Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXIV, Laos Crisis

394. Memorandum From Michael V. Forrestal of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)⁰

Washington, June 11, 1962.

SUBJECT

• Laos Planning

Events of the last few days have put our Laos planning in a somewhat difficult posture. As Averell points out, we are just entering the most difficult period of all, namely the care and feeding of the Souvanna Government. It is precisely at this time that our attitude, both in terms of military force and economic aid, be maintained and used with the utmost subtlety and flexibility.

The three Princes have finally agreed upon a Cabinet.¹ It is not ideal from our point of view, nor is it as good as Averell thinks we could have gotten six months ago. The two most unpalatable points are Quinim Pholsena as Foreign Minister and Souphanouvong as Minister of Information. The Foreign Ministry, however, is also subject to the troika principle, and Souphanouvong in Information is somewhat balanced by having a Phoumi man in Education.

The next steps are the presentation of the Cabinet list to the King, and the convening of the National Assembly to grant full powers to the King, who will then appoint the new government. It is hoped that this will be done before Souvanna’s return to Paris, but such a hope is optimistic.

After these steps have been taken, the Geneva Conference will get back into gear. A few points remain to be ironed out in Geneva. Among them are an agreement on the prohibition against “private armies” and the physical resources to be made available to the ICC. Both are important points, and it is presently contemplated that Averell and Bill Sullivan will carry on negotiations. The Geneva Conference must also approve the Souvanna Government. This will involve getting Marshal Sarit’s acquiescence, which may not be easy.² Young is being instructed to impress upon Sarit the importance of his going along, because if he doesn’t, the North Vietnamese will not go along.³

Averell wants to give Phoumi the June installment of U.S. aid (of $3 million) promptly. I have suggested that this be done in such a way that we maintain some control over these dollars, at least, and State is trying to work this out. I think the President ought to function on this question, and I concur in Averell’s recommendation that we should give the RLG what may be our last payment to it.

We then have the problem of devising ways and means of supporting Souvanna and the right-wing elements in the new Government. This will be very tricky, and Averell has established an interdepartmental group including Defense, AID and ICA to work on these problems.

In the meantime, the State Department hopes that the military will continue their planning for unfortunate contingencies; and it is in this light that the President’s meeting on Wednesday will take place.⁴

The basic disagreement between State and Defense continues, Defense feeling basically that the very large cost of any military intervention in Laos cannot be justified as a political matter, and State (particularly Averell) feeling that it is most important to have the Communists believe that should they attempt to overturn the Souvanna Government or otherwise sabotage the Geneva Conference, we would have the will and the ability to move in at least to the areas presently controlled by the RLG. Averell makes the point that we can always decide to withdraw if the Communist reaction becomes too great. The political cost of such a withdrawal is not as great, he feels, as the political cost of keeping a much greater U.S. force permanently in Thailand and South Vietnam. His basic thesis is that it would be politically disastrous for our position in Southeast Asia if Thailand, Cambodia and South Vietnam felt themselves dangerously threatened by a Communist take over of all of Laos.

Under these circumstances, the best result of the President’s meeting with State and Defense on Wednesday would be a decision merely to continue planning for all the unpleasant contingencies in Laos, but specifically to plan carefully for the limited intervention proposed by State. The President should also ask Defense whether there are any deployments which should be programmed or undertaken during the next few weeks to put our military forces in a position to execute quickly the limited intervention proposed by State, the objective of which would be to preserve the Geneva Agreements and the neutrality of Laos. The whole purpose of the planning would be to give the President the opportunity to react quickly and effectively in the event of an aggressive Communist move and also to signal to the enemy that we are not kissing goodbye to Laos.

Mike

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Laos: General, 6/6/62–6/12/62. Top Secret.
1. On June 11, the Embassy reported that the three Princes had agreed on a cabinet slate that afternoon. The following positions were apportioned to the following Xieng Khouang neutralists: Souvanna Phouma—Premier, Defense, Veterans, Social Action; Pheng Phongsavan—Interior, Social Welfare; Quinim Pholsena—Foreign Affairs; Khamsouk Keola—Health; Tiao Sisoumang—Post, Telegraphs and Telephones; Gen. Heuan Mongkhonvilay—Secretary of State (hereafter S/S) Veterans Affairs; and Khampheng Boupa—S/S Social Action. Vientiane neutralists were as follows: Bounthan Songvilay—Cults; Khoun One Vorang—Justice; Ngon Sananikone—Public Works; and Keo Viprakone—S/S Social Welfare. Royal Lao Government: Phoumi Nosavan—Finance and Vice Premier; Leuam Insisiengmay—Education, Fine Arts, Sports, and Youth; Phouangphet Phanareth—S/S Finance; and Bouthong Voravong—S/S Sports, and Youth. The Pathet Lao were as follows: Souphanouvong—Economy and Plan, Vice Premier; Phoumi Vongvichit—Information and Tourism; Kampheuane—S/S Economy; and Tiao Souk Vongsak—S/S Public Works. (Telegram 1696 from Vientiane, June 11; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/6–1162)
2. In a meeting with visiting CIA Director McCone and Young, Sarit and Thanat expressed alarm at the proposed appointment of Quinim Pholsena as Foreign Minister, whom they viewed as a “dangerous man.” (Telegram 1967 from Bangkok, June 11; ibid.)
3. In telegrams 1977 and 1980 to Bangkok, both June 13. (Ibid., 751J.00/6–1362) See also Document 399.
4. June 13; see Document 398.