Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

481. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, July 29, 1963.

Tuesday’s Laos meeting¹ is to report to you the progress made under Phase I of the three-phase Laos program (we have UK, French, Aussie OK on T–28s) and to recommend beefing up Phase I by the inclusion of some parts of Phase II.

On 19 June you directed that no Phase II steps be taken without your approval.² State and Defense now argue that certain of these steps (see State memo) really belong in Phase I, [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. In effect State/Defense propose a modest step up of Laos pressures and want your OK now so they can carry out these added actions as needed, probably in the next few weeks.

The chief issue is whether you wish to grant this authority now; some of the actions proposed (e.g. selected “offensive” use of T–28s instead of “reprisal” use, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] may go beyond the intent of Phase I, at least as seen on 19 June.

State/Defense also want you to approve in principle the remainder of the Phase II measures, i.e. those involving major US moves outside Laos or leading to overt violation of the Geneva Accords. But they undertake to get your specific approval before carrying these out. We see no problem here, since you already approved these as planning actions on 19 June.

R.W. Komer

[Attachment]

³

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

On June 19 you authorized certain steps designed gradually to increase the pressure on the Communists in Laos as a first step in a graduated program to achieve our basic goals in Laos. This is a status report on these authorized actions of Phase I and recommendations on Phase II.

With regard to Phase II, we recommend below a rearrangement of actions to provide better time phasing and control. We present further details on certain actions and recommend that you authorize now some actions subject to Department of State decision, with Department of Defense concurrence, on actual timing.

Phase I Status

Military assistance support has been authorized for the FAR, neutralist, and irregular (Meo) forces, thus enabling the Ambassador to draw on direct shipment of supplies sufficient for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the flow of heavy weapons (105 mm howitzers, 4.2 and 81 mm mortars) to the FAR/Neutralist forces has been stepped up so that shortly their supply of these will be up to their capacity for utilization. In order to give maximum flexibility to Souvanna and the FAR in military and other supply operations, we are making available twelve additional aircraft of appropriate types. Despite their initial reluctance, we gained the acquiescence of the British, French and Australians for the replacement of obsolescent T–6 aircraft, held by Phoumi, by T–28s. Three T–28s will go in immediately—the remaining three as recommended by the Embassy.

Under discussion in Laos are plans for the use of Thai artillery advisers (Lao are presently reluctant) and arrangement for training of Lao units in Thailand. Souvanna did not desire at this time direct US contact with the neutralist forces, except through periodic visits by the Army Attache, but in order to permit greater flexibility in this regard, we have increased the Attache staff by three specially selected assistants. A plan is being developed to establish a pilot “defended village” program. If this proves feasible, the program will be extended in order to give added security to other key areas. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Steps have been taken to strengthen irregular and tribal forces to consolidate the non-communist area of Laos.

Phase II

The actions included in Phase II have been regrouped under three separate categories (Tab A). Group A contains those actions which are basically an extension of Phase I, which are covert or do not involve violations of the Geneva Agreements. Group B contains those actions involving major US moves outside Laos, and Group C, those which would involve or lead to overt violations of the Agreements.

With regard to Group A actions, a concept has been prepared for guidance to the FAR forces to clear and hold important areas provided they have been successful in the efforts undertaken under Phase I. Likewise, extensive use of T–28’s has been planned to include types and locations of key targets. [1 line of source text not declassified] enlarged guerrilla activity will be dependent on progress made in the operations now being accomplished under Phase I. Advance planning and training is being undertaken to permit enlargement of these activities when possible. [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

With regard to Group B, flexible plans are in hand for both air and sea lift of US forces into Thailand. Reaction time can be from one to thirty days depending on the forces used. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Defense [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] capabilities to provide combat aircraft and pilots for use against the Pathet Lao. Plans are ready if it is decided to move additional USAF units to Thailand. This movement could be accomplished within four to twelve hours. Likewise, plans are fully prepared for employment of a carrier task force off South Viet-Nam.

With regard to Group C, preparatory planning has been done and plans are such that the actions could be initiated on relatively short notice. Details for these actions are being worked out as possible.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the actions contained in Group A and delegate to the Department of State, with Department of Defense concurrence, the authority to implement these at such time as to have maximum effect.

2. That you approve the actions in Group B and C in principle with the understanding that your specific approval for any or all of these actions would be sought when it was deemed that they should be executed.

Tab A⁴

PHASE II

Group A

Actions which are basically a continuation, expansion, or intensification of Phase I actions, and which do not violate the Geneva Agreements or which are plausibly deniable (covert):

1. Encourage selected offensive action by FAR/Neutralist forces (Extension of No. 8, Phase I).

2. Encourage selected offensive use of T–28’s and T–6’s (Extension of No. 9, Phase I).

3. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

4. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

5. Further enlarge pro-Western guerilla units in Laos and expand operations in enemy-held territory (Extension of No. 6, Phase I).

6. [3–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

7. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Group B

Actions which involve major U.S. moves outside Laos or covertly violate the Geneva Agreements:

1. Consider the re-entry into Thailand of selected U.S. combat forces.

2. [4 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Move U.S. Air Force units into Thailand.

4. Move U.S. naval carrier task force off South Vietnam.

Group C

Actions which involve or lead to overt violation of the Geneva Agreements and the introduction of U.S. forces within the Laos-North Vietnam conflict area:

1. Resume U.S. aerial reconnaissance of Laos.

2. Expand U.S. military advisory role to FAR and Neutralist forces (MAAG or supply and training mission).⁵

3. Unrestricted logistic support, on a selective basis, to the RLG (including airlift) (Extension of Nos. 1 and 2, Phase I).

4. Implement a Farmgate type operation in Laos.

5. Take selected actions against North Vietnam (overflights, high and low altitude reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam; harassment of North Vietnamese shipping).

6. Nonshooting intercept and harassment of North Vietnamese airlift, and other activities in Laos and North Vietnam.

7. Armed escort of U.S. transports in Laos.

8. Take preparatory measures for the implementation of CINCPAC OPPlan 99–64.⁶

9. Request SEATO members to prepare to deploy forces to the area.

0. Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries, Laos Security, 6/1/63–11/22/63. Top Secret.
1. See Document 482.
2. See Document 478.
3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
4. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text.
5. This action may be recommended for implementation out of phase if necessary to insure proper and adequate administration of material being introduced into Laos and to insure that adequate advisers are available in country. [Footnote in the source text.]
6. CINCPAC OPLAN 99–64 provided for overt employment of U.S. forces in military operations designed to stabilize the situation in Laos and South Vietnam.