Office of the Historian

482. Memorandum for the Record0

Washington, July 30, 1963.

PARTICIPANTS

  • The White House
    • The President
    • McG. Bundy
    • R.W. Komer
  • Department of State
    • Secretary Rusk
    • Mr. Harriman
    • Mr. Hilsman
    • Mr. Henry Koren
  • Department of Defense
    • Secretary McNamara
    • Mr. Gilpatric
    • General Taylor
    • Mr. William Bundy
  • CIA
    • Mr. McCone
    • Wm. E. Colby

Meeting with the President on Laos Planning, 30 July 1963

Hilsman opened by describing the purpose of the meeting. Phase I measures approved by the President on 19 June1 seemed to be going forward without any hitch. [2–1/2 lines of source text not declassified] There might be similar problems in Phase II,2 but we were trying to work them out. We were also trying to get the tribal forces to take control of certain areas of “no man’s land.” The British, French, and Australians seemed to be in sympathy with our general proposals. Hilsman then described the proposed regrouping of Phase II actions, and requested approval of those which were in effect an extension of Phase I.

There ensued some discussion of T–28s. It was pointed out that the T–28 was the next generation beyond the T–6 but was essentially not much different. The President wondered whether we were doing more now than we had in 1961 when six T–6s were used. McNamara didn’t think the T–28s would accomplish much more militarily. Hilsman pointed out, however, that they were now authorized to use bombs and that our MA credited them with the deterring of an attack on Attopeu recently. When he had raised the T–28 matter, the French had some reservations over giving Phoumi too much of an independent capability of violating the Geneva Accords. But Hilsman felt they had been satisfied by our explanations.

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He then summed up the Laos situation as being “relatively quiet”; discussions were going forward about further negotiations to form a government. The President wondered whether any of the proposed actions would disturb this quiet. Hilsman responded that this was why State wanted standby authority for the new series of moves, e.g. they could time each of them precisely in terms of the total situation. In response to a Rusk query, Hilsman said we would discuss most of these moves with the UK first. McCone saw bad weather as a major reason for the lull in Laos; he thought it might erupt again later. Hilsman agreed, granting that our Phase I measures had not had time to take effect as yet so we could not argue they had led to quieting down the situation.

The President indicated that: (1) he had no objection to the seven measures proposed; (2) planning could proceed on the other Phase II measures on the understanding, spelled out in the memorandum to him, that his specific approval would be requested for the latter.

R.W. Komer3
  1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by Komer.↩
  2. See Document 478.↩
  3. See attachment and Tab A to Document 481.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩