37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India0
2579. New Delhi for Ambassador Harriman. Deptel 2566.1
If still feasible you should request Nehru to arrange meeting with Prince Souvanna Phouma not as Prime Minister but as former Prime [Page 97] Minister and prominent Lao. If meeting arranged you should talk to Souvanna2 along following lines:
Situation in Laos was one of most pressing international problems confronting new administration when it took office. After reviewing situation, administration determined that it remained policy of US to support independence and integrity of Laos. It is view of US that Laos should be at peace and recognized as neutralized state unaligned in its international relations, and free to exercise its sovereign right to manage its own affairs and to provide for its national integrity.
It also remains policy of US to try to find peaceful settlement which would ensure these objectives. For this reason US has continued to consider with great interest various proposals that have been made for such settlement. One of these was proposal to call international conference made by Sihanouk and supported by Souvanna.
After careful study of all these proposals, it appeared to US that declaration issued by King of Laos on February 19 offered sound basis for peaceful settlement. It incorporated ideas suggested by Sihanouk and by Government of Burma. It proposed to bring into Laos representatives of nations which have clear interest in preservation of independence of countries of area and yet which are unaligned. It offered guarantees to all neighbors of Laos that it would not be used as base of aggression. To Lao themselves it offered assurances that they could work out their internal differences free from international pressures and intervention. US is prepared to support such settlement which it considers equitable and in consonance with best interests of Laos. For its part and as token of its willingness to work toward truly neutral Laos, US would be prepared to have its military assistance screened by proposed Neutral Nations Commission (NNC) and to examine with other donor states channeling of economic and technical aid through international mechanism.
US has never been opposed to international conference in principle but has had misgivings because there is yet no known mutually acceptable basis for settlement. US has feared that conference held under these circumstances might permit continuation of Communist intervention aimed at capture of country, lead to public exchange of recriminations, which far from bringing about tranquilization of situation might result in heightening international tensions, and possibly fail. Such failure [Page 98] would make likelihood enlargement of conflict greater. Furthermore even if it could come to grips with problem, US seriously wonders whether international conference would produce better settlement than one proposed by King. Indeed it might be worse.
US also shares Souvanna’s desire to end fratricidal struggle in Laos. For this reason we are seeking to have Soviets call a cessation of hostilities. If a de facto cease-fire can be achieved within few days, we prepared agree to meeting of International Control Commission (ICC) and holding 14-nation conference. If however Communists do not halt their offensive, we shall consider other measures. In US eyes however essential step is reconciliation non-Communist elements to bring forth widely representative RLG. It has been a constant of US policy as Souvanna knows to encourage unity of patriotic elements in Laos for US believes only on basis such unity can Laos confront united party supported by bloc. Thus US considered Phnom Penh talks between Souvanna and General Phoumi as constructive step and regrets that Souvanna’s departure has prevented their being pursued further. US hopes that Souvanna would return to Phnom Penh and talks resumed ASAP. US also hopes that Soviet airlift can stop or that at very least Souvanna will dissociate himself from Communist build-up which threatening very life of country.
In endeavor to save Laos, US is convinced that Souvanna deeply imbued with patriotic desire of freedom of his country from foreign domination from either side which is all US itself desires and that he will recognize real dangers to his country. US is convinced that Souvanna has essential role to play in helping save his country.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/3–2161. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Chapman, cleared with SEA and in draft by Parsons, and approved by Rusk. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Rangoon, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane.↩
- In telegram 2566, March 20, the Department told Harriman the President wanted him to make contact with Souvanna Phouma through Nehru and that guidelines for the talk would follow. (Ibid., 751J.00/3–2061)↩
- Harriman saw Souvanna Phouma in New Delhi and had a conversation with him, but because of a delay in communications, Harriman did not receive telegram 2566 until after Souvanna left for Paris. Therefore, the Department cabled identical instructions to Ambassador James Gavin in Paris to present to Souvanna on his arrival. (Telegram 1063 to Manila, Bowles to Rusk, March 24; ibid., 751J.00/3–2461) Harriman’s discussion with Souvanna in New Delhi is in a memorandum of conversation, March 22. (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Subject File, SEA)↩