480. Memorandum of Conversation0
SUBJECT
- Laos
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Ambassador Leonard Unger
- Mr. Forrestal
The President asked about the influence the Russians still have on the situation in Laos, and I replied that, on the basis of recent experience in Vientiane, they had very little. It was agreed nonetheless that the Russians should be continually reminded of their undertaking with regard to a neutral Laos and the Geneva Agreements.
The President inquired whether Prince Souvanna Phouma has become disheartened, and I said, on the contrary, I found him surprisingly committed to the present tasks which he must undertake in Laos today. I referred, in this connection, to the phased program which has recently been developed for Laos in the executive branch in order to deter further communist encroachment, and I suggested that in putting this program into action we must be careful to make clear at the same time that we are continuing to follow our political line of support for Prince Souvanna Phouma and a neutral Laos. Increased emphasis on military action may tempt people here in Washington, as well as General Phoumi in Laos, to assume a return to the relationships of several years ago and the seeking of a military solution. The President agreed that we must maintain our political line.
Mr. Forrestal and I referred to reports of some resumption of hostile action by the PL on the PDJ in the last several days, and in this connection I referred to the desirability of introducing T–28s as a signal to the PL that we mean business. I pointed out at the same time that these T–28s should not be used until it was clear that the military situation so required, and that in any case they should not be used in such a way to extend the area or scope of fighting.
I also mentioned to the President the possibility that we might have to depart from our policy established a year ago of avoiding support to a given rate of exchange. The resumption of military activity, the impossibility of demobilization and further budget reduction have led to economic [Page 1036] deterioration which will probably have to be stemmed by special means. In this connection I expressed the hope that we could make a strong try at securing French help with a stabilization fund or whatever other measures were required. The President was rather pessimistic of securing French help but agreed fully that we should make a strong try to get it.
The President also inquired about Kong Le, whether he was going out of the picture and what he represents in Laos.
Mr. Forrestal, in connection with the question about the Russian role in Laos, raised the question as to whether Souvanna should not seek aircraft from them or, on a more modest scale, seek spare parts etc., for the equipment which the Russians earlier provided to Souvanna’s forces. Mention was also made of the new situation that may develop as a result of the clarification of the Soviet-Chinese ideological split; whereas large-scale military action on the part of the communists has not seemed likely heretofore, it was considered possible that the Chinese might decide to resort to this to show their strength and independence.
At the conclusion of our conversation the President offered to write to Prince Souvanna Phouma a letter of encouragement if this seemed useful, and it was agreed that such a letter would be prepared and picked up by me on my return to Washington in August to carry back to the Prince.1 I took leave of the President after explaining that I expected to be in the United States until about August 10 or 12.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 Laos. Secret. Drafted by Unger and cleared by Forrestal on July 19. According to Kennedy’s appointment book, the meeting was held at the White House and lasted until 11:15 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)↩
- The letter, August 12, was taken by Unger to Vientiane and presented to Souvanna on August 16. (Telegram 257 from Vientiane, August 16; Department of State, Central Files, POL 15–1 Laos)↩