Office of the Historian

38. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos0

Washington, March 21, 1961, 11:01 p.m.

992. 1. At White House meeting1 following was decided:

a.
Objective remains to reach political settlement.
b.
We shall pursue courses of action both political and military.
c.
Political—We shall seek British cooperation to tell Soviets that if PL offensive stopped and de facto cessation of hostilities can be achieved, we willing to agree to meeting of ICC and holding 14-nation conference.
d.
Military—We should pursue courses of action already in train to meet all eventualities.
e.
We should prepare RLG and King appeal to SEATO and in event PL offensive did not stop, we persuade RLG to make an appeal. We would expect SEATO to respond by bringing forth a SEATO force into Thailand for possible move to Laos if it became necessary. Preliminary phase to Thailand following political action outlined above should facilitate SEATO unity (hitherto lacking).

2. You should immediately consult King and Phoumi to describe to them above proposed line of action. You should make clear to them that while we moving on political front to seek peaceful settlement, we remain firmly determined to do what is necessary to preserve independence of Laos and there should be no let-down in military effort. It particularly important at present time when this major test of PL and Soviet intentions is being made that King and Phoumi rally morale FAL and Government to be prepared for next phase, political or military, either of which will require maximum effectiveness Lao effort. FYI. RLG should not of course launch SEATO appeal until agreed time. End FYI.

3. You should urge on King to remain in Vientiane as we would hope to consult closely with him on development of events. FYI In view uncertainty military situation we would prefer he remain there than Luang Prabang. As added argument you might tell him that in our view he symbol of country’s unity and independence. Therefore considering difficult times country is experiencing it seems to us that his continuing presence in Vientiane should have beneficial effect of upholding morale and prestige of population and RLG. End FYI.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2161. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Parsons, cleared by Usher, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and priority to Bangkok.↩
  2. See Document 36.↩