ministers or one of technicians. I emphasized that so long as US and USSR each support different group in Laos, it difficult for Laotians themselves broaden their govt. I said I had no brief for Boun Oum but pointed out there are other people in his govt. I said it would be clearly impossible for us to acknowledge Souvanna as head legal govt but said we had no objection to Souvanna in broadened govt or even as head govt if others in Laos agreed. I said we should let Laotians work out their own govt and we and USSR should attempt reach agreement to support neutrality of Laos just as we did in Austria. I concluded we did not see how conference of 14 countries with different positions can arrive at settlement we both desire. This bound result in polemical discussion which would make situation more difficult.

Khrushchev agreed this question for people Laos. He said he did not know what kind govt could be established since neither Boun Oum nor Souvanna recognize each other. He said USSR, like US, exercises influence and renders assistance in Laos and it necessary try find decision.

Khrushchev said if we honestly agree on neutrality for Laos, this already step forward and perhaps conversations should be continued. He pointed out Gromyko now New York and suggested he and Secretary Rusk might continue discussion. He said he had desire achieve peace in Laos but did not see concrete way.

Khrushchev then said US would not lose if Souvanna heads govt, because he not Communist nor candidate of Communists but rather man like Sihanouk or Nehru and would not, in Khrushchev’s opinion, follow pro-Soviet policy. He added parenthetically no Communists in Laos, but perhaps sympathizers.

Referring to possibilities for creating new govt in Laos, I said Phoumi was important factor. I reiterated idea of King heading govt, of King appointing govt of technicians, or of agreement on govt headed by someone acceptable to both sides. I said we thought NNC would be helpful in forming govt and that once Laotian knew US and USSR agree, once US and USSR out of picture, they will be able work more easily together. Khrushchev said he agreed and then referred to Phoumi’s plans to see Souvanna but said he did not know on what they would agree.

Khrushchev said if we both honestly want create conditions to end fighting and have neutralist Laos, let us not reject efforts find common ground. Noting Souvanna plans trip, said maybe we should wait little while, but before I could make point he went on to say question should not be put off for long time because it would become more complicated and fighting could flare up. I replied that precisely what we concerned about. I said it would be good for Secretary and Gromyko to discuss how to solve problem. I said it would be pity if we could not arrive at solution on problem where we had same objectives.

Khrushchev said he agreed, and then, as final remark, jovially said let us accept Souvanna. I replied let us both accept Boun Oum. Khrushchev answered that we cannot agree on which is legal govt, and then asked what other subjects we might discuss.

Comment follows.³

Thompson

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1061. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 8:21 a.m.
1. Apparent reference to a letter from Kennedy to Khrushchev, February 22 (?), in which the President suggested the “use of diplomatic channels for quiet informal discussion” of outstanding issues and proposed a face-to-face meeting. (Ibid., Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 206, Kennedy/Johnson Correspondence with Khrushchev)
2. In this telegram, March 6, the Department of State instructed Thompson to express U.S. disappointment over the Soviet answer to the U.S. proposal for a neutral nations commission; to express U.S. misgivings about the Soviet proposal for a reconvocation of the 1954 Geneva Conference; to reject the Soviet contention that U.S. military support of the Phoumi-Boun Oum government caused the crisis in Laos; and to reiterate Washington’s desire for neutralization of Laos accomplished by a commission of neutral neighbors. (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/3–661)
3. In telegram 2139, March 10, Thompson reported that Khrushchev seemed convinced that the United States was “genuinely seeking” neutrality for Laos and that he was “intrigued by the possibility” of settling the problem. Thompson suggested there was a real possibility that Rusk could convince Gromyko to urge Souvanna to accept either a government of technicians headed by King Savang, a government of former prime ministers and vice prime ministers, or a government headed by a third party. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–1061) Also published in Declassified Documents, 1977, 636.