Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

479. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for Director of Central Intelligence McCone⁰

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Operational Planning On Laos—Presidential Meeting 19 June 1963

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary of Defense McNamara
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Bundy
• Mr. John A. McCone
• Governor Averell Harriman
• General W.F. McKee
• General Lucius Clay
• Assistant Secretary of State, Hilsman
• Mr. Michael Forrestal
• Mr. William Colby

1. The President opened the meeting by expressing his doubt as to the desirability of Phase III strikes against North Vietnam, particularly air strikes, commenting that he wondered how much damage these would cause and if they would not immediately involve the Chinese. He expressed the belief that the threat of such strikes is influential with the DRV, but that the actual strikes might be less significant. General McKee stated that the strikes planned would cause real damage in North Vietnam.

2. Governor Harriman then pointed out that it was hoped to receive Presidential approval only to proceed with Phase I, plan for Phase II and give consideration to the possibility of going toward Phase III in the future. The President then asked what tricky items were in Phase I. Governor Harriman pointed out that very few were tricky and that this Phase would not be much more than a step-up of current activities and a stretching of the Geneva Agreements. The Director commented that certain of the covert CIA actions would be outside the Agreements and that the word covert is relevant, as the actions taken would immediately be known and suspicions at least exist of our involvement. Mr. Hilsman suggested that a better word might be “disavowable”. Governor Harriman pointed out that most of the Phase I efforts operate under the request of Souvanna Phouma and that we do not believe we are bound to look to his authority under the Troika concept before honoring these requests.

3. The Secretary of Defense then pointed out the time lag in building up the actions of Phase I, and suggested that this would permit time for future planning and consideration of steps beyond it. The President was advised, in answer to his question, that the rainy season would have little effect on the situation. The Secretary of Defense then reported Admiral Felt’s belief that the situation in Laos was “rapidly” deteriorating. Both the Secretary of Defense and the Director commented that we do not have evidence of a rapid deterioration, but rather of a continuous nibbling action.

4. The President then asked what the French attitude was. Governor Harriman referred to recent indications that the French attitude was somewhat better and were encouraging Kong Le to recruit additional elements and are giving Kong Le more positive military advice. He referred, however, to the reluctance of both Kong Le and Phoumi to accept a close relationship with the French. He commented that the Russian attitude was somewhat better but their will and ability to bring about a real cease-fire by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese is doubtful but on the other hand they are respecting the Agreements themselves.

5. The President then decided that he wished the subject of the steadily if not rapidly deteriorating situation to be raised with the French and the British and that we ask them what they believe should be done. Only after we could receive some indications of their views should we expose our thinking on what should be done along the Phase I or Phase II directions. The President stated that he wished the French to be thoroughly involved and consulted at the outset so that they could not later be in a position of saying that the U.S. had unilaterally messed up Laos.

6. The Director pointed out the phrase in the SNIE (page 8)¹ that the credibility of U.S. intentions would be affected by the absence of U.S. ground forces in adjacent areas, e. g. Thailand, as an important element of the picture. The Secretary of Defense stated that DOD wished to change the course of action No. 5 in Phase II (to consider the retention of U.S. forces currently in Thailand) to permit the withdrawal of these forces but later reinserting them. The Secretary commented that the credibility point could better be shown by the insertion of additional troops.

7. The Secretary of Defense asked whether Sarit should be consulted. The President’s reaction was to suspend this in the sense of a general consultation as his reactions are fairly predictable and he would essentially press us to act to the full limit of U.S. involvement in Laos. The President did not wish to go to this degree with Sarit but agreed it would be necessary to ask him about various specific aspects of Phases I and II, but should not do this as an overall approach, including the Phases.

8. Mr. Forrestal asked whether the agencies involved could be instructed to commence planning on Phases II and III. The President commented that we are not likely to receive Congressional or public support of U.S. intervention in Laos and we should not kid ourselves about this too much. He thus said we should not engage in full blown planning pending the consultation with the French and British mentioned above. He also commented that the SEATO powers would have to be consulted, but that this should also be suspended until the French could be involved.

Addendum:²

The statement credited to Governor Harriman at the bottom of Page 1 and top of Page 2 is not accurate as I recall it. In response to McCone’s statement that certain activities in Phase I would be undertaken by CIA and involved either stretching or violating the Geneva Accords, Harriman responded that any such activities are approved by Souvanna Phouma. It was not obligatory upon us to go past his authority to determine the Geneva Accords. We can defend our actions on the basis that they were requested by Souvanna Phouma and thus avoid the actual wording of the Geneva Accords.

With reference to numbered paragraph 3, McCone said that the Board of National Estimates appraisal of the situation did not entirely confirm Admiral Felt’s statement that the situation was deteriorating rapidly. I pointed out that while resistance was offered by the FAR Royalist forces as was the case in Attopeu, the attacks by the Pathet Lao seemed to have quieted down. SecDef confirmed this.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-McCone Files, [text not declassified]. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent via the Deputy Director (Plans). The source text is unsigned, but was probably prepared by William Colby.
1. SNIE 58–63, “Communist Reactions to US Actions Taken With Regard to Laos”; see footnote 2, Document 477.
2. Prepared by McCone.