Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

33. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Rusk⁰

Washington, March 16, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Possible Visit to the United States by Souvanna Phouma

Background:

Souvanna has indicated to the press that he would be glad to visit the US during his trip if there were any indication forthcoming from the United States that he would be welcome here. Embassy Vientiane has reported (Vientiane’s 1679 of March 12)¹ that Souvanna told Ngon Sannikone that he would like very much to stop off in Washington and see the Secretary and, if possible, the President. Souvanna indicated belief that he might be able to persuade them that the Soviets would stop their airlift if the US ceased its supply of war materiel to the Phoumi forces, but he spoke bitterly of US policy in the past. Ngon said he hoped the US would invite Souvanna to visit Washington so as to soften Souvanna’s bitterness. Phoumi told the Embassy that he preferred that Souvanna stay in Phnom Penh, but that if he did start a tour then it would be a good idea for Souvanna to visit the US to make him more amenable to Western influence.

Reports from our Embassies in Phnom Penh and Vientiane, as well as Souvanna’s own statements in reply to your message,² indicate that the negotiations in Phnom Penh between Souvanna and Phoumi foundered on the issue of the nature and timing of an international conference on Laos. Although Souvanna’s initial position was that a conference should be convened prior to the formation of the NNC, he apparently retreated to the concept that the NNC could be formed simultaneously with the convening of the conference. Souvanna also seems to be pressing for fairly early elections.

Phoumi has, of course, agreed in a discussion with Souvanna, and with Cambodian Government officials, that there should be an international conference. However, at Ambassador Brown’s suggestion, Phoumi has held out for the concept that any conference should follow the work of a NNC. Ambassador Brown also told Phoumi that we would be prepared to consider a conference called for the purpose of ratifying and implementing the actions of the NNC, although we were not enthusiastic about this. (Vientiane’s 1693)³

While we have not put forward any proposal with respect to the question of elections, it is our view, and one which the RLG would undoubtedly accept, that elections should be postponed for at least a year and a half. The British have volunteered a similar view on the matter to our Embassy in London.

Discussion:

It is generally known throughout the world and, of course, in Laos that the US has considered that Souvanna is a man who is too willing to make dangerous compromises with the Communists. Moreover, the press has reported that Souvanna left Phnom Penh before concluding negotiations with the RLG representatives there; that the main issue has been disagreement on the timing of an international conference; and that Souvanna has embarked on a world tour to gain support for his position. Communist broadcasts from Peking and Hanoi in the last few days have been emphasizing that to restore peace in Laos and provide a guarantee of its neutrality an international conference should be called which “should assign concrete tasks to an international commission”. These broadcasts have also insisted that “the US imperialists and their lackeys must, first of all, withdraw their aggressive troops from Laos and must stop their military assistance to the Phoumi-Boun Oum traitor clique”. These broadcasts have also specifically stated that the NLHX “is willing to support at all times all efforts made by Souvanna in carrying out the above mentioned policy—the only correct policy”.

It is pretty clear then that, as of the moment, Souvanna is unwilling to go any further in accommodating his position to that proposed by Phoumi than is permitted by the limitations placed upon him by the publicly announced Communist policy.

If under these circumstances we were to receive Souvanna in the United States for talks with the Secretary and the President, our action would be interpreted by the Lao, as well as by other members of the international community, as indicating a serious weakness in our intentions to oppose Communist designs in Laos. This would have a further deteriorating impact on the already waning morale of the Lao Army.

On the other hand, if during Souvanna’s visits to New Delhi, Paris and London, the Indians, French and British would press upon Souvanna the importance of handling the conference question in the manner proposed by Phoumi and putting off the elections for at least a year and a half, it is possible that Souvanna might indicate a willingness to try to move beyond the limitations placed on him by the Communists toward an accommodation with Phoumi’s position. If there were good evidence that this in fact was being accomplished during Souvanna’s visits to these countries, we might then find it useful to receive Souvanna here in order to confirm our willingness to seek a solution on the basis of Phoumi’s proposals and our firm intention not to go beyond those proposals toward the Communist position in seeking a peaceful solution. Under such circumstances we could make it clear to the Lao and others that we are standing behind the RLG’s efforts to oppose Communist ascendancy and that we are only receiving Souvanna because he has manifested a willingness to move constructively toward the Phoumi position.

Recommendations:

1. That we seek British, French and Indian agreement that every effort must be made to bring Souvanna around to acceptance of the Phoumi position on the question of the conference and the timing of elections.

2. That if as a result of British, French and Indian discussions with him, it appears that there would be any possibility of our moving Souvanna in that direction, we would indicate a willingness to receive him here on an unofficial basis.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.11/3–1261. Secret. Drafted by Usher and cleared by Anderson, Chapman, and Steeves.
1. Not printed.
2. Document 32.
3. Dated March 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–1461)